...Hamilton also. He gives for the Law of Excluded Middle : Of contradictory attributions, we can affirm only one of a thing ; and if- one be explicitly affirmed, the other is implicitly denied." This is the compound ; the latter member is the principle of contradiction. His subsequent exposition,...

...principles. The law of excluded middle is commonly stated thus, "A thing must either be or not be," — "A either is or is not,'' — " A either is, or is not, B." These expressions are ambiguous. They may mean simply, "A thing must either be or not be," that is,...

...principles. The law of excluded middle is commonly stated thus, "A thing must either be or not be,"—"A either is or is not,"— " A either is, or is not, B." These expressions are ambiguous. They may mean simply, "A thing must either be or not be," that is,...

...question understood in the same sense (Ueberweg) ; Of contradictory attributions we can only affirm the one of a thing, and if one be explicitly affirmed the other is denied (Hamilton). Mill again asserts a corresponding postulate of expression : "It is allowable to...

...contradictions, enounces that condition of thought which compels us, of two repugnant notions which cannot both coexist, to think either the one or the other...A either is, or is not. A either is or is not B." " (4) The thinking of an object as actually characterized by positive or negative attributes, is not...

...compels us to think that of two repugnant notions that cannot both coexist, one or the other does exist. "Of contradictory attributions we can only affirm...denied. A either is or is not. A either is or is not B." l A centaur either is or is not. Socrates either is or is not guilty. From our present point of view...

...other of them must exist. It has been thus expressed: "Of contradictory attributions we can affirm only one of a thing; and if one be explicitly affirmed,...denied. A either is or is not. A either is or is not B." Either there are mermaids or there are not mermaids. There is no intermediate state. John Smith cannot...

...principle " enounces that condition of thought which compels us, of two repugnant notions, which cannot both coexist, to think either the one or the other as existing." Take, for instance, the disjunctive judgment. " Either A. is or is not B." This proposition compasses...

...Conditioned affords the most striking illustration of this. As a logician he very properly maintains that, of contradictory attributions, we can only affirm one of a thing ; and that if one be explicitly affirmed, the other is implicitly denied. By the laws of identity and contradiction...