...essentially identical. Consider the circularity evident in Berkeley's definition of generality : " an idea, which considered in itself is particular,...stand for all other particular ideas of the same sort" (PHK Intro. §12). How in the first place does one know they are "particular ideas of the same sort"!...

...to call nothing (else) "the same thing." And even if you say, with Berkeley, that "an idea [or word] which considered in itself is particular, becomes...stand for all other particular ideas of the same sort" (Principles), Introduction) you still haven't explained how this word gets used for these various "particulars,"...

...means no more by this than Berkeley who says in paragraph 12 of the Introduction to the Principles that "an idea, which considered in itself is particular,...or stand for all other particular ideas of the same sort."32 In any event, the point that there cannot be general ideas has been drummed home for generations...

...Knowledge: 'Now, if we annex a meaning to our words, and speak only of what we can conceive, I believe we shall acknowledge that an idea which, considered...by being made to represent or stand for all other particulars of the same sort' (sect. 12). What Berkeley does not seem to have realized, or to have...

...ideas: "Now if we will annex a meaning to our words, and speak only of what we can conceive, I believe we shall acknowledge that an idea which considered...for all other particular ideas of the same sort." 36 In the same vein, Hume says that "a particular idea becomes general by being annexed to a general...

...for a class of particulars by signifying 'an idea, which considered in itself is particular, [but] becomes general, by being made to represent or stand for all other particular ideas of the same sort' (1710: Introduction 12). There is no need to assume that a single abstract idea is signified by each...

...though he denies abstract general ideas he does not intend to deny general ideas absolutely? His view is that 'an idea, which considered in itself is particular,...or stand for all other particular ideas of the same sort'.2 Thus universality does not consist 'in the absolute, positive nature or conception of anything,...

...can be understood by considering "how ideas become general," that is to say in the following way: ... an idea, which considered in itself is particular,...stand for all other particular ideas of the same sort. (PHK Intro., #l2) A word, too, we must infer, becomes general by being made to stand for other ideas...

...stands for all other particular sensible figures of the same sort. Thus "An idea, which considered itself is particular becomes general by being made...for all other particular ideas of the same sort." (Sec. 12 of Introduction to Principles). II. Universality may be considered not to belong to things...

...particular ideas. As for what a general idea is, Berkeley says: "an idea, which considered in it self is particular, becomes general, by being made to represent...stand for all other particular ideas of the same sort" (PHK, Introduction §12). Hume's view is similar, although the details of how one idea comes to represent...