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against the effect, or be perpetually employed, in palliating or diverting its malignity. According to our different apprehension of the cause, the remedy applied will be different, and the event more or less successful.

It must be remembered that man is a complex being, and by nature constituted with a variety of passions, appetites, powers, propensities, and susceptibilites; with external senses, and an internal discernment adapted to the perception of objects physical and moral. Some of these have a more immediate relation to his individual being and happiness, yet so as not to be opposed to society; while others relate more immediately to society, yet not to the exclusion of self. He was not made for independence, but for mutual connexion, mutual dependence; and to this every thing in his nature is more or less relative.

On the right discernment of moral relations, either singly, or in their various combinations, arising from various objects, situations, and circumstances, depends the justness of his moral perceptions; on a full and right comprehension of the result, depends the knowledge of his duty. He is from the constitution of his nature, capable of impressions from an infinite variety of objects external and internal; for the operations and affections of the mind by reflection become objects, and again have their impressions. These impressions give an equal variety to the modifications of his passions, appetites, powers, and faculties. The result of all these constitutes the temper, disposition, and character of the man; and from the various modification arises, in a principal degree, the various influence of motives. Were man left in this situation he would be the sport of blind impulses ; there is evidently a necessity for a balance, as well as some arbiter of moral action. Reason, by which he combines, compares, distinguishes, and marks the result, has been considered by many, if not most of our ethical writers, as being to man the balance of his moral powers and the arbiter of his actions. I think this is not the office of reason. Reason is the hand that adjusts the balance, extends and limits it, rather than the balance itself. Let it be observed, that reason is here used, not for simple intellect or intelligence, but for ratiocination or the power of reasoning. However nice and metaphyisical these distinctions may appear, they lead to some important consequences in the moral economy of man.

What then, it will be asked, is to man the arbiter of his actions? what the balance of his moral powers? I answer, the moral sense or conscience, as explained in the preceding chapter, is, in all cases, the arbiter of moral action. Reason is an advocate to argue, compare, and inform; but to conscience or the moral sense, is left the ultimate decision. I believe every one will be capable of perceiving this distinction. The remaining part of the subject is, indeed, a little more intricate; but I hope to make it intelligible to all, who will attend to what passes in their own minds.

We have seen that man is a being constituted with a great variety of powers, faculties, passions, and appetites; that these, from the various impressions to which the mind is subjected, are capable of an almost endless variety of modifications and combinations, which furnish to motives different directions, and different degrees of force. To a being thus constituted, some balance, to prevent the utmost capriciousness of conduct, and give him a command of choice in his actions, some constant regulator is necessary. A little attention to those faculties, that constitute the reasoning powers, to their operation, to the manner in which they are affected, influenced, and biassed by impulses internal and external, will discover that reason, instead of being qualified to serve as a regulator, has itself need of a balance, some steady principle for its regulation. Nature, always equal to her wants, has provided such a principle. This, in addition to the moral sense, is found in that sense of accountability, which is common to man. The sense of accountability has already been investigated and explained; but it will be here necessary to examine it with a little more attention, and that we may have at once, an entire view of the subject, to repeat some things that have been said before.

The principle of accountability having its immediate origin in the sentiment of approbation and disapprobation, of which a man is conscious in regard to his own actions, it will be necessary to keep in view, as well the faculty, by which we discern moral relations, and the moral quality of actions, as the sense of desert which accompanies that consciousness. Man, as before observed, has a passion, a desire, an appetite call it by what name you please, for the approbation of others;

censure.

and he extends it to all intelligent beings, whom he conceives to be, in any way conusant of his actions, (and its force is increased or diminished according to the relation in which he considers himself placed, in respect to those beings.) When he perceives that his actions are morally right, he is conscious that he deserves their approbation; on the contrary, if he has done wrong, he is conscious that he is deserving of their He is conscious to himself of a feeling of approbation and disapprobation of the conduct of others, as he views it to be right or wrong. Judging from his own feelings, and the expressions he observes in others, he justly expects to find the same sentiments in all; and thus, as before expressed, he finds himself bound to his duty by a three-fold cord of accountability-to God, to his own conscience, and to his fellow men. The sense of accountability constantly operating with the moral sense, though not exempt from the imperfections incident to the nature of man, constitutes the balance of his moral powers, and a steady principle for the regulation of his actions. Reason, by comparing circumstances, marking the result, and detecting the impositions, to which, not only the external sense, but the internal faculties, are more or less liable, is qualified to adjust the balance. Here we may again observe, that neither the moral sense, nor the sense of accountability is given in perfection to man; they are but plants in the germ, the growth and improvement of which can be expected, only from a proper cultivation. I cannot but flatter myself, that the distinctions I have endeavored to make, are intelligible, and the principles clearly established. By the assistance of these principles, we shall be able to throw some light on the question, respecting so universal an abuse of power.

The correctness of a man's conduct will depend, principally, on a just discernment of moral relations, a clear perception of what, in his situation, is right or wrong, in moral action; on the means of information, the strength and impartiality of his reason, and a just sense of accountability, to God, to his conscience, and to his fellow men. In proportion as there is a

*Note.

deficiency in one or all of these, he will be liable to a deviation from right, and every deviation, by changing the force of habit to the weaker side, will strengthen and confirm the bias. He, therefore, who in life and action would persevere in a course of virtue, must beware, how he indulges any deception on his moral discernment, any bias upon his reason or any relaxation of his sense of accountability. Free a man from his sense of accountability only, he is left to the dominion of his passions and appetites, and driven precipitately into vice; it is like detaching the balance of a watch in motion.

That branch of the sense of accountability by which a man perceives that his actions are of right, subjected to the praise or censure of his fellow men, is not least efficacious in preserving the balance of his moral powers; yet his sense of accountability to them may become extinct, from the situation merely, in which he may be placed. Place him, in a situation to consider himself either above or below the regard of his fellow men, he will no longer feel himself accountable to them for his conduct. He, who in such a situation, can maintain the guard of his virtue, and successfully resist the solicitations of his passions and appetites, the covert approaches, and the open attacks of vice, must be something more than human. Such is the original adjustment of the moral constitution of man, its parts, connexions, and dependencies, mutually supporting and supported, that not a pin can be loosened, without endangering a derangement of the whole structure.

That political situation which places a man in any degree of independence on those, over whom he exercises a power, in the same degree cherishes the emotions of pride, and transforms that which before was only a contempt of what is low, mean and unworthy of the man, into haughtiness, under the name of grandeur. It engenders a contempt for men, and extinguishes those sentiments which ought to subject his conduct to their approbation or censure, according to his desert. Such has been more or less the situation of all hereditary monarchs on the globe; of all aristocrats and aristocratical bodies; of all men in authority; who have had, or have conceived themselves to have the ability to continue their authority independent of those, over whom it was exercised; in a word such is the

situation of all who hold their power in contempt of the people, they govern. A situation not indulged to man by the laws of his nature, and which providence has often, though hitherto with little effect, warned him, by the pernicious The consequences, not to intrust to any one of the race. wonder is not that men, in such a situation, should have been guilty of so many vices, but that they should have exhibited even a few virtues; how few have been those virtues, could we strip the actions of princes and nobles of the false glare of character, we should learn from every page of their history.

Instances of constant and flagrant abuse of power, by men thus situated, demonstrably prove that it is dangerous to exceed the limits of our nature, to step beyond the limits of its laws, but they prove no original malignity in man. In a different situation within the limits assigned, by the laws of human nature, men have administered the powers of government, with the greatest abilities and the most exalted virtues, for the sole good of the community. May we not instance more than one, may we not instance many examples in these United States? In situations in which rulers have held themselves fully accountable to the general sentiments of the people for the exercise of the powers, with which they were intrusted, they have conducted with as much integrity and virtue as have been exhibited in the more private scenes of life. It must be allowed that few such situations have been devised by political wisdom.

When any people are capable of forming a constitution of government, on natural principles, and establishing a power of administration within the limits of those principles, they will be able to secure themselves from the danger of all exorbitant abuses. Care must always be taken, that the ruler shall feel in a proper degree, his responsibility to the people, for his public conduct, and to provide, that he shall administer, not his own powers, but the powers of government intrusted to him as a sacred deposit.

If, then, the observations here made, upon this subject are just, and the reasoning correct, we may say, whatever human institutions have done, nature has not disqualified man for any of the functions of civil government.

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