would not be generally discovered by its effects to be in force, during the term for which it was contracted. I place considerable reliance on the weight men of candor will give to this remark, because I believe it to be true, and little short of undeniable. When the panic dread of the treaty shall cease, as it certainly must, it will be seen through another medium. Those, who shall make search into the articles for the cause of their alarms, will be so far from finding stipulations that will operate fatally, they will discover few of them that will have any lasting operation at all. Those, which relate to the disputes between the two countries, will spend their force upon the subjects in dispute, and extinguish them. The commercial articles are more of a nature to confirm the existing state of things, than to change it. The treaty alarm was purely an address to the imagination and prejudices of the citizens, and not on that account the less formidable. Objections that proceed upon error, in fact or calculation, may be traced and exposed; but such as are drawn from the imagination or addressed to it, elude definition, and return to domineer over the mind, after having been banished from it by truth.

I will not so far abuse the momentary strength that is lent to me by the zeal of the occasion, as to enlarge upon the commercial operation of the treaty. I proceed to the second proposition, which I have stated as indispensably requisite to a refusal of the performance of a treaty will the state of public opinion justify the deed?

No government, not even a despotism, will break its faith without some pretext, and it must be plausible, it must be such as will carry the public opinion along with it. Reasons of policy, if not of morality, dissuade even Turkey and Algiers from breaches of treaty in mere wantonness of perfidy, in open contempt of the reproaches of their subjects. Surely, a popular government will not proceed more arbitrarily, as it is more free; nor with less shame or scruple in proportion as it

has better morals. It will not proceed against the faith of treaties at all, unless the strong and decided sense of the nation shall pronounce, not simply that the treaty is not advantageous, but that it ought to be broken and annulled. Such a plain manifestation of the sense of the citizens is indispensably requisite; first, because if the popular apprehensions be not an infallible criterion of the disadvantages of the instrument, their acquiescence in the operation of it is an irrefragable proof, that the extreme case does not exist, which alone could justify our setting it aside.

In the next place, this approving opinion of the citizens is requisite, as the best preventive of the ill consequences of a measure always so delicate, and often so hazardous. Individuals would, in that case at least, attempt to repel the opprobrium that would be thrown upon Congress by those who will charge it with perfidy. They would give weight to the testimony of facts, and the authority of principles, on which the government would rest its vindication. And if war should ensue upon the violation, our citizens would not be divided from their government, nor the ardor of their courage be chilled by the consciousness of injustice, and the sense of humiliation, that sense which makes those despicable who know they are despised.

I add a third reason, and with me it has a force that no words of mine can augment, that a government, wantonly refusing to fulfil its engagements, is the corrupter of its citizens. Will the laws continue to prevail in the hearts of the people, when the respect that gives them efficacy is withdrawn from the legislators? How shall we punish vice while we practise it? We have not force, and vain will be our reliance, when we have forfeited the resources of opinion. To weaken government and to corrupt morals are effects of a breach of faith not to be prevented; and from effects they become causes, producing, with augmented activity, more disorder and more corruption; order will be disturbed and the life of the public liberty shortened.

And who, I would inquire, is hardy enough to pretend, that the public voice demands the violation of the treaty? The evidence of the sense of the great mass of the nation is often equivocal; but when was it ever manifested with more energy and precision than at the present moment? The voice of the people is raised against the measure of refusing the appropriations. If gentlemen should urge, nevertheless, that all this sound of alarm is a counterfeit expression of the sense of the public, I will proceed to other proofs. If the treaty is ruinous to our commerce, what has blinded the eyes of the merchants and traders ? Surely they are not enemies to trade, or ignorant of their own interests. Their sense is not so liable to be mistaken as that of a nation, and they are almost unanimous. The articles, stipulating the redress of our injuries by captures on the sea, are said to be delusive. By whom is this said? The very men, whose fortunes are staked upon the competency of that redress, say no such thing. They wait with anxious fear lest you should annul that compact on which all their hopes are rested.

Thus we offer proof, little short of absolute demonstration, that the voice of our country is raised not to sanction, but to deprecate the non-performance of our engagements. It is not the nation, it is one, and but one branch of the government that proposes to reject them. With this aspect of things, to reject is an act of desperation.

I shall be asked, why a treaty so good in some articles, and so harmless in others, has met with such unrelenting opposition; and how the clamors against it from New Hampshire to Georgia, can be accounted for? The apprehensions so extensively diffused, on its first publication, will be vouched as proof, that the treaty is bad, and that the people hold it in abhorrence.

I am not embarrassed to find the answer to this insinuation. Certainly a foresight of its pernicious operation, could not have created all the fears that were.

felt or affected. The alarm spread faster than the publication of the treaty. There were more critics than readers. Besides, as the subject was examined, those fears have subsided.

The movements of passion are quicker than those of the understanding. We are to search for the causes of first impressions, not in the articles of this obnoxious and misrepresented instrument, but in the state of the public feeling.

The fervor of the revolution war had not entirely cooled, nor its controversies ceased, before the sensibilities of our citizens were quickened with a tenfold vivacity, by a new and extraordinary subject of irritation. One of the two great nations of Europe underwent a change which has attracted all our wonder, and interested all our sympathies. Whatever they did, the zeal of many went with them, and often went to excess. These impressions met with much to inflame, and nothing to restrain them. In our newspapers, in our feasts, and some of our elections, enthusiasm was admitted a merit, a test of patriotism, and that made it contagious. In the opinion of party, we could not love or hate enough. I dare say, in spite of all the obloquy it may provoke, we were extravagant in both. It is my right to avow that passions so impetuous, enthusiasm so wild, could not subsist without disturbing the sober exercise of reason, without putting at risk the peace and precious interests of our country. They were hazarded. I will not exhaust the little breath I have left, to say how much, nor by whom, or by what means they were rescued from the sacrifice. Shall I be called upon to offer my proofs ? They are here, they are every where. No one has forgotten the proceedings of 1794. No one has forgotten the captures of our vessels, and the imminent danger of war. The nation thirsted not merely for reparation, but vengeance. Suffering such wrongs, and agitated by such resentments, was it in the power of any words of compact, or could any parchment with

its seals prevail at once to tranquillize the people? It was impossible. Treaties in England are seldom popular, and least of all when the stipulations of amity succeed to the bitterness of hatred. Even the best treaty, though nothing be refused, will choke resentment, but not satisfy it. Every treaty is as sure to disappoint extravagant expectations as to disarm extravagant passions. Of the latter, hatred is one that takes no bribes. They, who are animated by the spirit of revenge, will not be quieted by the possibility of profit.

Why do they complain, that the West Indies are not laid open? Why do they lament, that any restriction is stipulated on the commerce of the East Indies? Why do they pretend, that if they reject this, and insist upon more, more will be accomplished? Let us be explicit more would not satisfy. If all was granted, would not a treaty of amity with Great Britain, still be obnoxious? Have we not this instant heard it urged against our envoy, that he was not ardent enough in his hatred of Great Britain? A treaty of amity is condemned because it was not made by a foe, and in the spirit of one. The same gentleman, at the same instant, repeats a very prevailing objection, that no treaty should be made with the enemy of France. No treaty, exclaim others, should be made with a monarch or a despot: there will be no naval security while those sea-robbers domineer on the ocean: their den must be destroyed that nation must be extirpated.

I like this, sir, because it is sincerity. With feelings such as these, we do not pant for treaties. Such passions seek nothing, and will be content with nothing, but the destruction of their object. If a treaty left king George his island, it would not answer; not if he stipulated to pay rent for it. It has been said, the world ought to rejoice if Britain was sunk in the sea; if where there are now men and wealth and laws and liberty, there was no more than a sand bank for the sea-monsters to fatten on; a space for the storms of the ocean to mingle in conflict.