ed to exaggerate its imperfections. I am willing to admit, that the surrender of the posts, even with the conditions annexed, is of some importance; but I will assert, that the surrender loses a great portion of its value to the United States, in consequence of the conditions attached to it. Two objects of primary importance were to be effected by the unqualified surrender of the posts. The one was to obtain the influence over the Indians in their neighborhood, which the British now possess. The other, the participation, at least, in the fur trade carried on with those Indians. The conditions accompanying the surrender, will, in my opinion, very much impede the one, and completely defeat the other object.

The stipulation in the second article, which authorizes British subjects, now living within the precincts or jurisdiction of the posts, still to continue to reside there, with the free use of their property, and to elect either to remain British subjects, or become American citizens at pleasure, will, in my opinion, very much impede, if not wholly obstruct, the salutary influence of the United States, over the numerous tribes of Indians in that quarter; which is one great object hoped for from the possession of those posts. The effects of this stipulation will appear more obvious, when it is compared with the stipulations in the next article, by which the trade with the Indians is regulated. The second object, to wit, the participation in the fur trade, I believe will be completely defeated by the regulation of that trade in the third article. That article stipulates an equality of duties between American citizens and British subjects, a free communication through that country, upon an equality of portages and ferriages. These conditions, in my opinion, will secure a complete monopoly of the fur trade to Great Britain; because the superiority of the British capital employed in that trade, and the inferiority of duties, paid upon goods imported for that trade into Canada, will, in my judgment, wholly exclude American citizens from a

participation in that trade through any channel in the United States. The United States have no mode left to counteract this monopoly, but by a system of drawbacks, which appear to me, from the nature of the trade and country, to be almost impracticable; or if not absolutely impracticable, it will compel us to purchase the trade at a price greater than it is worth. It appears to me, that Great Britain foresaw these consequences, and that these articles are as well calculated to produce them, and to obstruct the views of the United States, as sagacity itself could have devised. Hence it appears to me, that the value of an unqualified surrender of the posts, is very much lessened by the accompanying conditions. The gentleman from Connecticut, observed, that the surrender of the posts was absolute, and that no conditions were annexed to it. It is a sufficient answer to say, that his observation is a mere criticism upon terms. If they be not conditions of the surrender, they are accompanying engagements, and are to be executed, with good faith, by the United States.

The fourth and fifth articles relate merely to the ascertainment of the boundary line, and therefore I shall pass over them without comment.

The sixth article is, in my judgment, highly objectionable. This article assumes the payment of all debts, interests and damages, due from American citizens to British subjects, previous to the revolution, in all cases where insolvencies have ensued, and where legal impediments to the recovery of the debts have existed. I will remark, that this is an assumption of debt by the public, which they do not owe, and never promised to pay, and that it is bettering the condition of the British creditor under the treaty of peace, without any obligation on the United States to do so. As amongst the fashionable calumnies of the day, this article has been a fertile source of misrepresentation against the state I have the honor to represent, I am anxious to place this subject in its true light;

and as I profess to be well acquainted with it, I hope to be indulged with some minutia of explanation. This subject presents two aspects to the public; the one, as it respects states, the other, as it respects the individuals of the United States. As to the first, I admit, that if a greater proportion of debts of this description are due from Virginia than from other states, (which has not, however, been ascertained, and which, I doubt,) in the same proportion as a state, Virginia would receive an advantage over the rest of the states, by a common assumption of the debts; but as it respects the individuals of that state, who are not debtors, they stand precisely upon the same footing with individuals in the other states, because they are, in common with others, to contribute to the payment of debts which they never owed. It is of very little consolation to them, that they live in the neighborhood of those, whose debts they are to contribute to pay; for propinquity or distance can make no difference in the state of interest between the individuals, who do not owe, but who are to contribute to pay. As a very small proportion of the inhabitants of Virginia come under this description of debtors, the phenomenon of an opposition of that state to this particular article, is thus explained.

It is to be remarked, that this article contains no limits as to the amount of debts assumed by it, nor are there any precise data furnished for calculation. But it has been said, that if the debts be due, they ought to be paid, be the amount what it may. Gentlemen should reflect, that the amount will depend very much upon the mode of adjustment, and that the mode adopted by the treaty, is the most objectionable that can be devised.

The principle established for the adjustment of the debts, instead of preserving the conflicting interests of debtor and creditor, will produce a complete union of interests; and of course, will furnish the greatest temptations to frauds against the United States from

both debtor and creditor. Hence the amount of debts assumed by the United States, will probably be greatly increased beyond what would be the amount, if the debtor and creditor were left to the ordinary course of judicial proceedings to adjust their own differences under the principle of opposing interests. To entitle the creditor to a claim upon the United States, it is necessary for him first to establish his demand against his debtor, and then to show that his debtor was solvent at the commencement of the late war, has since become insolvent, and that some legal impediment has intervened to prevent the recovery of the debt. Hence it becomes the interest of both debtor and creditor, to establish these facts; because the debtor will be reliev ed from his debt, by the assumption of the United States, and the claim of the creditor will be transferred from the individual to the United States, which he will in all cases prefer, particularly as the assistance of the debtor will often become necessary to facilitate the establishment of the debt. This is the natural operation of the union of interest, produced by the assumption of the debts by the United States, and there is more danger to be apprehended from it, from the impossibility of checking it by any vigilance on the part of the United States, and from the peculiar circumstances attending these debts.

The greatest proportion of debts remaining unpaid, I believe, stand upon open accounts. In many cases, when the debts were evidenced by specialties, payments have been obtained, either by the usual course of judicial process, or by compromise between the parties. There are two circumstances, attending the open accounts, which will give great scope to fraudulent combinations between the debtor and creditor. The one respects the evidence, the other the substantial causes of difference in the accounts of the creditor and debtor. In the reign of George the II., an act was passed for the more easy recovery of debts due to his majesty's subjects, from his majesty's plantations

VOL. I.

46

in America. This act authorized the merchant, residing in Great Britain, to establish his debt against a colonist, by affidavits, taken before the commencement of the suit, and authenticated in the usual mode. This deprived the defendant of all opportunity of cross examination, so essential to the discovery of truth, and the jury of all knowledge of the character and credibility of the deponent.

In Virginia, the affidavits, taken in pursuance of this act, have been deemed incompetent to the establishment of the debt, because the act itself destroys the very nature and properties of evidence. Hence, in all disputed claims, founded upon this act, judgments have been rendered for the defendants. If this should be deemed a legal impediment to the recovery, this whole description of debts will probably come under the description of debts assumed. The words used in the treaty were calculated, in my opinion, with a view to this construction, and must have been dictated by persons, better informed of the nature of this business than I presume the envoy extraordinary of the United States could have been. The words alluded to are the following: "The said commissioners, in examining the complaints and applications so preferred to them, are empowered and required, in pursuance of the true intent and meaning of this article, to take into their consideration all claims, whether of principal or interest, or balance of principal and interest, and to determine the same respectively, according to the merits of the several cases, due regard being had to all the circumstances thereof, and as equity and justice shall appear to them to require. And the said commissioners shall have power to examine all such persons, as shall come before them, on oath or affirmation, touching the premises; and also to receive in evidence, according as they may think most consistent with equity and justice, all written depositions, or books, or papers, or copies, or extracts thereof, every such deposition, book, or paper, or copy, or extract,