"The English Constitution," says one of them, was at that time in reality much worse than our own; and, if it is now superior, it is so because its growth has not been hindered or destroyed by the too tight ligaments of a written fundamental law."* What then are the evils incident to the American system which we say are so great that Canadians should never dream of exchanging their own system of National Government for it? Mr. Bryce sums up many of them in one general expression. There is, he says, in the American Government, considered as a whole, a want of unity. Its branches are unconnected; their efforts are not directed to one aim, do not produce one harmonious result. The sailors, the helmsman, the engineer, do not seem to have one purpose or obey one will, so that instead of making steady way the vessel may pursue a devious or zig-zag course, and sometimes merely turn round and round in the water. For the present all is comparatively well, for that vessel sails upon a summer sea.t

To be more specific, I will enumerate some of the more obvious defects of the American system, in

*Congressional Government, p. 311.

+American Commonwealth, Vol. 1, pp. 287, 303.

the words of no mere academical critic, but of Story himself, one of the most brilliant names upon the roll of American jurists. In his Commentaries on the American Constitution he says: "The heads of departments are, in fact, by the exclusion from Congress of all persons holding office, prevented from proposing or vindicating their own measures in the face of the nation in the course of debate, and are compelled to submit them to other men, who are either imperfectly acquainted with the measures, or are indifferent to their success or failure. Thus, that open and public responsibility for measures which properly belongs to the executive in all Governments, and especially in a republican Government, as its greatest security and strength, is completely done away. The executive is compelled to resort to secret and unseen influence, to private interviews and private arrangements, to accomplish its own appropriate purposes, instead of proposing and sustaining its own duties and measures by a bold and manly appeal to the nation in the face of its representatives. One consequence of this state of things is, that there never can be traced home to the executive any responsibility for the measures which are planned and carried at its sug

gestion. Another consequence will be (if it has not yet been) that measures will be adopted or defeated by private intrigues, political combinations, irresponsible recommendations, and all the blandishments of office and all the deadening weight of silent patronage. The executive will never be compelled * It will to avow or support any opinions. * assume the air of a dependent instrument ready to adopt the acts of the legislature, when, in fact, its spirit and its wishes pervade the whole system of legislation. If corruption ever eats its way silently into the vitals of the Republic, it will be because the people are unable to bring responsibility home to the executive through his chosen ministers."* And so to exchange the grave, judicial language of Judge Story, for the lighter style of Mr. Bryce: "Not uncommonly there is presented the sight of an exasperated American public going about like a roaring lion, seeking whom it may devour, and finding no one."†

But now let me call attention to some matters which do not lie so obviously upon the surface. It

*Commentaries on the American Constitution, 4th ed., vol. 1, p. 614, seq.

+American Commonwealth, vol. 2, p. 320.

is necessary for every legislative body to evolve some kind of organization. Debarred from having the ministers of the day as a ruling committee controlling all business, as with us, the Houses of Congress took the alternative of distributing business among a number of committees, to each of which is assigned a specific class of subjects. In 1888 there were in the American Senate 41 standing committees, each appointed for two years, and consisting of from 3 to 11 members each, and in the House of Representatives there were 54 standing committees, each appointed for a period of two sessions, and consisting of from 3 to 16 members each. We may confine our view to the House of Representatives, but the system in both Houses is the same; and I shall take what I have to say principally from the American writer, to whom I have so often referred already, Mr. Wilson, though he is entirely confirmed in what he says by the independent testimony of Mr. Bryce. The way business is divided among these committees is indicated by their names, of which some of the principal are Ways and Means; Appropriations; Banking and Currency; Rivers and Harbours; Railways and Canals; Foreign Affairs; Naval Affairs; Mili

tary Affairs, and Public Lands. Now, to some one of these small standing committees, each and every bill is referred, and it is positively startling to any one accustomed to the free and open debate of a British Parliament, to find that all legislation is at the mercy of the particular committee to which it is assigned. These committees deliberate in secret, and no member speaking in the House is entitled to state anything that has taken place in committee other than what is stated in the report of that committee. They are practically under the control of their chairmen, who are strict party men appointed by the speaker, who is himself under the American system a staunch and avowed partisan, making smooth whenever he can the legislative paths of his party, and the most powerful man in the House by virtue of his function of appointing these chairI know not men of the standing committees. how better," says Wilson, "to describe our form of government in a single phrase than by calling it a Government by the chairmen of the Standing Committees of Congress."* But these chairmen of committees do not constitute a co-operative body like a ministry. They do not consult and concur *Congressional Government, p. 102.