be on the defenfive; as appeared upon the duke of Anjou's coming to his army upon the furprize of Balaguer by the allies, and expoftulating with • marshal Bezons for not joining " upon that occafion the Spanish army; for which he justified himself by producing the king's orders. By this middle way, the king thought he could deceive the allies, without abandoning the Spaniards; and, in the mean time, the duke of Anjou, according to the direction of French councils, made his utmost efforts to put Spain into a condition to defend itfelf, as if they were in earneft to expect no farther affiftance from France ; which had fo good an effect on the Spaniards, that they exerted ⚫ themselves beyond what could be expected of them. They compleated in a little time ⚫ their old regiments, and raised befides a great many new ones; and the most vigorous measures were taken to find money, and erect magazines, as if they were to ftand for the future, on their own bottom, though the king of France was far from intending they fhould want his affiftance, when their affairs called for it. And that his grandfon might not want a general for his army, it was publicly talked at Paris, before • monfieur Rouillé's return, that, in cafe of a peace, the duke of Berwick had defired leave to refign his Baton of marfhal of France, that he might go and

3

to

command in Spain. Which 'fhews us, how the duke of Anjou might have officers as well as men from France, if he had any want of them. If therefore the king of France withdrew his troops, it was not with a defign to leave his grandfon to himself, but upon very different views: it was to make the allies and his own people believe he was fincere, and that he was willing to remove, as far as he could, all the difficulties in the way of peace; and yet, at the fame time, and by the same action, increase the difficulties he would feem to remove, by rendering by this means the most reafon⚫able demand of the allies impracticable befides that he really wanted these troops himfelf against another year, the danger he was threatened with in Flanders obliging him to have a more numerous army on that fide. This was all he meant by withdrawing his troops from Spain, and therefore he did not do it, till he had put the duke of Anjou's affairs upon a pretty good foot, and he was fure there could be no immediate want of them, the campaign there being at an end. And, that this removal of his troops might be of the leaft prejudice poffible to his grandfon, he contrived, that as many of his own troops 'fhould defert as would make feven or eight battalions; and, to fupply the place of the reft, as far as he could, he sent his

grandfon

grandfon all the Walloon regiments from Flanders; from whence they began their march for Spain the beginning of the • February following, which was as foon as money, arms, and cloaths could be provided for them. And not content with giving the duke of Anjou this affiftance, and supplying him with great flores of ammuni⚫tion, because new-raised troops could not be much depended on, the king kept many of the troops he withdrew in Rouffillon upon the borders of Spain, to be ready to return, when his grandfon's affairs fhould make it neceffary. And is not this very like the conduct of one, who means in earneft to abandon Spain, and would reftore it to the house of • Austria, if he could? But poor • man! he cannot do impoffibi<lities. It is a pretty way to facilitate the reduction of a kingdom, to make it as difficult as poffible; a great fign of fincerity to put things out of our power, which we cannot, without discovering our infin<cerity, keep in it; and mighty

reasonable to create impoffibilities, and then complain of < them. Who can help believing fuch a man, when he tells you, he would with all his heart, to procure a peace, give up the Spanish monarchy, if he could, but that he really cannot; and that this is the only hindrance? Or what pledge of his good-will is there, one may not expect from him, as a cau

prefence

tion, that he will not, directly or indirectly, hinder your doing what he cannot poffibly himself do for you? To expec a valuable pledge from a man, to be returned to him when that is done, which he intends • never shall be done, is a great jeft. And therefore, fince the French king has fo plainly dif covered his intention, you must ⚫ not wonder he makes fuch difficulties in fettling an expedient, as you could not expect in a man, who means not one ⚫ word of what he says.

The first and only good expedient, you fee, is made impracticable, on purpose that it may not be infifted on. The next beft was to put into the hands of the allies fome French ⚫ towns on the frontier of Spain, fuch as Bayonne and Perpignan, which would have inabled the allies to fend forces to Spain ⚫ with infinitely lefs expence and trouble, and in a quarter of the time they can now; and, at the fame time, have obliged the French pretty effectually to keep their promise not to affift the duke of Anjou, by cutting off in great measure the com⚫munication between France and Spain. This was an expedient, which the king could not fay it was not in his power to comply with. But when one has not a mind to do a thing, ⚫ nothing is fo eafy as to find out a reafon for not doing it. If this could not be faid to be an impoffible expedient, it was eafy to pretend, that it did not • fuit

made the condition on which ⚫ the caution he depofits fhall be <reftored. If the king does not defign Spain fhould be quitted by his grandfon, it must be • owned it would not be very ⚫ prudent in him to give the al⚫lies fuch important places under the notion of cautionary towns, which muft either defeat his defign of fupporting his grandfon; or, if that defign fucceed, could never of right be de⚫manded back of them: not but that a prince of his known ⚫ abilities would, we may be sure, • foon find a pretence to ask for them; and that pretence he would juftify, if not readily • fubmitted to, the fame way he has fo many others no lefs groundless, by force and arms, which with him have always ⚫ been the measures of right and wrong. But if he were fincere, if he really meant that Spain fhould be restored, what in• convenience could there be in ⚫ complying with this expedient? • What ill ufe could the allies make of it? Could they, by the help of these towns, hurt France, before they had re⚫duced Spain? Can it be ima• gined, that would not find them

prehend any thing from them. • Nor can there be the leaft pretence for a fufpicion, that the allies, if these towns were once in their hands, would never ⚫ part with them, fuppofing the

end anfwered for which they • were intrufted with them; for, ..befides that fuch a breach of • faith is without example on the • fide of the allies, they cannot,

for the reafons I gave you in my last, act a false part in this matter, if they would, espe ⚫cially not on this fide of France;

where, if the allies had ever fo ⚫ much juftice on their fide, they

could not long fupport them ⚫ felves under the mighty difad vantages with which they muft make war on this frontier. But there is no need of faying more, to fhew you how ridiculous it is to pretend any fear of the allies, if thefe towns should be put into their hands. The fupporting of Spain has coft ← France too dear, not to know the low condition it is in; and that nothing could be greater madness in king Charles, or his

• Nothing therefore can be • thought to be the true reason, why the king of France rejected this expedient, but that he never intended the allies • fhould obtain the end, for ⚫ which it was asked, as you will fee more plainly in what fol⚫lows. On the fide of Alface, nothing was proposed, that I know of, but Thionville, a place of great confequence to • France, were they in any danger from the empire. But, ⚫ confidering the feeble low con

dition of that enervated ex• hausted body, one cannot but ⚫ think the ftrong places on that • fide are of no other use but to • enable the French to invade the · empire, and not to secure them against invafions from it. And ❝ what should be depofited as a pledge, would be to be restored long before the empire could ⚫ be in a condition to make any • use of it, that would be either • unjust in itself, or troublesome to France. But France never intending to fulfil the condition on which the town fhould be restored, this propofal was • rejected upon the fame pretence

as the former.

Nothing now was left, but to feek for an expedient in Flanders, which was what the French offered from the first, ⚫ and all along preffed, as if they

prefence

were very much in earnest. But, had they been fo, it is very hard to give a good reafon, why an expedient should ⚫ be looked for here, rather than in any other part. The allies, though they were fenfible what ever could be given on this fide, was but a poor expedient at beft; yet they were fo fincerely difpofed to put an end to the war, that they would nor • abfolutely reject it. Whatever

towns France could put into ⚫ the hands of the allies on this fide, if they were not fuch as lie nearest to those that are to ⚫ be given up by the prelimina

ries, their tenure would be ⚫ very precarious; and it would be very difficult to keep them, when France had a mind to have them again. This you may eafily judge of by the impoffibility the allies were under laft campaign to make the fiegs of Arras, while they left Doway behind them; and the difficulty Ypres gave them in the 'fiege of Aire. But if thefe ⚫ cautionary towns were to be of ⚫ those that lie neareft, they could • not be of so much importance to France, as that they fhould not be willing to part with them to keep Spain, fince this would only be making a little farther addition to the barrier of the Netherlands; which • would fecure them more from

France. But, as bad an equivalent as this was at the best, • the French refused to make it as good as they could, by, ex'cepting fuch towns as were of

• most