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the prosecution is for a political delinquency, not for a civil crime the cognizance of which belongs to the civil judicature, and the end is the removal or disqualification of an unworthy public servant, not a vindictive punishment of the offender. these, among other reasons, the house of representatives has been thought the most proper board to institute the enquiry and to bring forward the accusations of the public, and the senate to constitute the most proper tribunal for the trial of such accusation. Objections may be suggested to this depository of the power of impeachment; but probably no better provision can be made. The introduction of an independent tribunal for the trial of impeachments might have greater inconveniences, without securing the command of more wisdom, integrity, and weight of character in the judges.

It may be a very proper provision, that in the exercise of some powers entrusted to the executive, the advice and consent of the senate should be made necessary to the validity of his acts. An instance of this is found in appointments to office. By subjecting nominations to office by the president to the approbation of the senate, a more judicious selection will generally be made, and the appointment of unworthy persons prevented. The members of that body coming from the different parts of the state may know of objections to the person nominated, which had not come to the knowledge of the executive. So in the case of a treaty, the advice and consent of the senate may well be made necessary to its final ratification. For although the power of making a treaty as a national compact is, with propriety entrusted to the executive; yet, as when ratified, it becomes a law binding on the citizens as well as a compact binding on the state, the senate in this case may be said not to depart altogether from their character as legislators. It may also be sometimes proper for the legislature as general representatives of the people, to advise and recommend to the attention of the executive, the pursuit of some national measure that may be deemed highly necessary or expedient. Their previous advice will give weight to the measure, and a facility to the execution. Such advice, however, should be general and in those matters that are considered discretionary with the executive, and never extend to those

particular instances of conduct which may become the ground of impeachment.

Finally, it should be a sacred stipulation in the constitution that all debates in the legislature should be open, except when some measure submitted to their consideration by the executive may require secrecy; and that effectual means be adopted for their publication in course, and to facilitate an early and general circulation among the people. This will prove an efficient and salutary check on the members, by enabling their constituents to form a just estimate of the characters of those to whom they entrust the powers of legislation.

ernment.

The executive is the ultimately efficient power in the govFor the sake of despatch and unity of action, and of representing the individuality and sovereignty of the state in transactions with other nations, this power ought to be vested in a single person, who with us has been denominated the governor or president. We shall generally adopt the term president. Some have thought that the election of the executive chief may with the greatest safety be entrusted to the legislature. Others have held that this right should be retained by the people. There are certainly very strong objections to committing its exercise to the legislature. It gives an idea of a dependence of the executive on that body, and intercepts his accountability to the people, whose power he ought to represent in his department. All elections by the representative body are subject to intrigues and coalitions which are very injurious in their influence on public measures, and on morals. This evil is increased in proportion to the importance of the election.

An upright and faithful discharge of the duties of the executive office is the most honorable of any in the state,—an abuse, the most dangerous and in no office are the temptations more powerful. It ought therefore to be guarded with every rational check ; at the same time, it must not be so encumbered as to clog its necessary activity. The good or bad conduct of the executive, is in most instances of internal administration, immediately felt by the people. To avoid any hurtful coalition between this high officer and the legislative body, and to subject him to the control of public sentiment, his appointment should be by

periodical elections by the people. In more complicated governments, such as that of the United States, this mode of electing the president may be extremely inconvenient or even impracticable. When this shall appear to be the case, some other provision must be made; but care should be taken to exclude all legislative interference in the election, unless as may sometimes happen, no choice shall have been made in the mode prescribed, and to make it depend as much as possible on the sentiments of the people.

It will be the duty of the president as head of the executive department, to execute the laws, to carry into effect many provisions of the constitution and the measures directed by the legislature within the limits of their powers, and the decisions of the judiciary in the manner prescribed by the laws and constitution, and to represent the state in public transactions. In the president also will with propriety be vested the chief command of the military, a peculiar department, which by the constitution must be placed in subordination to the civil power. Besides the duties of the executive, just mentioned, there are other duties to be performed very necessary to an orderly and economical arrangement of measures. It will at all times be the duty of the president, the head of this department, to inform the legislature of the situation of public affairs, of the event of measures that have been adopted, and to recommend to their consideration those measures, which demand their more immediate attention.

The business of the executive is too extensive and various to be performed by one man. Many of its duties must be performed by subordinate officers and ministers. According to the ordinary routine of official business, it will be the duty of the subordinate ministers of the executive department, under the direction of the president, as often as shall be required by the legislature, to make proper reports of the matters committed to their management and to accompany them with all the necessary information, which may assist that body to pursue and adopt a regular system in the internal economy of the state and enable it to conduct with propriety and good faith as well towards the citizens, as in the intercourse with foreign nations. Although there ought to be maintained an amicable inter

course between the legislature and the executive for the purpose of mutual information, and a mutual co-operation of the several departments of the government, in the exercise of their several powers, yet as will appear in the sequel, no one of the departments should be permitted to exercise any of the essential powers, committed to either of the others. The president therefore, as head of the executive department, ought not to have a negative, or any direct controling power in legislation. He may, however, within certain limits, well be allowed a deliberative voice-conversant in the execution of the laws and all the measures of government; his department will be the centre of information on those subjects. It will be his duty at all times to communicate such information to the legislature, so far as will be necessary to assist them in their deliberations. He will more readily than others perceive the difficulties that may arise in the execution of a law from any discrepancy with the provisions of the constitution or the general system of public measures. Every act of the legislature, therefore, ought, before it become a law, to be submitted to the president for his approval. If he approve it, he will affix his signature with his approval simply, whereupon it will become a law. If he do not approve, he should be required to return it with his objections fairly stated in writing to be re-considered by the legislature. If the legislature, on re-consideration, still pass the act, it must become a law, notwithstanding the objection of the president. If this be made a provision of the constitution, as I think it ought, it furnishes an additional reason against the election of the president by the legislature.

Although the members of the legislature cannot, from the nature of their functions, be made accountable for their acts to any other tribunal but that of public sentiment expressed by the people in their elections, yet happily for mankind it has been found, that the executive power is capable of limitations sufficiently precise, by known and established laws. Its ministers therefore, from the president down through every grade, may be subjected to trial before a proper tribunal, to removal and to further punishment for their unconstitutional acts. Impunity should on no account, be annexed to office or dignity. So far is it from consisting with the good of the community,

that it is directly opposed to the common interest and safety. By the constitution it is to be made the province of the judiciary to decide on the laws by interpreting and applying them to particular cases according to their analogy; and by their decisions to pronounce upon whom, and in what way and manner the executive power shall be exercised, either for the satisfaction and reparation of injuries, or the punishment of offenders. To the judges, the ministers of this power, it will belong to interpret all acts of the legislature agreeable to the true spirit of the constitution as founded in natural principles, and the rules therein explicitly given, and to make a just and impartial application in all cases of disputed right; and as under this form of government the constitution is the supreme law limiting the powers of the several departments, it will be within their power, as it is their duty, to decide in questions coming before them, on all acts both of the legislature and the executive, and in all cases in which the acts of either are opposed to that supreme law or are clearly not warranted by it, to pronounce them unconstitutional and void. By this provision, the rights and interests of all the members of the legislative and executive departments will be kept in union with the rights and interests of the citizens; all will be equally protected against an unconstitutional law; all will be equally exposed by an unjust law, or amenable for an arbitrary execution.

The situation of the judges, the ministers of the judiciary department, is very different from the situation of other functionaries of the government. The integrity of their conduct has a powerful influence. It is indispensably necessary to an impartial administration of justice and the security of public and private rights. Their decisions, though sometimes extending to the acts of the other departments, are mostly of local and private rights; but the precedents established by their decisions, become general rules for the interpretation of the laws which follow the principles of the government. In a republican government, the laws should be interpreted with a spirit of equity, impartiality, and moderation. In the mode of performing the duties of the legislature and the judiciary, there is a very material distinction. In making laws, a regard must be had to the circumstances, the manners and sentiments

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