 | David Hume - 1804 - 552 páginas
...intelligible a proposition, and implies no more contradiction than the affirmation, that it will rise. We should in vain, therefore, attempt to demonstrate...and could never be distinctly conceived by the mind. : It may therefore be a subject •worthy of curiosity, to inquire what is the nature of that evidence,... | |
 | David Hume - 1809 - 556 páginas
...intelligible a proposition, and implies no more contradiction, than the affirmation, that it will rise. We should in vain, therefore, attempt to demonstrate...and could never be distinctly conceived by the mind. ., It may therefore be a subject worthy of curiosity, to inquire what is the nature of that evidence,... | |
 | David Hume - 1825 - 526 páginas
...intelligible a proposition, and implies no more contradiction, than the affirmation, that it will rise. We should in vain, therefore, attempt to demonstrate its falsehood. Were it demon-s stratively false, it would imply a contradiction, and could never be distinctly conceived by... | |
 | David Hume - 1826 - 626 páginas
...intelligible a proposition, and implies no more contradiction, than the affirmation, that it will rise. We should in vain, therefore, attempt to demonstrate...and could never be distinctly conceived by the mind. It may therefore be a subject worthy of curiosity, to inquire what is the nature of that evidence,... | |
 | David Hume - 1854 - 576 páginas
...intelligible a proposition, and implies no more contradiction, than the affirmation, that it unlt rise. We should in vain, therefore, attempt to demonstrate...and could never be distinctly conceived by the mind. It may therefore be a subject worthy of curiosity, to inquire what is the nature of that evidence,... | |
 | David Hume - 1854 - 596 páginas
...intelligible a proposition, and implies no more contradiction, than the affirmation, that it will rise. We should in vain, therefore, attempt to demonstrate...demonstratively false, it would imply a contradiction, and Tx)ul^^ It may therefore be a subject worthy of curiosity, to inquire what is the nature of that evidence,... | |
 | Thomas Henry Huxley - 1879 - 230 páginas
...intelligible a proposition, and implies no more contradiction, than the nffirmation, that it will rise. We should in vain, therefore, attempt to demonstrate...could never be distinctly conceived by the mind."— (IV. pp. 32, 33.) The distinction here drawn between the truths of geometry and other kinds of truth... | |
 | Herbert Spencer - 1881 - 752 páginas
...intelligible a proposition, and implies no more contradiction, than the affirmation, that it will rise. We should in vain, therefore, attempt to demonstrate...all the perceptions of the mind " are divided into inyiressions and ideas, and in the other of which " all the objects of human reason or inquiry " are... | |
 | Herbert Spencer - 1882 - 722 páginas
...is no less intelligible a proposition, and implies no more contradiction, than the affirmation, Unit it will rue. We should in vain, therefore, attempt...Sections II. and IV. are two classifications ; in tho ono of which " all the perceptions of the mind " are divided into impressions and ideas, and in... | |
 | 1883 - 836 páginas
...intelligible a proposition, and implies no more contradiction, than the affirmation that it will rise. We should in vain, therefore, attempt to demonstrate...could never be distinctly conceived by the mind."— ( IV., PP- 32. 33-) The distinction here drawn between the truths of geometry and other kinds of truth... | |
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We should in vain, therefore, attempt to demonstrate its falsehood. Were it demonstratively false, it would imply a contradiction, and could never be distinctly conceived by the mind. 
