Page. Rowe v. Granite Bridge Co. 90, Trustees of Watertown v. Cowen 92, 118, 121 Rust v. Boston Mill Corp. 280 Page. 122, 202 120, 173 U. v. Low 114 Valentine v. Piper 228, 229, 232 Verplanck v. City of New York 41 247 Sparhawk v. Bullard 72, 227, 229, Spring v. Russell v. Seavey Vinton v. Welsh 243, 244 152 230, 233 78, 94 78 W. State v. Creek Co. 73 Storer v. Freeman 153 229, 270 v. Draper Water Power Co. v. & Wor. R. R. Co. 153 Boston 92 Striker v. Mayor, &c., of Waters v. Lilly 273 New York 240 Westfall v. Van Anker 132 T. White v. Whittier Wilson v. Black Bird Creek 192 Marsh Co. 63, 86, 90 Thompson v. Androscoggin v. Forbes 77 111 v. Inloes 173,247, 248 INTRODUCTION. OF THE RIGHT OF TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION OVER THE SEA, ARMS OF THE SEA, AND NAVIGABLE RIVERS. As the right of property in the sea, arms of the sea, and navigable rivers (the subject proposed) is involved with the sovereign right of territorial jurisdiction, and is co-extensive with it,' the latter subject suggests a claim to attention as preliminary to an essay in exposition of the law of the former. In regard to the jurisdiction of nations and states over the open sea, by virtue of jurisdiction over adjacent territory, it is only necessary to refer to the well established rule, that, from its nature, it cannot be possessed; and that it is therefore regarded as the common property, as is signified by the common term, "common highway," of nations. The dominion of a nation is allowed, however, to extend so far from the land as is necessary for its own safety. 'Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 3 How. (U. S.) R. 212; App. cxiv. The writers upon maritime and international law admit, that every nation has jurisdiction to the distance of cannon shot, or maritime league, over the waters of its adjacent shores.' The Congress of the United States have recognized this limitation, by authorizing the District Courts to take cognizance of all captures, made within a marine league of the American shores.2 The power of a nation within its own territory, is absolute and exclusive, and the seizure of a vessel within the range of its cannon shot, by a foreign force, is an invasion of that territory, and an act of hostility. It is true, indeed, that the maritime authority of a nation, to secure itself from injury, may be extended beyond the limit of its territory, as in the instance of the acknowledged right of a belligerent to search a neutral vessel on the high seas for contraband of war.^ History, however, it is well known, affords instances in which a greater extent of dominion over the sea has been arrogated by nations and states than the limit above prescribed, or than that consistent with strict justice. The naval strength of England has emboldened its monarchs to attribute to themselves as Lords paramount, the whole sea which surrounds their island, even as far as the opposite coasts.5 28. 1 Vattel, 207; Bynk. 61; 1 Azuni, 204; Ib. 185. 2 Act of Congress, 1794, c. 50; 1 Kent, Comm. 29. 3 Church v. Hubbart, 2 Cranch, (U. S.) R. 234; 1 Kent, Comm. 26 4 Church v. Hubbart, ub. sup. Selden's Mare Clausum, L. 1, b. 2; Vattel, 191; 1 Kent, Comm. |