LET us now compare the Writings of thefe two great Men together. The Philofophy which Mr. Newton has handled in his Principia and his Opticks, is experimental: viz. That which does not confidently affert the Caufes of Things, any further than as they may be confirmed by Experiments; and is not to be ftuff'd with Hypothefes, which cannot be proved by Phenomena. And therefore Mr. Newton in his Opticks hath diftinguifhed thofe Things which are confirmed by Experiments from thofe which yet remain uncertain. And hath propofed fome things of that kind which are dubious, as Queries at the End of his Opticks. And for the fame Reafon in the Preface to his Principia, when he mentioned the Motion of the Planets, and of the Comets, and of the Moon and Sea, as deduced in that Book from the Theory of Gravity, he adds, I wish we could derive the rest of the Phenomena of Nature by the fame kind of Reasoning from Mechanical Principles: For I am induced by many Reasons to fufpect that they may all depend upon certain Forces, by which the Particles of Bodies, by fome Caufes hitherto unknown, are either mutually impelled towards each other and cohere in regular Figures, or are repelled and recede from each other: Which Forces being unknown, Philofophers have hitherto attempted the Search of Nature in vain. And towards the End of that Book, in the fecond Edition, he fays, That for Want of Sufficient Experiments in this Matter, he hath not attemp ted to explain the Laws of the Actions of that Spirit or Agent, by which this Attraction is performed. And for. the fame Reafon he pronounces nothing concerning the Caufe of Gravity; because he had no Experiments or Phænomena at hand, by which he could certainly demonftrate its Cause. And this he had abundantly declared in the very Beginning of his Principia, in thefe Words : I bere defign only to give a Mathematical Notion of these Forces, without confidering their Phyfical Caufes and Seats.. And, a little after: I ufe the Words Attraction, Impulse, or Propenfity of any Sort towards a Centre, promiscuously and indifferently one for another; not confidering thefe Forces phyfically, but mathematically: Wherefore the Reader is not to imagine, that by thofe Words, I any where take upon me to define the Kind or the Manner of Action,, the Causes or the phyfical Reason thereof: Or that I attri

bute

bute Forces in a true and phyfical Senfe to Centres, (which are only Mathematical Points) when at any Time I happen to speak of Centres, as attracting, or as endued with attractive Powers. And towards the End of his Opticks; By what efficient Cause thefe Attractions are performed, 1 do not bere enquire. What I call Attraction, may posibly be effected by Impulse, or by some other Method unknown to us. I would have the Word Attraction fo understood bere, that it may univerfally fignify any Force whatever, by which Bodies mutually tend to each other, to whatsoever Caufe that Force may be attributed: For we must first be taught from the Phenomena of Nature what Bodies attract each other, and what are the Laws and Properties of that Attraction, before it is reasonable to enquire by what efficient Caufe this Attraction is perform'd. And a little afterwards, he confiders thefe Attractions, as Forces, which it is certain, from Phenomena, have an Existence in the Nature of Things, although their Caufes are yet unknown; and diftinguifhes them from occult Qualities, which are fuppofed to flow from the fpecifick Forms of Things. And in the Scholium at the End of his Principia, when he had mentioned the Properties of Gravity, he adds this: Hitherto I have not been able to difcover the Caufe of thefe Properties of Gravity from Phenomena, and I frame no Hypothefes, for whatever is not deduced from the Phenomena is to be called an Hypothefis ; and Hypothefes whether metaphyfical or phyfical, whether of occult Qualities or mechanical, bave no Place in Experimental Philofophy. It is enough that Gravity does really exift, and acts according to the Laws which we have explained, and abundantly ferves to account for all the Motions of the Cæleftial Bodies, and of our Sea.

AND now, after all thefe Things which Mr. Newton had on purpofe forewarned, who would not wonder, to find him reproached by any one, because he hath not ex plained the Caufes of Gravity, and of other Attractions by Hypothefes As if it was a Fault to be content with Things we are certain of, and to pafs over what are uncertain: And yet the Editors of the Acta Eruditorum (for the Month of March, 1714, Pages 142 and 143) have upbraided Mr. Neeton with this, that he has denied the Caufe of Gravity to be mechanical: And they affert, that

if

if this Spirit or Agent, by which Electric Attraction is performed, be not Ether or the fubtle Matter of Cartefius, that it is more contemptible than any Hypothefis; that perhaps it may be the Hylarchic Principle of Henry More. Nay, and even Mr. Leibnitz himself, in his Treatife De Bonitate Dei; and, in his Letters to Hartfoeker, and elfe where, has blamed Mr. Newton, as if he had made Gravity to be a certain Natural and Effential Property of Bodies; nay, even an occult Quality, and laftly a Miracle. And by thefe and fuch like fophiftical Cavils, thefe Men endeavour to perfuade their Countrymen, that Mr. Newton had but a finall Share either of Wit, or Judgment; nor could be the Perfon who was able to invent fo arduous a Matter as the Doctrine of Infinitefimals.

INDEED it must be confefs'd, there is a very great Difference betwixt Mr. Newton and Mr. Leibnitz in their Manner of treating upon Philofophy. The former goes as far as the Evidence of Phenomena and Experiments leads him and where that fails him, he ftops: The latter abounds altogether with his Hypothefes, and propofes them not to be examined by Experiments, but to be implicitly believed. The One, for want of Experiments which would certainly indicate the Caufe of Gravity, does not affirm, whether it be mechanical, or no : TheOther, if it be not mechanical, pronounces it to be a perpetual Miracle. The One, (and that alfo not defining, but inquiring) attributes it to the Power of the Creator, that even the leaft Particles of Matter are hard: The Other imputes that Hardness of Matter to certain confpiring Motions: And, if its Caufe fhould be fuppofed any other than mechanical, afferts it ought to be derided as a perpetual Miracle. The One dares not affirm the Animal Motion in Man to be meerly mechanical: The Other boldly affirms it to be purely mechanical; fince from his Hypothefis De Harmonia Preftabilita, the Soul or Mind of Man can rever fo act upon the Body, as either to affift or impede is Motions. The One afferts, that GOD, (the God, in whom we live, and move, and have our Being) to be omniprefent, but yet not as the Soul of the World: The Other indeed affirms him not to be the Soul of the World, but a SUPRAMUNDANE INTELLIGENCE, from whence

it

any it would feem to follow, that God is not able to do thing within the Bounds of the Universe, unless by a Miracle altogether incredible. The One advifes Philofophers, to proceed from Phenomena and Experiments to their Caufes, and fo on to the Caufes of thofe Caufes, 'till at length they arrive at the firft Caufe: The Other accounts all the Actions of the firft Caufe for Miracles, and efteems all the Laws impreffed upon Nature by the Will of God, as perpetual Miracles, and occult Qualities; and therefore he orders them to be banish'd out of Philofophy. But is this to be our Way of Proceeding? Or are the perpetual and univerfal Laws of Nature, if they be derived from the Power of God, or from the Ac tion of a Caufe yet unknown to us, to be hifs'd at for Miracles and occult Qualities, that is in his Opinion, for Monfters and Abfurdities? Or are all the Arguments for the Existence of a GoD taken from the Phenomena of Nature, therefore to be exploded; becaufe fome one may defame them by New and Ignominious Names ? Or, Shall Experimental Philofophy, be rejected as fuperftitious and abfurd, becaufe no Man will define without Experiments, nor has any one hitherto been able to prove by Experiments, That all the Phenomena of Nature can poffibly be folved by mere Mechanical Caufes.

TRULY this Matter deferves both our Mature and Se rious Confideration.

New

兔兔兔兔兔兔弟弟蕊蕊龜兔兔兔兔兔兔兔蕊蕊蕊蕊

All the ENIGMAs answered in the Perfon of a diftreffed Lover, by I. H. M.

6

Iften, dear Phyllis, to my grievous Moan,
All Day I figh, and all the Night 1 groan :
And if by Chance, fatigu'd with Grief, I fleep,
Opprefs'd with melancholly Dreams I weep.
Then wak'd by fudden Crowing of the * Cock,
Or by the startling Sound of Neighb'ring * Clock,
In wild Confufion toffing too and fro,
Inceffant Miferies I undergo :

Refolv'd at laft to quit my weary Bed;

*

I rife with trembling Hands, and aching Head;
With Stroke of hard'ned Steel the Flint-Stone plv,
From whence the* SPARKS in fwift Disorder fly.
"The well-prepared Tinder foon takes * Fire,
True Emblem of an amorous Defire :
By Help of Match a Candle then I light,
And an Epiftle to my Fair One write:
My Pen abounds in warm * POETICK LAYS,
In hopes fome tender Sentiments to raife.
But if my Plaints her Pity cannot move,
I'll ftudy Ovia's Remedy of Love.

5.

* 6:

4.

All the Enigmas answered by RUSTICUS. SOON OON as the Morning Light begins to peep, Th' induftrious Ploughman wak'd from bilmy Sleep. Harks to the frequent Crowing of the * Cock, And thereby gueffes what may be the * CLOCK: 6.

C

*

5.

Goes