terests of the British Empire, by pursuing its ancient and traditional policy, were thwarted by Mr. Gladstone, who boasted that for many months he had devoted all his energy, his eloquence, and his great influence, to defeat and upset his rival. With this object he appealed to the passions of the English people, which were easily roused by the highlycoloured picture he placed before them, in moving and eloquent language, of shocking cruelties inflicted by barbarous Musulmans upon unoffending Christians, and of their unparalleled sufferings. His speeches and pamphlets, describing what were known as the 'Bulgarian atrocities,' threw a large portion of the nation almost into a state of frenzy, which rendered it incapable of either reflection or prudence. He eagerly accepted every horrible and revolting detail of torture and outrage, with which sensational newspaper correspondents or designing agents of Russia could furnish him, to excite popular prejudice and indignation against the Turks, who were to be driven, bag and baggage,' out of Europe. Evidence from the most authentic sources was in vain produced, to prove that the accounts coming from these sources were totally untrustworthy. His object was to discredit and embarrass Lord Beaconsfield and the Government, by leading the world to believe that they tolerated and condoned, if they did not actually approve and promote, all the horrors of which the Porte and its officers were accused. He succeeded in doing so to a great extent; and thus encouraged Russia to enter upon the war which led to such terrible bloodshed and such indescribable misery. For these results Mr. Gladstone must be held responsible, as he must be for similar results of his policy and intemperate language elsewhere. Had it not been for his action, the war would have been prevented, and history would have been spared one of its bloodiest pages. At the same time England would have been saved from the dangers which now threaten her Indian Empire from the rapid advance of Russia in Central Asia, and from the enormous expenditure which Russia's nearness to our Indian frontiers, and the constant alarm which it causes, now impose upon us. This conviction was more than once publicly expressed by Lord Beaconsfield.

We cannot but contrast Mr. Gladstone's conduct in this instance with that of Lord Beaconsfield under nearly similar circumstances. When Mr. Gladstone's Ministry found itself in grave difficulties during the American Civil War, the opposition, of which Lord Beaconsfield was then the leader, might have caused it the most serious embarrassment. Lord Beaconsfield, considering only the interests of his country, and putting

aside all personal and party feelings, restrained his followers, which was at that time no easy task, and left the Government a free hand to deal with the many complicated and dangerous questions, which were then constantly arising, and which, unless treated with the utmost prudence, might have led, sooner or later, to war. History will decide which of the two statesmen shewed the greater patriotism and the higher sense of public duty.

After the war between Russia and Turkey had broken out, Lord Beaconsfield retained his opinion, that England had a right to interfere by force of arms should diplomatic measures fail to restore peace, and to aid Turkey in resisting an unprovoked and unjustifiable aggression, which, if Russia attained her object, would prove of incalculable injury to the interests of the British Empire. His first endeavour was to prevent war, and with this object he did his utmost, and not without success, to prevail upon the Porte to make such concessions and sacrifices as he considered ought to satisfy the ostensible complaints and demands of Russia. His efforts in this direction having failed, in consequence of the encouragement given to Russia by the feeling excited by Mr. Gladstone in England, he determined to avail himself of the first opportunity to interfere to arrest her attempt to dismember the Ottoman Empire.

This opportunity nearly presented itself after the defeat of the Russians before Plevna. Had the Turkish commander followed up his victory, as there is every reason to believe that he might have done, by pursuing the flying Russian army, not only could it have been totally destroyed, such was the panic with which it was seized, but the Emperor himself would in all probability have been made prisoner; England might then have stepped in, and might have brought the war to a close on her own terms and with due regard to her interests.

The next occasion upon which, we have reason to believe, Lord Beaconsfield was prepared to give armed assistance to Turkey was after the fall of Plevna, and after the Russians had forced the Shipka Pass. He was informed, on high military authority, that the invading army was so greatly reduced in numbers, and was so much demoralized by the losses it had sustained from disease, exposure, and the stubborn resistance it had experienced, that, if the Turks were to make a determined stand at Adrianople, it would be under the necessity of retreating. The Porte had taken measures to place that city in a state of defence, and it was garrisoned by a sufficient number of troops to hold it against any force that the Russians could then bring against it. It was abandoned by their commander at the first news of the approach of the enemy, who

entered

entered it without resistance. This unexpected and unaccountable collapse caused bitter disappointment to Lord Beaconsfield, who had been led to believe that the advance of the Russians upon Constantinople would be effectively checked, and that they would have no means of renewing the campaign until the following spring, thus giving time to England to interfere by diplomatic means, and if these failed to procure peace by more effective measures. The Porte, by its folly and irresolution, and by the incapacity, if not treachery, of its generals, lost the assistance which might have saved it from the disasters and fatal consequences of the war, and might have secured to the Sultan, for some time to come, the possession of his European Provinces.

The fall of Adrianople was followed by the march of the Russian Army upon Constantinople, by its encampment near the city in the lines of Buyuk-Tchekmedji, and ultimately by the signature of the Treaty of San Stefano, extorted from the Porte in the moment of its despair, which would have put an end to the Turkish dominion in Europe, and would have handed over the Turkish European Provinces to Russia. The Grand Duke Nicholas, acting upon instructions which he is known to have received from St. Petersburg, would have occupied Constantinople, had it not been for the prompt and courageous action of Lord Beaconsfield in ordering the British fleet into the Sea of Marmora, and for the notice that was privately conveyed to the Russian Commander-in-Chief, that it would at once be brought before San Stefano, whence it would command the approach to the Turkish Capital, if the Russian troops made any further progress. By this step Lord Beaconsfield stopped the Russian advance upon Stamboul, which must have led to most disastrous consequences, and in the end, in all probability, to a general war.

The Congress of Berlin, and the part which Mr. Disraeli, now Earl of Beaconsfield, played in it-the reputation for wisdom, patriotism and statesmanship which he acquired by it, not only in his own country but throughout the civilized world, and the impression which his character and bearing made upon his colleagues, the foremost statesmen of Europe-are of too recent a date and are of too great notoriety to require any further notice here. He returned to England bringing Peace with Honour,' and having achieved perhaps all that could possibly have been achieved in the interests of his country amidst difficulties which only his sagacity, courage, perseverance, and temper, could have overcome. He was consequently received with enthusiastic welcome by all classes of his countrymen.

Lord Beaconsfield knew full well that, although he had succeeded

succeeded in checking Russia by compelling her to abandon the most objectionable clauses of the Treaty of San Stefano, she would not renounce her secular policy with respect to the final possession of Constantinople and the Ottoman dominions in Europe and Asia. She had, indeed, acquired a better position, than she had held before the war, for furthering her designs as soon as she saw a favourable occasion for doing so. He deemed it, therefore, of vital importance to England, that she should be possessed of some station in the Levant, from which she could be ready to meet Russia, should the latter attempt to advance upon the Bosphorus and the Euphrates Valley through Armenia, for which she had prepared the way by acquiring Kars and Batoum. His thoughts reverted to Cyprus, where nearly fifty years before he had landed, and had apparently conceived the idea, that the occupation of this island by England would enable her to maintain that preponderating influence and position in the East, which were necessary to the retention of her Indian Empire. Whether Cyprus was the most favourable position to establish what Lord Beaconsfield described as a 'place d'armes,' may be open to question. But as to the wisdom of his policy there can scarcely be a doubt.

A proposal was made to the Sultan for the temporary cession of Cyprus to England, who, in return, was to guarantee to him the possession of his Asiatic territories, and to be prepared to aid him in resisting any attempt that Russia might make to invade them; the Porte undertaking, at the same time, to introduce certain reforms for the improvement of the condition of its Christian population. Lord Beaconsfield has been accused of having taken undue advantage of the fears of the Sultan, consequent upon the disasters which he had experienced, to impose upon him by threats the Cyprus Convention. No charge could be more unfounded or unjust. The Sultan himself, fully alive to the importance to Turkey of an agreement which would secure to him the help of England in repelling an invasion by Russia of his Asiatic provinces, was most anxious for the speedy conclusion of the Convention. He personally superintended the negociations for it, which were carried through with a secrecy and promptitude of which we doubt whether the annals of diplomacy in Turkey furnish any example. The advantages to be obtained by it were reciprocal, and the arrangement was a just and equitable one. If it has not hitherto had all the results that were expected from it, the fault does not lie with us but with the Sultan himself, who has weakened, if not annulled, the obligations we imposed upon ourselves, by neglecting to put into execution the reforms for

the

the amelioration of the condition of his Armenian subjects, which he had solemnly pledged himself to introduce, and by listening to the perfidious counsels of those whose object it has ever been to create suspicion and distrust in his mind of the motives and objects of England.

Lord Beaconsfield had now reached the highest pinnacle of power and fame that a British subject can hope to attain. He had, indeed, exceeded all that his imagination, vast and romantic as it was, could have conceived possible even in its most heated moments. To one who had known him in his youth-the object of ridicule and contempt as a wild visionary and a fop, and as belonging to a despised race, beginning life without powerful friends or the influence of station and wealth, and having to struggle with every disadvantage that could impede a successful public career; to see him preside at a banquet in that historic house in which the most illustrious of our statesmen had dwelt before him, with the heir to the Crown of England at his side as his guest, an Earl with the Garter at his knee, and the blue riband of this ancient order and the star, usually resplendent with diamonds, on his breast, the Prime Minister of the most powerful Empire on the face of the earth, just returned from representing his country in a European Congress, the most important since that of Vienna, and the chief of a great party which he had himself formed, and which he had led to victory-was more marvellous than the wildest and most improbable fiction that ever issued from his imaginative and fertile brain, more wonderful than even the achievements of 'Sidonia,' the favourite creation of his youth! Whatever may have been his reflections and emotions, and they must have been mingled with legitimate feelings of pride and triumph, they were veiled by that imperturbable and impassive countenance which, in the hours of sorest disappointment as in those of the most signal success, never deserted him. We are inclined to think that, with his romantic disposition, he would have been even more proud and more triumphant, could he have foreseen that he was to become a popular hero, whose memory was to be annually recorded throughout England by the display, by high and low, rich and poor, of his favourite flower-the Primrose.

ART.