Senator TSONGAS. I will read the paragraph.

Mr. LEFEVER. Well, it is not in that paragraph, sir. I considered about seven hypothetical alternatives and then I came down to what I was recommending. As academics do, I suppose politicians consider hypothetical alternatives, too.

My policy-well, let me see if I can find the pages here for myself. My policy recommendation

[Pause.]

My policy recommendation was my preferred course in that issue was, and I am adding a few words, once a nuclear force exists, the U.S. accepts it as a fait accompli. I am referring to the Israeli nuclear force. The United States should undertake efforts to encourage the adoption of responsible command and control measures of the force.

Obviously this would be less difficult in situations where the United States had been providing military assistance. In a quiet advisory relationship undergirded by technical dependence on the United States, American experts could help convey the mood, discipline, and procedures of restraint and accountability developed over the years by the first nuclear power.

And then here is the key point and where my policy recommendation comes in: "Modest nuclear assistance to Israel compatible withSenator TSONGAS. Now wait a minute. It says modest nuclear assistance.

Mr. LEFEVER. Yes, but we are talking about Israel. The whole section, "The Israeli Case," is about Israel. I said I would add words for clarity:

Modest nuclear assistance compatible with the nonproliferation treaty is a small price to pay for helping to influence greater nuclear responsibility in a new nuclear state. Such aid, however, may be read by some threshold governments [those ready to go nuclear], as an inducement for them to go nuclear to reap the benefits of the U.S. assistance.

Here I am recommending nuclear assistance to Israel. If you would read the total chapter on this subject, you would realize that the whole effort of my analysis and recommendations is designed to maintain stability in the Middle East, to protect Israel. Israel not only has a right to exist. I also refer to the United States as Israel's chief patron. And I am at a little bit of a loss to know what this has to do with human rights.

Senator TSONGAS. I am at a loss to understand why in reading from your book vou inserted the words "to Israel" when they don't exist in this book [indicating]. Let me read. You referred to several courses and you say:

Neither course appears feasible. The government of an imperiled state will not voluntarily surrender its ultimate weapon. The United States, the chief advocate of the nonproliferation treaty, would hardly consider helping Egypt to build nuclear arms.

There are less drastic ways to help redress the nuclear imbalance. The United States has already been pursuing several. The sale of reactors to Egypt and Israel on the same terms would help balance the nuclear equation, while the significant increase in U.S. military and economic aid to Egypt will help to establish a more equitable general balance as well as to replace Soviet influence. The U.S. support of Jordan also tends to offset Israel's military superiority and nuclear monopoly.

Under these unique circumstances, the United States should consider extending the nuclear guarantee to Egypt, Syria and other Arab states. This would have the effect of deterring both the use of Israel's force for military purposes or blackmail and the acquisition of nuclear arms by Egypt.

Thus far compensatory assistance to Israel's potential victims-and we are all now talking about aid not to Israel, but to everybody else has not been sufficient to offset the bargaining advantage and the warmaking potential of the Israeli force. So the United States should pursue efforts to deter or prevent Israel from increasing its nuclear capability.

In a sense it has already done so in its participation in the nonproliferation treaty, et cetera, et cetera. The United States and other concerned powers should demand that Israel grant IAEA inspectors access to all facilities, but this demand is not likely to be met. This raises the question of undertaking measures of denial or even punitive actions against Israel.

It goes on:

Domestic political questions in the United States make it very difficult to invoke such denial measures. Both Senators Glenn and Ribicoff oppose measures of that severity.

Then you go on:

The efforts directed toward Arab states could include military and economic aid, civilian nuclear assistance and a nuclear guarantee. These are the kinds of policy options available for mitigating the destabilizing impact of a militarily significant force.

Mr. LEFEVER. May I respond, sir? I don't understand why this particular subject is brought up. But the purpose of this speculation about different options that should be considered is something the United States is always doing. The U.S. Government, as you know, has offered nuclear reactor assistance to Israel and Egypt on precisely the same basis, assuming they both would permit international inspection.

And the purpose here is stability. The purpose of my analysis and my whole thought is designed to avoid nuclear war in that part of the world and designed to protect the interests of our friend and supporter, Israel. The analysis is fully in accord with the U.S. position of regarding Israel as a friend, as a supporter, and as a strategic asset in an area which is threatened by the Soviet Union.

Senator TSONGAS. So you do not advocate a nuclear guarantee?

Mr. LEFEVER. I said before, sir, that I went through various options. I am not giving policy advice here; I am analyzing options which the U.S. Government might consider.

Senator TSONGAS. Well, Dr. Lefever, as I read page 143, you reject the courses in the paragraphs prior to the one where you argue for the nuclear guarantee, and at no point subsequent to that do you reject the idea of a nuclear guarantee for Arab States.

I would request that those pages be made a part of the record, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. LEFEVER. Mr. Chairman, may I request that the relevant sections on Israel and Egypt be included, so that people can read what I write in context?

Senator TSONGAS. I have no objection to that.

The CHAIRMAN. Approximately what length is that?

Mr. LEFEVER. Well, it is about 10 pages.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, it is so ordered. [The material referred to follows:]

FUTURE RELATIONS OF ISRAEL AND EGYPT [PAGES 79-81]

Any plausible future for the relationship between Israel and its hostile Arab neighbors will be significantly influenced by the interests and behavior of the Soviet Union and the United States in the Middle East and the fundamental relation between the two superpowers. Under probable circumstances, a high level of tension and political conflict between Israel and the Arab states will continue and a fifth war is always a possibility. Such a war could involve nuclear

arms.

The United States and the Soviet Union have had an essentially adversary relationship in the Middle East, but with varying degrees of hostility and accommodation. The United States will continue to be the chief patron of Israel and the Soviet Union the principal backer of the militant Arab states; both superpowers will probably maintain some supportive relationship with Egypt, though American influence appears to be increasing at Russia's expense. At times, U.S. pressure on Israel to make concessions in the interest of a comprehensive ArabIsraeli settlement has strained relations between the two.

Under these changing circumstances, both Israel and Egypt have sought to chart a more independent and self-reliant course. This has clear implications for their respective nuclear decisions. In fact, Israel has always pursued an almost wholly independent nuclear policy, albeit with technical assistance from France and the United States, under the fundamental assumption that in the ultimate crisis of survival Israel could not depend on the United States to come to its rescue. Israeli leaders with increasing frequency have emphasized to their people that in the final analysis Israel must depend on its own courage, will, and resources, though this determined political stance does not preclude attempts to get all the military assistance possible from the United States. Such assistance is regarded as essential for providing the resources necessary for Israel to consolidate its independent course.

Egypt is also attempting to become more independent, primarily by diversifying the sources of external diplomatic and material support. It will continue to receive substantial aid from Saudi Arabia. Though Soviet military assistance has been cut off, it could resume. In the meantime, the United States is providing some economic aid and arranging to sell nuclear power reactors to Egypt. But Egypt is not likely to become an ally of the United States, much less a beneficiary of a U.S. nuclear guarantee.

Within this context there are three broad alternatives nuclear futures short of war for Israel and Egypt: continuation of the Israeli monopoly, a nuclear arms race, or a balance of terror. Until the mid-1980s, and perhaps well beyond, Israel will probably continue to enjoy a nuclear monopoly. During these years it would probably increase the size, quality, and range of its bomb force. The monopoly would be maintained because of Israel's substantial lead and Egypt's relatively less advanced state of nuclear development. Israel would probably use its nuclear capacity with restraint holding it in the background, not boasting or threatening, or even acknowledging its existence. Under certain circumstances, however, Israel might threaten its use. While Egypt might prefer to balance Israel's force with one of its own, the material and political costs would outweigh the problematical benefits of its becoming involved in a nuclear arms race. The result of Israeli monopoly could be a kind of imposed stability. But it could serve to unite the Arab states in a massive conventional war against Israel.

Egypt might decide to challenge the Israeli monopoly by building a nuclear force of its own, taking all the necessary measures to develop the technical capabilities for exercising the nuclear option as rapidly as resource limitations and political constraints permit. Even a determined effort, with maximum external assistance from Arab and industrial states, would not be likely to yield a bombmaking capability much before 1985. At that point, Egypt would have to abrogate its safeguard agreements or otherwise violate the spirit or letter of the constraints that surround international commerce in nuclear technology and materials. Depending on many unpredictable factors on both sides, Egypt could not expect to catch up with Israel much before the year 2000. Egypt's effort could not be hidden and would certainly unleash anxieties in Israel and elsewhere. Egypt's aim would be to build a counterforce to balance Israel's advantage, to create a mutual deterrent system.

1 Attached are the relevant pages from "Nuclear Arms in the Third World: U.S. Policy Dilemma." by Ernest W. Lefever (Washington, D.C., The Brookings Institution, 1979: (pages 79-81 and 142-45.)

While a mutual deterrence subsystem in the Middle East could result in war, it might bring stability, which would not depend on a general political settlement having been achieved between Israel and the Arab states. Stephen Rosen, among others, advocates "a regional balance of terror as a path to stabilization. . . . A stable system of mutual deterrence may be entirely possible, and such a system may make a positive contribution to the political deescalation of the Arab-Israel conflict." "51 However, nonnuclear factors, such as the military intervention of a great power, which determine the consequences of nuclear acquisition could change abruptly; almost overnight the deterrent value of Egypt's nuclear capability could be transformed into a dangerous provocation.

A nuclear arms race between the two countries seems a more likely future course than either the establishment of a deterrent system or the indefinite continuation of the Israeli monopoly. It seems implausible that Israel will freeze its nuclear force at its present level. Whether the force remains static or is further strengthened, it would appear that, at the very least. Egypt will seek to develop the capacity to exercise the nuclear option. As with Pakistan and Iran, keeping open the nuclear option offers Egypt advantages of ambiguity and flexibility that a crash program to develop a nuclear force would not enjoy. A continuation of Israel's monopoly or the achievement of a balance of terror is possible, however, within the next twenty-five years. Each of the alternative directions has certain assets and liabilities as far as Middle Eastern stability is concerned. Any one could lead to nuclear war. In theoretical terms, a system of mutually assured destruction seems to offer the best hope for military stability, but the process for getting there a crash program by Egypt-carries many risks. Under any plausible circumstances, it is impossible to predict that an Egyptian deterrent would improve the situation over the present one in which the Israeli capability may impose a degree of stability in a complex and volatile situation. Hence, acquisition of nuclear arms by Egypt is more likely to be destabilizing than stabilizing and thus would run counter to U.S. interests.

For years Israel has enjoyed certain benefits of deterrence without suffering the political costs of being an open nuclear arms state. But this strategy always carried the risk that convincing disclosure of Israeli nuclear power could prompt countermeasures by Egypt or, under certain circumstances, by the USSR or the United States. Israel's force is not likely, however, to draw the Soviet Union and the United States into a nuclear confrontation. The past record of the superpowers in the Middle East and elsewhere suggests that each has developed certain disciplines and safeguards to prevent either from providing the other with a plausible reason to launch a nuclear attack.

A SIGNIFICANT FORCE THE ISRAELI CASE [Pages 142–145]

Israel is the only state in the Third World that appears to have a militarily significant nuclear force of ten or more bombs and the means to deliver them to plausible targets. No other threshold state is likely to acquire one by 1985, though India, Taiwan, or South Korea, if highly motivated, could have a significant capability by 2000. Thus Israel provides a view of the problems the United States confronts in attempting to blunt the destabilizing effects of acquisition. The potential responses by the United States to a militarily significant capability depend on how threatening the nuclear force appears to be. Assessments of the strength of Israel's nuclear arsenal can vary enormously, depending on how the complex Middle Eastern conflict is viewed. It is clear that Israel's force has neither caused nuclear war nor provoked Egypt into building an independent nuclear force of its own. It probably has prompted Egypt to take measures to keep open the nuclear arms option. And it has, according to Time's report on the 1973 crisis, caused Israel to exercise restraint.

Israel's regional monopoly is similar to the nuclear monopoly enjoyed by the United States before the Soviet Unions' first explosion. But Israel's policy options are limited by the nuclear power of the Soviet Union. The impact of the force is as impossible to predict as ever. At best, its effect on regional stability will continue to be ambiguous. It could either induce the Arab states to seek a peaceful settlement or encourage Arab belligerency, but it is more likely to have a mixed effect of simultaneously encouraging a peaceful solution and inducing Egypt to build a compensatory force of its own. Whatever impact Israel's force may have within

51 "Nuclearization and Stability in the Middle East," p. 157.

the region, it is not likely to draw the Soviet Union and the United States into a nuclear confrontation.

The general U.S. policy approach toward Israel and specific policy measures flow from a basic assessment of the net impact of Israel's nuclear force or an assessment of whether Israel's force strengthens stability, mildly disturbs the balance, seriously jeopardizes stability, or makes little difference either way. Regardless of its assessment, the United States as the chief patron of Israel has an obligation constantly to press on Israel a moderate, non belligerent foreign policy and a willingness to negotiate a peaceful settlement of its conflict with the Arab states. This would be the case were there no force. To this end, giving, suspending, and withholding of economic and military aid should be used as leverage. No special measures would be needed if Israel's force were held to be of little consequence and unlikely to be disruptive, or if it seemed likely to strengthen stability. That the U.S. government is apprehensive about Israel's nuclear power is indicated by its insistence on comprehensive safeguards for the reactor that is being sold to Israel. Consequently, the United States should undertake special measures to mitigate the dangers of this lopsided nuclear development in a region of unresolved conflict. The severity of the measures should reflect the seriousness of the perceived danger. If it is considered very serious, the United States should attempt to establish a nuclear balance in the area. This could be done theoretically by removing all nuclear arms or by helping Egypt to catch up with Israel. The first course would require Israel to destroy its nuclear weapons or surrender them to a credible international authority. The second would mean external aid to help Egypt develop a compensatory force so that a regional system of mutual deterrence could be established. Neither course appears feasible. The government of an imperiled state will not voluntarily surrender its ultimate weapon. And the United States, the chief advocate of the nonproliferation treaty, would hardly consider helping Egypt to build nuclear arms.

There are less drastic ways to help redress the nuclear imbalance and the United States has already been pursuing several. The sale of reactors to Egypt and Israel on the same terms will help balance the nuclear equation, while the significant increase in U.S. military and economic aid to Egypt will help to establish a more equitable general balance, as well as to replace Soviet influence. The U.S. support of Jordan also tends to offset Israel's military superiority and nuclear monopoly. Under these unique circumstances, the United States should consider extending a nuclear guarantee to Egypt, Syria, and other Arab states. This would have the effect of deterring both the use of Israel's force for military purposes or blackmail and the acquisition of nuclear arms by Egypt. Thus far, compensatory assistance to Israel's potential victims has not been sufficient to offset the bargaining advantage and war-making potential of the Israeli force, so the United States should pursue efforts to deter or prevent Israel from increasing its nuclear capability. In a sense it is already doing so through participation in the nonproliferation treaty, the IAEA safeguards system, and the suppliers group, but the effect on Israel is severely limited because its vital nuclear facilities are not safeguarded. The United States and other concerned powers could demand that Israel grant IAEA inspectors access to all facilities, but this demand is not likely to be met.

This raises the question of undertaking measures of denial or even punitive action against Israel. Should the United States withhold military and economic aid until Israel opens all its facilities to IAEA inspection, announces the size and character of its nuclear force, or makes a no-first-use pledge? Domestic political pressures in the United States would make it very difficult to invoke such denial measures, though both Senators Glenn and Ribicoff proposed measures of that severity to curb nuclear forces in the Third World. They recommended a ban on all nuclear exports to states that are not parties to the nonproliferation treaty, and Israel is not a party.

The United States should undertake a series of measures designed to encourage Israel to pursue a moderate foreign and military policy and to refrain from brandishing a nuclear threat. They might well include the use of military and economic aid as a weapon to persuade Israel to join the nonproliferation treaty and to admit IAEA inspectors. These measures might be combined with compensatory efforts to bolster the security of Egypt and other Arab states subject to possible nuclear blackmail or attack. The efforts directed toward

8 Glenn, Washington Post, March 8, 1976; and Abraham A. Ribicoff. New York Times, March 26, 1976.