masses that are being persecuted and being punished and terrorized, until hopefully some day, somehow, someplace, the people of that nation end up with something better than what they have lived with in the past.

I think history itself is a record of the attempts to improve upon previous conditions. And that's why I would hate to think that the message you're giving me is: Wait a minute, don't help any overthrow of anything anywhere, because we may end up with something worse, I say we have to aid the struggle against oppression everywhere or, at least, attempt to bring to the attention of the civilized world that changes need to take place in those areas.

Mr. LEFEVER. Senator, I certainly did not make myself clear. There are some oppressive regimes in the world which I would like to see overthrown. I am not sure it is the role of the United States to overthrow them. I think it is primarily the role of their own people.

There are some oppressive regimes which other people are trying to overthrow in order to install even more oppressive regimes. Life is pretty complex out there, and in those situations, which academics call "contested sovereignty," who is going to run the place, it would be just grand if we could wipe our hands clean and stay out.

But unfortunately there is a power in the world which is active in all of these places attempting to improve its vision of the future on that country, which in my view is a very brutal vision. So our choice is often to go in on the side of moderation, and I don't think we have always been losers by any means, and to attempt to nudge that situation in a more humane direction in order to prevent an even greater evil from coming.

It's a pragmatic thing. It is a very difficult thing, too.

Senator ZORINSKY. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Zorinsky.
Senator Tsongas.

Senator TSONGAS. Dr. Lefever, do you know what the administration position is on the seating of Pol Pot in the United Nations? Mr. LEFEVER. No, I do not know that position in detail. But I would be very glad to provide a written answer on that.

[The material referred to follows:]

RECOGNITION OF THE DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA REGIME

The United States has never recognized the Democratic Kampuchea (DK) regime, formerly headed by Pol Pot, and has consistently condemned that regime's gross violations of human rights. From 1975 through 1978 the DK was the only claimant for the Kampuchean seat at the U.N. and its credentials were routinely approved by the General Assembly, with the United States voting in favor. In 1978 and 1979, after close consultations with ASEAN and other friends and allies, the United States voted to continue to seat the DK regime on the technical grounds that there was no superior claimant. Our action does not in any way condone the abhorrent human rights violations under Pol Pot. The rival claimant, the Heng Samrin-lead People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) regime, was installed and is maintained by Vietnamese invasion and occupation. It has no valid claim to represent Kampuchea in the United Nations. To seat this regime would be to reward aggression and foreign domination.

The Reagan administration has reviewed policy toward Vietnam and Kampuchea, and is prepared to continue to support the ASEAN strategy on Kampuchea, including maintaining the seating of Democratie Kampuchea in the U.N. We foresee no likely developments which would change that strategy,

but should unexpected developments occur, we would consult closely with our friends, especially in ASEAN. We will also continue to oppose the return to power in Phnom Penh of the Pol Pot regime. We are working for a political solution in Kampuchea, as outlined in the UNGA resolution on Kampuchea, which would include the withdrawal of foreign forces, Khmer self-determination, and respect for the human rights of the Khmer people.

Senator TSONGAS. You had an article in "TV Guide" entitled "The Cambodian Blood Bath and the Great Silence," You referred to:

*** the bloodbath that has already happened, not in Cuba but in Cambodia. In the face of this massive atrocity, the President, the Congress and the United Nations have remained all but moot. American newspapers and TV with rare exceptions have neither reported the fact nor condemned what the "Christian Science Monitor" has called "one of the most brutal and concentrated onslaughts in history."

You go on to say that the "Wall Street Journal" suggests a partial reason for the silence:

*the frequent partnership of moral outrage and revolutionary zeal. The crimes of the Khmer Rouge, even though they dwarf some other state crimes of our times, have attracted less attention because they are inflicted in the name of revolution.

That was April 30, 1977. Now you're the designee for human rights, and I ask you what the position is on seating the same regime, and you say you don't know.

Mr. LEFEVER. Senator, this is under current review. It is a highly complex situation in which there are many actors. The Soviet Union is interested, the People's Republic of China is interested. There are contending factions on this.

The Pol Pot regime was a brutal genocidal regime.

Senator TSONGAS. Should we seat them? What is your personal opinion?

Mr. LEFEVER. I don't know enough about that circumstance to know whether they should be seated now or not.

Senator TSONGAS. One million people are annihilated by a genocidal regime and you say you have no opinion on whether that regime should be seated at the U.N.?

Mr. LEFEVER. This is a matter under discussion and big power factors are involved. It is very complex. I have already agreed to provide a written answer on this. It is a matter of sensitive current discussion inside our Government.

If it were simply seating that genocidal regime or a decent regime, there would be no problem. But it is a much more complex issue than

that.

Senator TSONGAS. Well, 1 million sparrows fell and the question of seating their murderers is under review.

Mr. LEFEVER. That's your definition of the problem.

Senator TSONGAS. How about 1 million people fell and your answer is, it is under review.

Senator HAYAKAWA. Will the Senator from Massachusetts yield? Senator TSONGAS. Yes: I vield.

Senator HAYAKAWA. The choice right now is between Heng Samrin, who is a murderer, has killed off millions, chased Cambodians out of their land, has been responsible for genocide, as versus Pol Pot, who is also a murderer and guilty of genocide. So I don't know how we can arrive at easy answers as to who is to be preferred and who is to be recognized.

I think you are asking Dr. Lefever a rather impossible question. Senator TSONGAS. The reason I raise the point is we have an article in TV Guide

Senator HAYAKAWA. I have the article in front of me.

Senator TSONGAS [continuing]. Which condemned the great silence. And here we are 4 years later saying it is under review. If a government can slaughter 1 million people and we still may support you at the U.N., why should anybody worry?

Let me talk about Nestle for a minute. Did you have a meeting with Mr. Herman Nickel, who is the Washington correspondent for "Fortune" magazine, on the notion of writing a piece involving the issue of infant formula?

Mr. LEFEVER. Yes, sir.

Senator TSONGAS. When was that meeting?

Mr. LEFEVER. I believe I talked with Mr. Nickel on October 4, 1979, and tried to persuade him to do one of the studies for the Center on the issue of infant nutrition in the Third World and infant formula. Senator TSONGAS. Did you give him a deadline for delivery of that article to the Center?

Mr. LEFEVER. Let me just try to put this into context. Mr. Nickel never heard of the infant formula controversy, and on October 25, which was 21 days later, he said he thought he might be interested if I could deliver material which I had been collecting from all parties of the conflict.

You will recall that the chief actors in this drama were starving babies in the Third World, their mothers, governments, WHO, UNICEF, church groups, INFACT, and manufacturers of formula. It is a highly complex controversy.

I approached Mr. Nickel because he had 20 years of distinguished service as a senior correspondent of Time, he headed the bureau in London and had done other case studies.

So he was reluctant to take on a subject he had never heard of before. But finally, on November 21, Mr. Nickel signed a contractual letter which called for a first draft by March 1, 1980. Mr. Nickel has not supplied the first draft of his study to this date because of a personal accident and unexpected travel abroad.

Senator TSONGAS. In that same March of 1980 did you receive money from the Nestlé Corp.

Mr. LEFEVER. No; I never received any money from the Nestlé Corp. Senator TSONGAS. Did the Center receive money?

Mr. LEFEVER. The nonprofit corporation of which I am an employee did receive a small contribution from Nestlé in March 1980.

Senator TSONGAS. Was that $5,000?

Mr. LEFEVER. It was $5,000.

Senator TSONGAS. So the $5,000 was paid by Nestlé in the same month that Mr. Nickel was asked to submit his first draft; is that correct?

Mr. LEFEVER. That is correct.

Senator TSONGAS. Did an article then appear in Fortune magazine in June 1980 entitled "The Corporation Haters"?

Mr. LEFEVER, That is correct.

Senator TSONGAS. And in July of that year did Nestlé provide more money to the Center?

Mr. LEFEVER. Yes; Nestlé did make a second contribution. I don't know the precise date. Yes; it was July 18 that we received a second contribution.

Senator TSONGAS. How much was that?

Mr. LEFEVER. The second contribution was $20,000.

Senator TSONGAS. Did you then have the article reprinted?

Mr. LEFEVER. The article was reprinted under a slightly different title in our distinguished reprint series.

Senator TSONGAS. And did you have that sent out to various people? Mr. LEFEVER. Of course. That's what we do with all articles. We promote them and try to sell them.

Senator TSONGAS. Did you indicate to your readership when you sent the article out that you had received money from the Nestlé Corp.? Mr. LEFEVER. No; I did not.

Senator TSONGAS. Are you aware of the memo alleged to have been written on August 10, 1980, by a estlé vice president to Nestlé's chief executive officer, Arthur Ferro? You must be aware of that memo. It's been in the press.

Mr. LEFEVER. I have heard about that memo.

Senator TSONGAS. Would you care to comment on it?

Mr. LEFEVER. No; I do not. I have not read the memo and it is not my business to read the internal memos or forgeries of our contributors. Senator TSONGAS. Are you saying this memo is a forgery?

Mr. LEFEVER. I am not saying this is a forgery. I don't know. I said it is not my business to read the internal memoranda of people who contribute to the Ethics and Public Policy Center.

I might say that your line of questioning suggests there is a connection between the contribution and our research, and there is no such connection.

Senator TSONGAS. Have you talked to Nestlé about the memo and asked them whether it was accurate?

Mr. LEFEVER. May I give some facts that will throw this into perspective?

Senator TSONGAS. If you could answer my question first, I would appreciate it.

Mr. LEFEVER. I have talked with some representatives from Nestlé, as we do talk with representatives of all of our contributors.

Senator TSONGAS. About the memorandum?

Mr. LEFEVER. A Nestlé person mentioned the memorandum, but I've never read it.

Senator TSONGAS. Did he say that the memorandum was a forgery? Mr. LEFEVER. I don't believe he said it was a forgery.

Senator TSONGAS. Why did you raise the issue of forgery? What makes you think it is a forgery?

Mr. LEFEVER. Because I don't know whether it is a forgery or not. Senator TSONGAS. Well, if you don't know, why did you suggest it was a forgery?

Mr. LEFEVER. Well, it's a possibility. Documents can be genuine or forged and I don't know which this is.

Senator TSONGAS. When you use the word "forgery," as when you use the word "unilateral disarmament," it carries a connotation. Mr. LEFEVER. Yes. A forgery is a false document.

Senator TSONGAS. That is my understanding as well.
Let me read from the memo:

The basic strategy for dealing with the boycott, i.e., containment of the awareness of the boycott campaign without being ourselves responsible for escalating the awareness levels, is working. It is unanimously endorsed by all those involved.

The credibility of third party rebuttals of the activist case was also unanimously endorsed. And the Fortune article together with the interest of the Ethics and Public Policy Center is the best opportunity we have had yet to put the record straight and must be fully exploited.

Implementation boycott. There must be maximum exploitation of the opportunities presented by the Fortune article and the Ethics and Public Policy Center's willingness to undertake additional activities. Mr. Guraunt is somewhat concerned that Nestlé should not be seen to be the dominant subscriber to the Ethics and Public Policy Center. Mr. Ward informs us that there are ways in which this matter can be satisfactorily handled, and in view of his own contact with Dr. Lefever and his presence in Washington, I suggest that Mr. Ward remain closely involved with the followup activities with the Center.

And you have never asked Nestlé whether that memorandum was accurate or inaccurate?

Mr. LEFEVER. I have not asked them that question.

Senator TSONGAS. If anybody had issued a memorandum involving my name with those kinds of implications. I assure you that I for one would have been on the phone to them the next day demanding an explanation.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Tsongas.

Senator Cranston-I beg your pardon-I didn't see Senator Helms. He would like to ask some additional questions.

Mr. LEFEVER. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have some time to clear up the implications of this rather strong statement with respect to Nestlé. I would like to give a few facts that are far more relevant than the ones we have just heard to this issue. And since this has been a matter of press attention for a long time, will there be any opportunity for me to have a few minutes?

Senator HELMS. Mr. Chairman, I suggest that Dr. Lefever be permitted to do it now. If the committee objects, I will yield my time to him, even though I have some questions of my own.

The CHAIRMAN. No; I think he should be able to clear up this point. And then, with the permission of the committee, after he has clarified. his position on the Nestlé point, which is an important one, we will recognize Senator Helms for 10 minutes.

Senator TSONGAS. Would the Senator yield?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator TSONGAS. The issue will be raised again. I was wondering whether we may inquire as the explanation goes along.

Senator HELMS. I don't think so. Mr. Chairman, I think that Dr. Lefever is entitled to state his position. With all due respect to my friend, you have constantly interrupted him when he was trying to answer the question. So I think he ought to have an opportunity to answer the question without interruption.

So I suggest we proceed.

Senator TSONGAS. I would withdraw the request then, Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Why don't we do this. We will make certain that we do stay here long enough for you to complete your answer on the Nestlé point. We will give Senator Helms 10 minutes to ask his questions. And then at that point, well, I see I don't have any time to yield, although I was ready to do so.