INDEX TO THE FEDERALIST* Achæn League, i. 105, 119, 246, 316. Achæns: They abandoned the experi- the Constitution, concerning them, i. 301. Anne, Queen: Extracts from her letter Articles of Confederation (appendix), Assemblies, objections to numerous, i. 378, 381, 383 (see "House of Rep- Bills of Credit: Provision of the Consti- Cambray, League of, i. 39. Cato: An opponent of the Constitution, cited, ii. 31. Coalition: The word used in a good sense, i. 397. Commerce (see "Confederation," Union): Examination of the A source of contention between the Policy of prohibitory regulations in Power under the Constitution of regu- Confederacies: Inexpediency of divid- Confederate Republic: Defined, i. 61. i. 97. Its great and radical vice, legislation Difference between a league and a gov- Want of a sanction to its laws, i. 135. Want of a power to regulate commerce, The nugatory power of raising armies, The right of equal suffrage among the Want of a judiciary power, a crowning *This index is the one made for the edition published in Washington in 1831 14 (209) The organization of Congress, another; Want of popular consent to it, another Impracticable character of certain pro- Answer to the question, on what princi- parties to it, i, 302. Articles of (appendix ), ii. 175-184. Public Debt"): Extracts from the Power of, under the federal Constitu- tion, over a district of territory not Consolidation: The plan of the Union improper consolidation of them- i. 423. Union, Confederation," "Standing Answer to an objection drawn from the Its guaranty to the States of a republi- Wisdom of the provision in the Consti- Laws under it, as to the enumerated and legitimate objects of its juris- Number and inconsistency of the Its conformity to republican principles, ments under it, and under the State Neither a national nor a federal consti- General view of the powers which it proposes to vest in the Union, i. 274. The power of defining and punishing Power of regulating commerce, i. 288. terfeiters, and to regulate weights Power to establish uniform laws of Power concerning public acts, records, Power of establishing post-roads, i. 293. over a district not exceeding ten Power concerning treason, i. 296. longing to the United States, i. 297 form of government to every State Obligation concerning public debts Provision i. 301. concerning amendments, Provision concerning the ratification by Question, what relation is to exist be- Disabilities of the States created by the Power given by it to Congress, to make Four other possible alternatives, which Provision that the Constitution, laws, Oath, etc., of officers, etc., to support the constitution, i. 312. Consists much less in the addition of Its provisions concerning the proper Peculiar division under it, of the power Its mode of protecting the minority Answer to the objection that it contains In the sense, and to the extent con- Answer to an objection to the Consti- tution, founded on the remoteness provision concerning debts due to Federal Constitution as agreed upon by the Convention ii. 185 et seq. Signers, ii. 198, 199. Amendments, ii. 201 et seq. (appendix), Construction, two rules of, i. 266. Provision of the Constitution concern- Convention at Philadelphia in 1787, i. 16 Delaware (see "States "): Provision in Number of representatives in the more Democracy: A pure one defined, i. 67. Principles of the British Constitution The partition among them to be main- District: Exclusive legislation of Con- Economy: The money saved from one England (see “Great Britain » ). Faction: Defined, i. 62. Its latent cause inherent in human The various and unequal distribution Federal Constitution (appendix) ii. 185 et seq. Fox, Charles James: His India bill, ii. 63. Geometry: Why its principles are re- Georgia: Provision in her constitution, concerning the separation of the legislative, executive, and judiciary powers, i. 336. Number of representatives in the more numerous branch of her legislature, i. 379. Germanic Empire: Its origin, constitution, and disadvantages, i. 124. Gold and Silver: Principle on which the States are inhibited to make anything else a tender in payment of debts, i. 305. Government (see • Minorities "): A government, the constitution of which renders it unfit to be intrusted with all the powers which a free people ought to delegate to any government, would be an unsafe and improper depositary of the national interests, i. 156. The danger of fettering it with restrictions which cannot be observed, i. 169. Examples among the States of impracticable restrictions, i. 170. Remarkable feature of every govern ment reported by ancient history which was established by deliberation and consent, i. 246. The reason of it, i. 247. Ought to control the passions, and to be controlled by the reason of the public, i. 339, 354. The greatest of all reflections on human nature, i. 354. Wise kings will always be served by able ministers, ii. II. The true test of a good government is its aptitude and tendency to produce a good administration, ii. 38. Definition of a limited constitution, Term of a member's service, i. 360, 365, 371. Biennial elections defended, i. 367, 370. Argument in their favor derived from the time they afford a representative for acquiring the requisite information, i. 367, 369, 378. The ratio of representation, i. 372, 377. Its proposed number of members defended, i. 378, 388. Provision of the Constitution concerning the ineligibility of its members under certain circumstances, to civil offices, i. 383. Imputed tendency of the plan for the House of Representatives, to elevate the few above the many, i. 389. Provision for the future augmentation of its members considered, i. 396. Economy consulted by the provision for its temporary number, i. 400. Maxim as to the proper number of representatives, i. 401. Why more than a majority ought not to be required for a quorum, i. 401. Provision for regulating elections to it, i. 403. Less likely than local legislatures to be partial to particular interests, i. 410. Advantage of uniformity in the time of elections, i. 419. Why it ought to have no power in the formation of treaties, ii. 83. Why it ought to have no power in the appointment of federal officers, ii. 96. Human Nature: Its fair side, i. 383. A power over a man's support is a power over his will, ii. 70, 107. Hume, David: Citation from his essays, ii. 171. Impeachments (see "Senate," "Judiciary," "States," under their several titles). Indians: Difficulties concerning them when residing within a State, i. 288. Innovation : Its dangers exaggerated, some of its beneficial results, i. 94. Ireland, Elections in, i. 362. Jefferson, Thomas: Cited to show the evils in the constitution of Virginia, arising from the want of a barrier between the legislative, executive, and judiciary powers, i. 340. His draft of a Constitution cited, i. 344. His idea of a convention for correcting breaches of it, i. 344. Defects of this plan, i. 344-348. Jenkinson, Charles: His remarks introductory to his bill for regulating the commerce between Great Britain and the United States, i., 141. Judiciary (see "Jury Trial"): Want of, i. 148. |