Mr. President, the Senate having gone through the different amendments which have been before them, and it not being probable that there are many more, if any other, intended to be brought forward, the proper period for submitting a proposition, which will fairly bring into notice the general views of this subject, has, perhaps, now arrived. In support, then, of the proposition of postponement, to the first Monday in December next, of the further consideration of this bill, which I purpose to move you, I beg the indulgence of the Senate, while I endeavor to show, first, that it transcends the Constitutional power of Congress to pass a bill containing the provisions which this does; secondly, the inexpediency of enacting such a law as this, even if we possess the Constitutional power to do it; and thirdly, BANK OF THE UNITED STATES. that our true policy is to avoid, at this time, leThe Senate resumed the consideration, in Com-gislating upon the subject-to pass no law, at the mittee, of the bill from the House, to incorporate present session, incorporating a banking comthe subscribers to the Bank of the United States, pany.

That which has heretofore been the occasion of so much heated controversy, was simply a question relating to the existence or non-existence of a power in Congress to incorporate a company for establishing a bank. That question is now at rest, nor do I propose to disturb it. The sole inquiry we now have to make is, as to the true character and just extent of this authority, that we may not, in the exercise of it, carry it beyond its proper limits.

APRIL, 1816.

they devolved upon implication? Did not that enlightened body know that grants of specially enumerated authorities ould not warrant the exercise of a power as a means for carrying into effect another power, where the means itself is, in character and importance, entitled to rank with some one of the enumerated authorities? That such is the real character of the means in question, in relation to some of those authorities, even limited and circumscribed as it may be, I

insisting. That I have a doubt, therefore, on my mind, on this point, I am free to confess. It is possible, perhaps it is probable, if the vote I am to give upon this bill demanded of me, in respect to that difficulty, a decision, that further deliberation, aided by the authorities which, I am told, support the opposite opinion, might remove that doubt.

The power that is granted is a power to estab-am obliged to admit there is too much reason for lish a bank for a particular end, and, of course, constitutes only a part of the general power, in relation to the establishment of banks that previously existed in the States. For this reason it is a power of a minor character to that of the States, and is to be exercised always with a steady and distinct view to the end for which it is created. So far as it goes, it is a lawful power, and has a right to pursue its prescribed course. It may keep company with the State authority, but has no right to quarrel and slay its companion on the road. Every application, then, of this power, by the United States, which has a tendency to embarrass or impair the free exercise of the power reserved to the States, is unwarranted, and if done by us with a view to such a purpose, is the affair of arrogance and usurpation.

Sir, I confidently rely upon the cheerfulness with which honorable gentlemen who have heretofore so strenuously denied the existence of the power in question in this Government, will accompany me in the inquiry respecting the extent of this power. It is agreed, on all hands, to be (not an original, substantive, but) a derivative, incidental power. What, then, is the specially enumerated power to which it is incident, as one of the "necessary and proper" means for its execution?

Is it an incident to the power to "promote the general welfare?" The capacious character of this provision, if it is to be viewed simply as a grant of power, would render the subsequent enumeration of special powers a matter of supererogation. The terms "general welfare," when used in the Constitution, can only be considered as having themselves reference to one of the great objects for the promotion of which this Government was established, and for the accomplishment of which the special powers, contained in the Constitution, have been delegated.

This is not a primary, expressed, original power. In vain, as such, do we seek for it in the Constitution. It is only a secondary, an implied, derivative power, if such may be properly termed the means of executing an expressly delegated power. Here it may fairly be asked, Why was this power left to implication? Did it escape notice? Was it overlooked? Was it too unimportant for enumeration? Every view of this subject, and every relation in which it can be placed, to the other authorities, affords an inference not easily resisted, that a grant of this power was not intended to be applied. If the express grant of such a power was moved, the silence of the Constitution, as to that power, proves that it must have been rejected. I understand that it was moved in that body, and was rejected. If this was actually the case, (as I am persuaded it was,) it certainly requires the utmost effort of ingenuity to prove that this power was left to implication, in order that the subordinacy of its character might be the more clearly established, and the arrogance of its pretensions the more easily repressed. This is all, if it be not a great deal more than any fair mode of interpreting the Constitution, as we have it, will warrant. We cannot, for a moment, suppose that the great Is this power derived from that of coining men, who formed this frame of government, were money, regulating its value and that of foreign unacquainted with, or unmindful of, the impo- coin? Is the right to establish a National Bank, sing character of this power, or of its history on account of its tendency in our hands to operhere or abroad. Did they not know that a prop-ate upon what is called the currency of the counosition to incorporate a banking company, by the old Congress, had been, by that body, rejected? And furthermore, could those grave and learned men been unaware (if they intended this power to be inferred as a means of executing another power) of the arduous, perhaps I might be permitted to say, the odious character of the task

Is this authority to establish a bank an incident to the power of Congress "to borrow money on the credit of the United States," by reason of its correlative tendency in procuring a faculty to lend? If this be the source from which it is lawfully derived, we need look no further for the origin of this or of any other authority. If this be its fountain-head, we have here a never-failing spring of power, abundantly sufficient for all the purposes, lawful or unlawful, of this or of any other Government upon earth. I turn away from it, therefore, without further investigation.

try, derived from this or any other specially delegated authority? There are two provisions in the Constitution which have some bearing upon this point. That to which I have just referred respecting coin, and that which prohibits the States the issue of "bills of credit, and the declaring of anything but gold and silver a lawful

tender in the payment of debts." It cannot be necessary to argue that a power to make a bank distinctly with a view to its putting into circulation promissory notes that shall have the faculty of mixing and keeping company with the currency of the country, and of becoming something like paper money, is not a necessary and proper auxiliary to the power in this Government of making a metallic medium; that a power, in short, to make a metallic money has not incident to it, as a "necessary and proper" means for its execution, the power to make a paper money. Nor need any time be spent in resisting an inference, drawn from a restraint imposed upon a particular power in the State governments, which affects to communicate to, and to set up in, this Government a faculty co-ordinate with another power, which is left in those governments, free and unshackled. So far, then, as honorable gentlemen say this measure is intended or calculated, whether with a view to regulation or improvement, or under any other pretence, to operate upon what is called the national currency; or, in other words, to restrain the States from establishing similar institutions, and impair the free exercise of the franchises of those already incorporated, it is warranted by no part of the Constitution.

SENATE.

a time when the metallic medium shall disappear from circulation. Here provision, in relation to the currency generally, would seem at first, to be intended for an event like that of the disappearance of the metallic medium; but we must always remember that our power, in relation to the medium of circulation, refers solely to a metallic medium; and of course excludes the other-expressio unius est exclusio alterius. If it be not questioned how far, in this point of view, as connected with the currency (a subject, as beforementioned, expressly legislated upon) there is a power to procure for the people these kind of facilities, for the payment of their taxes; surely the power must, in this respect, confine itself directly to this end. What then is the capital necessary for constituting a bank to answer this purpose? This ought to have been shown us. Those who have no warrant to employ this power, but distinetly with a view to the attainment of a particular end, must have known that the purposes for which alone it can be lawfully used, prescribe the limitations to its exercise. The moral obligation imposed upon them not to exceed those limits, requires, likewise, that they should ascertain where they were placed. If there has been an inquiry made upon this head, what principles have guided that inquiry; and which of them have been presented to the Senate? What cal

I come now, sir, to that part of the Constitution where alone can be found, if anywhere, the law-culations have been submitted to us, to show that, ful source of the authority of this Government to incorporate a banking company. We have the power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises," for certain great national purposes. It is now admitted, by most of the former opponents of this doctrine, that the estabblishment of a National Bank is nothing more than the employment of a "necessary and proper" means for carrying "into execution" the power to which I have just referred. The correctness of this doctrine, I have before declared it to be not my purpose to call into question. This part of my argument is entirely predicated upon its admission, and is designed solely to be confined to those views of the subject which will show the true character and just extent of this authority, and enable us to determine whether we are not carrying it, by the provisions of the bill now on our tables, further than is warranted by the Constitution. This, then, being the power to which the authority to establish a bank is incident, as a "necessary and proper" means for its execution, we cannot have much difficulty in the definition of its limits. Its effect upon this power must be in relation to the collection, the safe-keeping and transmission of the public revenue. The notes which a bank issues may (but, by the by, the affairs of a bank may be mismanaged and they may not) provide the people with an equal medium for the payment of their public dues to this Government. This is, to a certain extent, to operate upon the currency; it is not merely to afford the people, in their relations with the Government, something more portable and convenient to procure, and pay, than metallic money, but it is to provide them with a medium of contribution, at

in respect to the capital, we are not exceeding the pale of our authority? The hazard of excess must not be incurred, while there are any means at our command of ascertaining how it may be avoided. It is not for those of us who think it, at this time, inexpedient to establish a bank, to show where the excess is. It is incumbent upon the friends of this bill, who call upon us for our votes, who desire that we should keep them company, to prove to us that they are going no further than they ought to go. This they have not done. It has not been affirmatively proven to us that a capital to this amount is necessary; and, for one, I think it can be demonstrated that a capital of thirty-five millions, is larger than is required, for the purposes for which we are to establish a bank. A capital much lower than even twenty millions would be adequate to the establishment of a bank, in each State in the Union; and the objects of safe-keeping, and easy transmission of the public revenue accomplished. The capital of this bank, with a view to the effect of its notes, in affording an equal medium for the payment by the people, and the receipt by the Government, of the public dues, is not to be inquired into, with a view to any given state of things. The charter is to last for twenty years. If this capital, during that period, should be likely to become too small, the power to raise it by our own, or other subscriptions, may be reserved. If we have a view, in ascertaining the proper extent of this capital, to periods when the preservative of a metallic medium shall be withdrawn from the paper circulation, then this capital (if the bank is to be what its advocates insist upon to be their intention to render it, a specie paying bank,) is unnecessarily large. Íts

SENATE.

Bank of the United States.

APRIL, 1816.

issues, in such times, must be limited, not by the amount of the public revenue, but by that of the specie in its vaults. If our attention, however, is principally directed, as to me it seems it ought to be, to the usual and natural state of things, when the presence of the metallic medium will afford to the paper currency a free and uninterrupted circulation, then a much smaller capital than that of thirty-five millions, in such a state of things, would enable the bank, by the succes-effect of this regulation, and insists that it comsive issues and returns of its paper, to afford to the people and to the Government the desired facilities. The process between the Government and the people, is that of payment and disbursement; and the steady and uniform succession of these operations, which can never be disturbed, communicates to a paper medium, even in a higher degree, the well known faculty belonging to a metallic medium, of transacting a large amount of business, with a small amount of money. In this view of the subject, can there be a question whether a much smaller capital would not afford every lawful facility that the revenue operations of this Government require? A capital of ten millions successfully accomplished this object, and with the aid of three or four millions of other banking capital, conjointly with the metallic medium, circulated the whole business of the Government and the country. Surely, then, a national banking capital of twenty millions, with the banking capital of the States, will be now amply sufficient for the same purposes; however high may be our estimate of the increased activity and expansion of the industry and enterprise of the country. If I am well founded in these remarks, I have sustained and established one Constitutional objection to this bill; by showing that the capital of this bank is larger than is necessary for the accomplishment of the objects we are required to keep in view, in the establishment of this institution.

against the mischief it might otherwise do. Sir, I deny not the truth of this position; but still it equally remains to be shown that the regulation in question, which invests the Government with an influence of such magnitude, is "necessary and proper" to prevent a greater mischief than the one which the regulation itself introduces. The honorable gentleman from Virgina (Mr. BARBOUR) contends for the salutary municates to the Government an influence too unimportant to justify any serious apprehension. He considers these directors merely as sentinels on the watch tower, and that the smallness of their number can never give to the Government a dangerous ascendency in the management of this institution. Let us for a moment inquire into the character of these directors. If they are sentinels on the watch tower; if they are to be enlisted into our service, what bounty are we to give them; what pay are they to receive from us? They are to perform for us an important service; they are to apprize us of the earliest approaches of danger. The board of directors will be daily assembled, and these our sentinels must mount guard as often; they are to have a full share of trouble in the superintendence of this institution, and they are to do all this, not for the good of the concern, in which they have no participation, but for our advantage solely, that we may know, in time to take care of ourselves, when this company is likely to go astray from its duty to the stockholders, the country, or the Government. These are services, I admit, of great value, and to be performed, no doubt, by able and virtuous men; and yet, for all this, you pay nothing; and why so? Are we to calculate upon a degree of patriotism and disinterestedness, to which we make no claim ourselves? The truth is, we do not expect these services to be performed for us without remuneration; but the anomaly consists There is another and a more interesting point in our not paying for them ourselves. These of view which it remains to notice, and which spies are to be in our service, and to labor for us, goes to show that this bill does not merely, in on account of the pay they receive from others. respect to capital, exceed our Constitutional au- In imitation of the Napoleon model, these gentlethority. I refer to that provision which author- men are to be maintained by those whom they are izes the appointment of a certain proportion of set over to guard. Their posts will be places in the directors of this bank by the Government. request at all times-in peace as well as in war. Every control and authority over this great In times of peace, of public repose, when the moneyed institution, so intimately connected as business of the country is undisturbed, and the it is with the great interests of society, beyond Government in no need of loans from the bank, what is requisite for the promotion of the limited these directorships will be entirely useless, for objects we are bound to keep in view, communi- any lawful purpose, to the United States. During cates to the Government an influence and patron- this period, the men who hold these appointments, age which it has no right to possess. It is proper and their numerous friends, will be but as vulthat I should circumscribe, within narrow limits, tures fattening on the institution. During this what I have to say in respect to the just charac period you obtain a patronage for the Administer of that influence, after the able view of it tration, through the medium of these directors, which must have been presented by the honor- and their retainers, without the performance of able member from New York (Mr. KING) in sup- any lawful service. In th respect, then, the port of his motion to strike out this part of the provision is unconstitutionals and the influence bill. The honorable chairman (Mr. BIBB) who for which you oblige others to pay, is as unjust as reported this bill, in reply to that argument, in- it is unconstitutional. But when the season of sisted that there was incident to the power to difficulty arrives; when war shall disturb and establish a bank, that of prescribing the regula- | break up the regular course of business; when tions which are necessary to guard the country public and private credit shall be shaken; when