liar to a certain dog under exceptional conditions; the result was such as would, or at least might, have arisen in man from a realisation of danger, a knowledge of the best available means of avoiding it, and an unselfish or selfsacrificing readiness to adopt these means.

We know, moreover, from other incidents that certain dogs are capable of the highest self-sacrifice; that they realise danger not only as it threatens themselves, but also when it approaches those in whom they are interested; that they are ingenious in devising the means of preventing or removing it. We equally know that dogs, like all other animals, have a keen love of life-that they are selfishly ready to take all necessary means for self-preservation, and that some are too selfish, and others too stupid, to place their master's interests before their own.

While, therefore, the dog that saved its master from death by cold may have been selfish or stupid, it is at least quite as legitimate to suppose that it may have been sagacious and self-sacrificing-in other words, that it was intentionally and consciously its master's saviour. That such was the case no man dare, however, affirm; that it may have been so is at least probable. In such a case it is only permitted to us to suppose-not to know-whether the dog had a definite object or motive, and what, if so, that object or motive was.

Escapes from new homes are common in certain runaway dogs; desertions from their masters' houses are so frequent that such animals are repeatedly 'lost.' Here, again, any one of several motive causes may be operative-such as affection for a former master or home, or dislike to a new proprietor or his abode; or the animal may be trained to abscond by one of those vendors of pet dogs so common in London, who in this way sell the same pug or poodle over and over again; or the action may be attributable to love of liberty; or it must be set down to caprice, or relegated to the category of eccentricity, individuality, or unexplained phenomena. Which or whether any-of these motives or causes has determined the conduct it may be impossible to decide, or even to guess.

In certain assemblies of Shetland crows, described by Edmonstone and others, we have the facts that—

1. The assembly is general-birds of the same species flock in large numbers from all quarters to a given point;

2. There is a marked difference in the behaviour of different individuals in the assembly, including

3. The punishment, or at least maltreatment, of one individual by the whole body

and man's interpretation is that in such an incident we have a criminal trial by a general jury, including arraignment, evidence, conviction, condemnation, and the execution of capital punishment. All this may have been embodied in the proceedings of the assembly. But it is equally improper to assert that it was or was not so. The unsatisfactoriness of man's speculations as to the cause, or nature, of the phenomena of animal conduct is frequently, however, much more obvious.

The pecking to death of the wounded by birds-such as certain Indian crows-is not necessarily an indication of cruelty, rather than of humanity. It has the effect at least of putting an end to an animal's torments-of preventing death by slow starvation, or its falling into the hands of cruel enemies; while it also effectually puts an end, however, to all chance of its recovery.

When the American goatsucker and other birds change their nest on any interference with their eggs, the supposed motive may be prudence, precaution, fear of danger and of loss of eggs; but much more probably the action must be referred for its causation to the category of puerperal, morbid mental phenomena.

In the mockery or mimicry of birds there may, or may not, be an intention to annoy; but it is not easy-to say the least to determine in what cases such a feeling or desire is present or absent. That it is frequently present is pointed out in the chapter on Practical Jokes.'

What may be the motive, feeling, or idea of the dog that day after day, week after week, or even year after year, couches upon its master's grave as in the case of the famous Greyfriars Bobby,' of Edinburgh- is a question abundantly open to conjecture.

Mutual assistance may or may not involve desire or intention to assist-for instance, in

1. Birds that accompany the African buffalo, rhinoceros, and crocodile.

2. Birds that warn man or other animals of danger. 3. Birds-such as the African honey-guide-that point or lead the way to honey stores.

So far from there being in such cases any moral merit, the ruling motive or idea may be self-interest. In the case of the African honey-guide its object is apparently selfish; for Livingstone tells us that it flies in front of the hunter only till he arrives at the spot where the bees' nest exists, waits till he takes the honey, and then feeds on the broken morsels of comb which fall to its share.' But even here distinction may have to be drawn between real and apparent selfishness.

There may be a selfish reason-real or apparent-for humanity, as in the case of ants feeding and kindly treating as friends-not as slaves-their milk cattle, plant lice (Aphides) or beetles (species of Claviger). Various authors have pointed out that Aphides are to ants-their captors, keepers, and masters-not mere prisoners of war; they are domesticated and happy. Whether or not the motive or purpose be a selfish one-an act of, or prompted by, selfinterest the procedure itself is obviously a wise, prudent, and commendable policy.

When harvesting ants nip off the germinating radicles of seeds prior to their storage, the possible result is a malting of the grain from the production of sugar; but it does not follow that the animals are aware of the fact that malting may or will occur, and that their destruction of the radicles has this end in view. They must be aware, however, of the necessity for destroying the radicle, and for thorough drying of the seeds in order to the proper preservation of the grain in their granaries.

An animal regarding itself for the first time in a mirror is less likely to be actuated by self-admiration than by mere surprise or wonder; or the reason may be curiosity or

In his 'Last Journals,' vol. i. p. 164.

jealousy of an imaginary rival (Darwin). Nor is the strut of the peacock or turkey cock necessarily an indication of vanity or pride.

Pierquin ascribes the running amok' of the 'rogue' elephant to a thirst for vengeance. But if he is correct in this supposition, the animal commits a mistake in directing its enmity against man, seeing that its banishment is at the hands of its own species. It may be, however, in the elephant, as in man, that vengeance is frequently vicarious, being inflicted on the weak, defenceless, and innocent when it cannot be directed successfully against the strong, powerful, and guilty.

The subject of motive, or object, is further, though casually, discussed in other chapters, such as that on 'Deception.'

CHAPTER XIX.

UNDERSTANDING OF HUMAN LANGUAGE.

As known to the lower animals, the language of man does not consist of mere

1. Words, whether singly, or in combination, as

2. Sentences or phrases in conversation; but it includes his

3. Looks facial expression, countenance-changes, the character of his eye.

4. Actions or movements, with gesture and gesticulations, attitude, manner, habits and observances, costume and its changes.

5. Natural voice-sounds, and their varied tones or intonations.

6. Artificial-musical or other-sounds, such as those made upon or by the bell, gong, horn, whistle, pipe, bagpipe, lute, drum, or bugle.

By dint of observation and reflection, certain dogsnotably the shepherds' dogs (or collies) of Scotland—that live in intimate association with their masters, that are man's fireside friends or companions, as well as his colleagues in work-perhaps even his accomplices in crimeteach themselves, or are taught by him, to understand and appreciate the meaning or significance of man's various modes of expression. They understand, for instance, his

1. Conversation-comments or remarks-at least when they themselves are spoken of.

2. Proper names—of persons, places, and things, including particularly their own names, the names of members of human households, and of household goods.

3. Calls by voice or by various musical instruments.