whether it is an indispensable element in mind; and, in short, what is the very essence of mind itself.

7. He should be free, or should free himself, from all bias, prejudging, preconception or misconception, foregone conclusion, mental preoccupation or prepossession.

8. He should be quite open to conviction by the evidence furnished by the observation of facts, ready to confess and renounce his own mistakes either of observation or inference.

9. There must be perfect honesty of purpose and singleness of aim, that purpose or aim being simply the discovery of truth.

10. But he must be prepared for the penalties that so frequently attach themselves to the discoverers or propounders of new or unpalatable truths; he must bear in mind that new truths are usually productive of uneasiness, suspicion, or fear in conservative minds, more especially when these truths come into conflict, as they so frequently do, with long-cherished associations or beliefs.

11. He must, however, be regardless of the consequences of his discovery or exposition of truth, of his logical generalisations from facts, or of his honest renunciation of error; fearless of the criticism, opposition, vilification--it may be even nowadays, and in one sense or another, persecution— to which his outspokenness may subject him.

12. He should have a natural capacity for, with due training and experience in, careful observation and accurate description.

13. It is at least desirable that he should be gifted with fertility in experiment, with a ready suggestiveness as to the best means of testing the correctness of his observations or conclusions.

14. The power of patient application to study, and to the study of many collateral branches of a main subject, is equally important.

15. A further mental endowment that may be considered indispensable is sympathy both with his subject—comparative psychology-and with the objects of his study-the lower animals themselves.

16. He should be able to discriminate between what man

can and cannot do in the solution of psychological problems; what the student may, or should not, attempt.

17. There should be no confusion with other-probably irrelevant questions or subjects. What the student has to determine for himself is simply this: whether other animals than man, and what animals, exhibit such phenomena as in him are ascribed to, or inseparably associated with, our ideas of mind.

18. His judgment should be cool and dispassionate, his decisions impartial; the mischievous element temper should be eliminated from all possible controversy in which he may find himself involved; and, as a rule, all controversy itself is to be avoided, as tending to the introduction of irrelevant and objectionable personalities.

19. In short, his investigation should be conducted on a strictly scientific method, and in the true scientific spirit.

Assuming, however, the perfect competency of the student to grapple with his task, there are certain inherent difficulties in the subject itself. For instance, it is not at all so easy. as may à priori appear, in drawing comparisons between the mental phenomena of man and other animals, to make the necessary allowance for differences in structure and habits, with which differences in mind and its manifestations are correlated.

Again, we are frequently told of man's incapacity for estimating either the quality or range, nature or comprehensiveness, of animal reason. But this is too obviously a conclusion based on the assumption that animal reason differs essentially from man's. Much has been urged as to the fallacy of reasoning by or from analogy; of judging of mind in other animals from the character of that of man. Fortunately, or unfortunately, it is only in this way, by comparison with his own ideas, feelings, actions, that man can study the mental or moral endowments of other animals at all; and it appears (to me at least) that this method of study, this mode of forming a judgment-such data for instituting a comparison-lead us to perfectly trustworthy results, assuming always that the student possesses the qualifications for such an enquiry that have been already specified.

In an investigation in which comparison is constantly being made between the human and animal mind, it is allimportant that man's standard, ideal, or type of the human mind should not be too high. It is much safer and sounder to form his ideal or average from the mental condition or phenomena of the lowest races and most degraded classes of man, than from those of the highly cultured Englishman or American, German or Frenchman.

Much has been made, by those who deny that animals possess mind at all, of the ever-present danger of confounding resemblance with identity; and I do not desire to conceal or depreciate the magnitude or frequency of occurrence of such pitfalls for the unwary. But the fact that the ex

istence of such difficulties or dangers is admitted by all parties those who affirm, as well as those who deny, the possession by the lower animals of mind of the same nature as that of man-merely indicates the desirability of the possession by the student of comparative psychology of the special qualifications before enumerated.

No doubt we can only make guesses or conjectures at the truth; we can attain but probabilities as to the presence or absence in the lower animals, under certain circumstances, of such faculties as consciousness. The difficulties of anything approaching proof or demonstration are sometimes insuperable; but these difficulties are equally great in regard to the analysis of the mental condition of countless thousands of human beings, in whose case at least it cannot be affirmed that analogical study is not admissible or appropriate.

The practice of mental analysis is indispensable to the student, who has only patiently to reflect upon the mental qualities involved, for instance, in some of the commonest tricks or feats of performing or other animals, to become convinced of the number, nature, and variety of their psychical aptitudes or gifts.

CHAPTER II.

FAULTS AND FANCIES OF TERMINOLOGY.

MAN has probably from time immemorial been in the habit of using towards his brother man abusive or opprobrious epithets based on the supposed evil qualities and mental inferiority or difference of the lower animals. These terms of contempt or abuse-of invidious comparison-embody and illustrate many current popular errors and prejudices regarding the mental endowments of animals, or the absence of such endowments. They libel animal intelligence and virtues, while they do no credit to those of man. Ignorant, selfish, proud, prejudiced man takes very much in vain the names of many estimable animals and animal virtues in such designations as the following:

1. Brute; brutal' or brutish,' brutality.' In so far as these words have become synonyms for want of feeling or affection, for savageness, for cruelty and the love thereof for its own sake; or for animals that are stupid, coarse, or unrefined, irrational, impulsive, swayed by the lower propensities, mentally degraded, devoid of moral sense, conscience, the religious sentiment, or even of reason (according to the dictionaries)-such terms are much more appropriate to man himself than to the lower animals; while, in so far as they are truly applicable to the latter, the propensities which man calls distinctively, but most erroneously, unjustly, and ungenerously, brutal' have been, in the majority of instances at least, produced by man's own bad example or training, or both-in short, by his own evil influence upon them, designed or unintentional.

2. Bestial, in so far as it is used synonymously with

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'brutal' in its bad sense. In the sense in which it is simply equivalent to animal' its use is quite legitimate, as when psycho-pathologists talk of 'bestial' insanity in man. man who is found in the gutter hopelessly drunk is said to have made a beast of himself;' and the coarse, rude, vulgar man is frequently said to 'behave like a beast.' Unfortunately there is a converse. Intoxication is one of the vices common to other animals with man-one of those, moreover, that they adopt by imitation from man. When, therefore, an unfortunate monkey, dog, or horse, ant or medusa, is inebriated, if the term 'behaving like a beast'-as one of opprobrium-is applicable at all, it is so to the man who is the cause, direct or indirect, of the animal's intoxication. Illustrations will be found in the chapter on alcoholic and other forms of intoxication' in animals.

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3. Animal, in so far as it is used distinctively — implying a distinction, structural or psychical-between man and other animals; for man himself is but an ‘animal,' and frequently very far from being either morally or intellectually the highest. The word animal' is both faulty and objectionable when applied-as it so commonly is by phrenologists-to feelings or faculties, organs, constitution, or nature in man in contrast with those other mental qualities which are described as moral and intellectual. Thus it is used as synonymous with sensual, sexual, unintellectual, when we speak of an 'animalised' man, or of a man as‘a mere animal,' or apply the term 'animality' to man's lower propensities in contradistinction to his 'humanity,' his moral and intellectual nature; but in all the senses in which it is so variously used it is at least quite as applicable to man as to other animals.

4. It is both an insult to the animals in question and an error in comparison to speak of conjugal or domestic jars as significant of a 'cat and dog life;' the fact being that cats and dogs frequently live-as do also many other animals, even of different genera and species-in the utmost harmony. If this harmony be not the result of natural conditions-if the animals in question do not contract natural companionship and interchange a natural affection and