CHAPTER IX.

ALLEGED PSYCHICAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN MAN AND OTHER

ANIMALS.

It is, and has for ages been, popularly believed that there exist certain fundamental psychical or other differences between man, on the one hand, and all other or lower animals on the other. There are, it is alleged, certain mental or other attributes which are distinctively or peculiarly human, absolutely confined to and characteristic of man, and which constitute therefore fixed and demonstrable points of differentiation between him and other animals. Some of these supposed exclusive prerogatives of man are physical; but the physical are so blended with the mental that in such a review of them as the present it is desirable not to separate them. The differences in question are, however, so numerous that it is equally impossible and unnecessary to analyse or discuss all of them here. And, moreover, some are of such a character that it could serve no good end to do more than refer to them en passant as being mere verbal distinctions— mere ingenious refinements of men determined by any means to prevent the occupation by other animals of the same moral or mental platform as man. It is proper, nevertheless, to give specimens of the different kinds of objections that have been raised-mainly by the prejudice of man-against granting to the lower animals a moral or mental status at all approaching that of the vain lords of the creation. Let us, then, enumerate the leading differences that have been supposed to distinguish man from what he contemptuously calls the brute;' and in doing so let us determine for ourselves how far the objections taken are real or substantial.

The chief alleged distinctive psychical or other attributes of man as compared with lower animals are, or include, the following:

1. It is alleged at the very outset that the possession of a soul or spirit places man on a platform by himself. I have already explained (in the Introduction) my reasons for not discussing, in the present volume, the subject of soul and its immortality in the lower animals. In so far as soul is to be held to be that part of man's nature which is destined to exist in a future, any discussion of the question whether such an attribute pertains to other animals must be purely speculative, and unsuitable therefore in a work which professes to deal only with the facts of observation, and with scientific or logical inferences from these facts. In man himself the existence of soul, with the probability or certainty of its immortality, is a matter of faith or belief, not of scientific demonstration. By no kind of scientific evidence can it be proved that soul exists, whether in man or other animals. And as regards belief and hope, there are, and have been, many eminent authors, including divines or theologians themselves, who have expressed their opinion that certain other animals, such as dogs, may have souls, which may further be immortal, just as is man's. No man is, therefore in a position to assert absolutely that the presence or absence of a soul characterises either man or other animals. Nor should it be forgotten that, according to many writers, the word or term 'soul' is regarded as synonymous with 'mind;' in which case there can be no question as to its possession by the higher animals; while the term 'soul' has also been applied-in figurative senses no doubt-even to plants. It obviously lies with those who assert dogmatically that all men have immortal souls, while no animals possess them, to reconcile with such a conviction the provable fact that many animals are superior to many men, not only in general intelligence, but as regards also moral sense and religious feeling.

2. The subject of immortality- the knowledge of or belief in a future destiny or state of existence is inseparably connected with the question of soul. Now, in the

first place, it is desirable to bear in mind how differently the matter of immortality is viewed at the present day by men of the highest scientific culture. We are told in one of the most recent expressions of scientific opinion regarding human religion-and especially regarding the peculiar tenets of the Christian religion-that some scientific men, 'professing themselves unable to conceive such an existence as a disembodied spirit. ... are forced to conclude, like Priestley, that the soul in its nature is not immortal believing, with Priestley and others, that immortality is a fresh and miraculous gift conferred upon man at the Resurrection; another [section of scientific men] unable to conceive the possibility of a miracle in the case of each individual, denying a future state altogether; while a third section maintains that there is no use in discussing the subject, because man after death has passed beyond the sphere of human enquiry.' Nor can it be pretended that a knowledge of a future existence, that anticipations of a future state, that ideas of immortality, are common to all men. There are, indeed, no means of either proving or disproving that such hopes or beliefs exist, on the one hand, in all men, or do not exist, on the other hand, in other animals or certain of them. It is, at all events, absurd to assert that other animals live only in and for the present. The whole phenomena of foresight, hope, expectation, contradict emphatically any such averment. The statement that they

live in and for the present only may indeed be made much more really or truly of many men, perhaps the majority. This subject is also touched upon in the chapters on 'The Religious Sentiment in Lower Man and the Higher Animals.'

3. Sense of religion, religious belief and ceremonies, ideas of God, the worship of a deity. Even among men of the highest scientific culture there are those who have maintained that we have no evidence of any such Being' as the God of the Christian; while in other chapters it is shown that whole races of lower man have no ideas of any sort of divinity, no kind of worship, no religious feeling. Unseen Universe,' pp. 34-5. ? Unseen Universe,' p. 35.

On the other hand, it will be seen that certain animals may, with perfect propriety, be said to have a kind or degree of religious feeling, including the recognition and worship of a god in the person of man, or of idols in the form of fetiches.

4. Moral sense, including ideas of good and evil, the sentiment of justice, conscience, sense of decency. But, as has been shown by Büchner, Houzeau, and others, notions of good and evil do not exist among all men. In other chapters it is pointed out that ideas of justice or right, that feelings of decency or shame, that that combination or essence of moral qualities known as conscience, are as certainly present in certain animals as they appear to be absent in countless numbers of men.

5. Self-consciousness. The distinction drawn by metaphysicians between consciousness and self-consciousness is too refined for practical purposes. Whatever self-consciousness may be, if it can be proved to be absent in the lower animals the probability is that, like so many presumably peculiar human attributes, it is equally wanting in whole races of man. According to Max Müller, the assertion as to selfconsciousness is either right or wrong according to the definition of the word;' and the same may be remarked of almost every one of the alleged moral or mental distinctions between man and other animals. Miss Cobbe and other authors hold that self-consciousness is necessarily associated with moral responsibility and abstract ideas, both of which are attributes of certain of the higher animals. Professor Huxley, too, apparently denies that self-consciousnesss is a good distinction, or a distinction at all. By perceiving objects as external, they [the lower animals] practically recognise the difference between the self and the not self.' The supposed distinction of self-consciousness was first pointed out by the schoolmen of the Middle Ages. Bayle, however, argues against it (Wardrop). Among its leading modern upholders was the late Professor Goodsir, of Edinburgh, but his definition of ordinary consciousness as instinctive in animals and rational in man is based on an utterly untenable distinction.

6. Potentiality. Much is made-a great deal too much

-of what is called the moral or mental potentiality of man. It is alleged that, however abject and degraded man is, he nevertheless has certain latent powers or capacities not possessed by other animals. In other words, it is held, though not in the same sense with Burns, that

A man's a man for a' that—

notwithstanding, that is, all the efforts which science has made, or may make, to show that he is virtually but an animal, and frequently in every sense a brute. Equally truthfully, however, may it be asserted that the potentiality of man must have frequently very narrow limits, while of that of other animals we have as yet but glimmerings. We know what is the actuality of mental and moral acquirement or progress in the savage; but it is as difficult to admitit would be as. inconsistent with fact to believe-that his moral or mental potentiality is that, or equal to that, of the civilised European, as it is to admit or believe that the moral or mental potentiality of the lower animals is on a par with that of civilised man. Intelligence is limited alike in the child, the civilised adult, the savage, the human idiot, and the animal, though the limit is not the same in all these cases. The possible range of mental or intellectual power has yet to be determined even in man, and man has also to confess his ignorance of either the latent psychical possibilities or potentialities of other animals, or of their mental acquisitions in relation to these potentialities. This subject of potentiality, of possible latent powers capable of development under favourable conditions, is nearly synonymous with

7. The capacity for progress or improvement. As regards man, we know that in whole races of savages progress is either non-apparent or to a most limited extent; while many nations have remained stationary for ages, and others have not only retrograded, but perished. The Australian aborigines, according to Madame Bingham, are incapable of civilisation. The missionaries have long given up any attempt to civilise them.' The East African negro for thousands of years has made no progress, although he has had sufficient contact with cultivated peoples,' according to