tice Sanderson. Thus, in 1847, on a memorial being presented to the Queen in Chief JusCouncil by the House of Assembly of the island of Grenada, complaining generally of the conduct of John Sanderson, Esq., in his office of chief justice of that is land, andenumerating various illegal and oppressive acts which he had committed during the fourteen years of his occupancy of the bench, her Majesty referred the memorial to the Judicial Committee. The chief justice also presented a memorial to the Queen, in which he complained of the reopening of bygone matters, which had been disposed of by competent authority, and protesting against the application, in the first instance, to the Privy Council, whilst there was a legitimate mode of proceeding by impeachment before the council in Grenada, where both parties could be conveniently heard; he prayed that the Assembly's complaint against him might be referred to that tribunal. But her Majesty referred the judge's memorial to the Judicial Committee. After hearing counsel on both sides, the committee decided that during the fourteen years he had held office, the chief justice appears to have committed several intemperate and some illegal acts; but that these acts were performed many years before the complaint was made, with only one exception, that of fining two magistrates for taking depositions in the third instead of the first person, the which, though erroneous and improper, was done in the execution of what the chief justice thought to be his duty. Wherefore, the committee did not think that he ought to be removed for misconduct.h mont. In July 1868, Chief Justice Beaumont, of British Guiana, was Chief Jusremoved from the bench, upon a memorial to the crown from the tice Beaulocal Court of Policy. This memorial charged the chief justice with improperly and intemperately holding up the executive government to contempt; vexatiously taking occasion to embarrass the colonial administration; imposing harsh and vindictive punishments; using offensive, intemperate, and calumnious language; illegally exercising arbitrary power; and improperly interfering with the judicial records. The memorial was referred to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, and at their recommendation an Order in Council was issued for the removal of the chief justice from office.i It is likewise competent to either House of the Imperial Parliament to entertain questions in relation to the appointment or conduct of colonial judges. Upon several occasions, a direct appeal has been made to the 6 Moore, P.C. pp. 38-42. Law Mag. N.S. v. 25, p. 358. J Case of Mr. Huggins, asst. judge in Sierra Leone, Hans. D. v. 198, p. Juris ic tion of Parlia judges. Colonial Imperial Parliament by, or on behalf of, judges who had been removed from office by the local authorities in various colonies or dependencies of the realm. Ionian judges. Ceylon judge. In 1863, a case of this description occurred in reference to certain judges in the Ionian Islands, which were then under the protection of the British Crown. Two of the judges of the Supreme Court in those islands had been removed by the Senate, with the approbation of the lord high commissioner, under a clause of the constitution which made judicial offices terminable at the end of every five years. Taking advantage of the fact that this provision had not been invariably enforced, the judges in question claimed that they ought to be considered as practically irremovable, and they appealed to the secretary of state for the colonies to be reinstated in office. But after a careful review of the circumstances, the colonial secretary ratified and confirmed the removal of these functionaries. The matter was then brought before Parliament, and debates arose in both Houses upon motions for the production of papers, and subsequently in the House of Lords for further papers upon the case. The latter motion was resisted by ministers on the ground that it was a most dangerous precedent to authorise an appeal to Parliament from acts of responsible ministers in the execution of the law, &c. Nevertheless, after much debate, the motion was agreed to, and the papers produced. But no action followed in either House. In the course of the debate an able despatch was quoted that had been addressed by the colonial secretary (Lord Glenelg) to the lord high commissioner (Sir Howard Douglas) in 1838, pointing out the incompatibility of an independent tenure of the judicial office with institutions so unlike those of Great Britain ; and showing that the principle of irremovability, as it is established in this country, and in other free states, is qualified and protected from abuse by other principles of at least equal importance. Such especially are:-1st. The right of the representatives of the people to address the crown for the removal of any judge for imputed misconduct; 2nd, the right of the public at large freely to discuss the judicial administration; and 3rd, the right of a supreme tribunal, exempt from all reasonable suspicion of prejudice, to receive and to decide upon impeachment of the judges.m In 1843, Mr. Langslow, a district judge in Ceylon, was suspended by the local government of Ceylon, and afterwards dismissed by the colonial secretary (Lord Stanley), for personal misconduct, not affect * Com. Pap. 1863, v. 38, p. 141. m See ante, vol. 1, p. 676. Hans. D. v. 170, p. 284. ing his judicial character. On petition from Mr. Langslow, an address to the Queen was moved in the House of Commons, on his behalf, for a consideration of his case, and that such relief might be granted to him as might seem fit. But after debate, wherein the justice of the sentence against Mr. Langslow was substantiated, the motion was withdrawn." In 1866, the attention of the House of Lords was directed (on a motion for papers) to the case of Mr. Manockjee Cursetjee, who had resigned his office of judge in the small causes court at Bombay, owing to the publication, by the government, in the newspapers, of a letter censuring him for his conduct upon the bench. After explanations from the secretary for India, the motion was withdrawn.° 6 able on a address. Since the introduction into the constitution of various RemovBritish colonies of the principle of responsible govern- parlia ment,' under which their political system has been mentary assimilated as far as possible to that of the mother country, a provision similar to that contained in the Act of Settlement, authorising the judges of the superior courts of law and equity to be appointed during 'good behaviour,' subject to removal upon an address from both Houses of Parliament, has been established by legislative enactment in the particular colonies. The constitutional Acts of the several Australian colonies, for example, contain clauses that the judges of the superior courts therein shall be appointed by the crown during 'good behaviour;' but, nevertheless, it shall be lawful for her Majesty to remove any such judge upon the address of both Houses of the colonial Parliament. In Canada, up to the time of confederation, the law was substantially the same, except that 'the governor' was empowered to remove a judge upon the address of both Houses of the Canadian Parliament; [and in case any judge so removed considered himself aggrieved thereby, he might, within six months, appeal Colonial judges. Also by the governor cil. to her Majesty in her Privy Council, and his amotion was not final until determined by that authority.]" This proviso is not in the British North America Act. It is therefore argued that as the appointment of a judge begins with 'the governor' (not with the sovereign), it also ends with the governor; and that a removal by this functionary cannot be appealed from to the crown in council. The effect of this distinction will be hereafter explained. Notwithstanding the facilities afforded for the reand coun- moval of a judge for misconduct, under the constitutional Acts, the imperial statute 22 Geo. III. may still be invoked by the governor and council of any British colony, for the amotion of a judge for any reasonable cause. Colonial legislative assemblies cannot be deprived of their undoubted constitutional right to address the crown for the removal of a judge, but the exercise of this right is altogether independent of the course which the governor of the colony may think fit to pursue. The experience, both of the Colonial Office and of the Privy Council, is, however, strongly in favour of proceedings by the governor, subject to a review by one or other of those departments of state; and they have invariably found that in the cases in which proceedings have originated with the local assemblies, the delay, uncertainty, and expense have been greatly augmented." But in a colony where procedure by parliamentary address against an offending judge has been established, recourse to the statute of George III. should only be had upon complaint of legal and official misbehaviour." 6 Upper Canada Consol Statutes, cap. 10, secs. 11, 12; Lower Canada Consol. Stats. cap. 81, sec. 1. By the imp. Act 30 Vict. c. 3, sec. 99, it is provided, that the judges of the superior courts,' throughout the whole Dominion of Canada, 'shall hold office during good behaviour, but shall be removable by the governor-general on address of the Senate and House of Commons.' r Papers respecting removal of judges, p. 8; Com. Pap. 1870, v. 49. See correspondence between ch. 6 circum The law officers of the crown in 1862 advised the secretary of state for the colonies, in reference to a case which had occurred in Queensland, Australia, as follows:-Although the judges' commissions in Queensland continue in force during 'good behaviour' sub- Under ject to a power in the crown to remove a judge upon the address of certain both Houses of the Legislature, we think that in this colony the stances. governor and council have power to remove any judge who (in the words of the Act 22 Geo. III. c. 75) shall be wilfully absent from the colony without a reasonable cause to be allowed by the governor and council, or shall neglect the duty of his office, or otherwise misbehave therein. In so advising, it is hardly necessary for us to add, that what the statute contemplates is a case of legal and official misbehaviour and breach of duty; not any mere error of judgment or wrongheadedness, consistent with the bona fide discharge of official duty. And we should think it extremely unadvisable that this power should be exercised at all, except in some very clear and urgent case of unquestionable delinquency: the power given to the crown, upon the addresses of the legislature, being adequate, and more appropriate, for all other exigencies which may arise. We do not think that any action would lie against the governor for any act bond fide done by him under the powers of the statute aforesaid.'t We may, therefore, infer that where the remedy by parliamentary address is open, a judge should only be proceeded against under the statute 22 Geo. III., in a case analogous to that which, in England, would warrant the issue of a writ of scire facias to repeal the patent of a judge for misdemeanour in office." If so, the institution of proceedings by a governor and council under the statute, against a delinquent judge, may be looked upon as a substitute for the more formal and less available method of applying for the repeal of a patent granted during good behaviour,' upon an alleged breach of the condition thereof. 6 justice and governor of N. S. Wales, in 1875, which was brought under notice of Earl Carnarvon (col. sec.) by the governor, which elicited an expression of regret on the part of the col. secretary, while the independent position of the chief justice precluded further proceedings against him. N. S. Wales, Votes & Proc. Quoted in Votes and Proceed- |