Powers of a war cabinet, and the premier concluded that he had changed his mind on the subject, until after the meeting of Parliament, when Lord John Russell retired from the ministry, giving as his reason that a motion was about to be made in the House of Commons for an enquiry into the disasters which had befallen the army before Sebastopol, and that he could not concur with the government in opposing enquiry, as he was not himself satisfied with the manner in which the war had been conducted. The retirement of Lord John Russell was speedily followed by the defeat of the ministry on the motion in question, and by their consequent resignation of office, on January 31, 1855. The new war secretary was Lord Panmure, also a member of the House of Lords, who held the office for three years; since then, to the present time (1888), with one exception, in 1863, it has been filled by a member of the House of Com mons. In proof of the necessity for a concentration of power in the direction of military affairs in the hands of one man, at all events during the continuance of hostilities with a foreign power, Lord John Russell makes the following remarks, in the correspondence above referred to:-In the prosecution of a war it is clear either that the prime minister must be himself the active, moving spirit of the whole machine, or else the war minister must have ample authority to control other departments. 'A cabinet is a cumbrous and unwieldy instrument for carrying on war; it can furnish suggestions or make a decision upon a measure submitted to it, but it cannot administer.' To do this effectually you must have a war minister of vigour and authority.' Elsewhere he says, In order to carry on the war with efficiency, either the prime minister must be constantly urging, hastening, completing the military preparations, or the Ante, p. 282. minister of war must be strong enough to control other departments. Every objection of other ministers, the plea of foreign interests to be attended to, of naval preparations not yet complete, and a thousand othersjustifiable in the separate heads of departments-must be forced to yield to the paramount necessity of carrying on the war with efficiency of each service and completeness of means to the end in view. This great duty may be performed either by the prime minister himself, or by a separate war minister. We have examples of both. Lord Godolphin, on the one hand, as first minister of the crown, superintended the campaigns of Marlborough; Lord Chatham, when secretary of state, guided the operations of the Seven Years' War. Again, the glorious termination of the war against Napoleon was directed by the secretaries Castlereagh and Bathurst, under the premiership of Lord Liverpool.' , m In point of fact, however, during the Crimean war, Controlled as appears from the evidence of the Duke of Newcastle, by the while the war secretary had the responsible direction and control in everything, yet the cabinet were largely consulted, and exercised considerable influence. The selections for the post of commander-in-chief in the Crimea, and of two or three of the generals of division, were submitted by the secretary of state for war to the cabinet for their approval; the names of other commanding officers he did not think it necessary to submit ; but all important operations, the number of troops to be sent out, and so forth, were, of course, submitted to the cabinet.' He also communicated to them every despatch he received from the commander of the forces in the Crimea, and informed them of the steps he was about to take in consequence thereof, so that they had an opportunity of dissenting from the same, if they m Rep. of Com. on Army before Sebastopol, Com. Pap. 1854-5, v. 9, pt. 2, pp. 360-363. Supremacy of war minister. thought fit; otherwise, they shared the responsibility of his acts. This practice he followed so long as the members of the cabinet remained in London; but, when they separated for country excursions, the despatches received were not circulated amongst them until their return to town." It is distinctly understood, that whenever circumstances render it necessary to send troops abroad, the consideration of the measure devolves, in the first instance, upon the whole cabinet. Their decision is communicated by the secretary of state for war to the commander-in-chief, with instructions to take the Queen's pleasure as to the regiments to be selected for the service. The appointment of a general officer to command a force for active service is made by the cabinet, and communicated by the secretary for war to the commander-in-chief, with instructions to take the Queen's pleasure thereupon. The secretary for war, however, is himself considered responsible for any such selection; and also, to a considerable degree, for the selection of officers to hold important subordinate commands, inasmuch as all general and superior staff-officers recommended by the commander-in-chief for commands or appointments must be submitted by him for the approval of the secretary for war." During active service, the secretary of state for war must have entire control over the operations, as bearing upon the conduct of the commander-in-chief, of the Admiralty (notwithstanding that department is presided over by another cabinet minister), and even to some extent of the Treasury itself; these must be, to a certain extent, superintended by him; and it is his duty to combine and concert together the various powers and authorities of those different departments, in such a manner as to conduce to the proper management of the military operations of the country. This was the opinion of Lord Derby, as expressed in the House of Lords in 1856, and it embodies, in the main, the present practice. This statement was acquiesced in at the time, by Earl Grey, with the qualification that, in his opinion, the prime minister, or the cabinet collectively, ought to be regarded as the chief director on such an occasion; acting, however, through the secretary for war, as above described. To a similar effect, it was stated by the Duke of Newcastle, in evidence before the Transport Committee, in 1860, that considerable alterations take place in the relative position of the departments of state, upon the breaking out of a war. The Admiralty is a totally independent office in time of peace, no secretary of state interferes or controls it in any way whatever; but, the instant war is declared, the whole thing is changed, and the Board of Admiralty comes under the immediate and entire control of the secretary of state for war. Thenceforward, so long as the war continues, the operations of the War Office and Admiralty, and the directions of the movements, both of the army and navy, become a part of the special duty of the secretary for war. And this, he declared, was no new system, but that it had always been so. This must not be considered, however, as interfering with the direct responsibility of the Admiralty for the conduct of naval operations during a war; or as limiting the responsibility of the Board of Admiralty in regard to the details of the naval service, which continue to be transacted, as in time of peace, without reference to any other department. Relative powers of war minister and of com. manderin-chief. The secretary for war gives his instructions to the Admiralty, and it is the duty of the board to see those instructions properly carried out.* Having discussed the principle of control and responsibility in war matters, involved in the establishment of a separate branch of the secretariat, to take charge of military business, and pointed out the customary limit and extent of interference, by the cabinet collectively, with the functions of the war secretary, we will now consider the relative position and duties of the secretary of state for war and of the commander-in-chief. It was on June 12, 1854, as has been already observed, that the declaration in council was made appointing a fourth secretary of state, to be styled the secretary of state for war. But it was not until May 18, 1855, that letters patent were issued, formally conferring this office upon Lord Panmure. Shortly afterwards, the separate departments of the Ordnance and the Commissariat, together with the office of secretaryat-war, and the control of the militia, including the yeomanry and the volunteers, were consolidated, and committed to the charge of the new war secretary." The East India Company's troops were likewise amalgamated with the Imperial army, and subjected to similar control. The letters patent were necessarily framed in general terms, conferring upon the secretary of state the administration and government of the army and ordnance; including all matters relating to the pecuniary affairs, establishment, and maintenance thereof. In addition to this patent, however, there was issued, Rep. of Sebastopol Come. Com. u Clode, Mil. Forces, v. 1, p. 336. See Act 18 & 19 Vict. c. 117, vesting estates and powers of Board of Ordnance in the secretary for war. The War Office never interferes with a militia regiment (as, for example, to prescribe routes for them when on the march), except through the lord-lieutenant (Clode, Mil. Forces, v. 1, pp. 281, 584; v. 2, pp. 391, 763). Hans. D. v. 188, p. 87. Ib. v. 194, p. 1124, As regards volunteers, see Report of Commissioners appointed to enquire into condition of the volunteer force. Com. Pap. 1862, v. 27, p. 89. |