tion not merely of any cases of positive irregularity on the part of any department of the state in the expenditure of public money placed in their hands for particular purposes, but also of any cases wherein, with the sanction of the Treasury, surpluses of certain votes had been used to defray the deficiencies of other votes, in conformity with the provisions in the recent Appropriation Acts, permitting the Treasury to authorise such an arrangement temporarily,' and subject to the future approbation of Parliament." Upon their presentation to Parliament, the appropriation accounts of the sums granted for the service of the year to which they relate, together with the reports thereon of the comptroller and auditor-general, and the observations of the Treasury upon the same, are referred to the Committee on Public Accounts. should Hitherto in no single instance has the House of Commons directed what should be done in respect to any irregularity which has been pointed out by the Audit Office. Where questions have occurred between the Treasury and other departments regarding the surrender of unexpended balances, the adjustment ultimately enjoined by the Treasury has been tacitly who accepted by Parliament, notwithstanding that the audi- finally detors have pointed out that it fell very far short of what termine should have been made. And even when it has been reports. necessary to take a vote of the House of Commons to confirm a grant which had been temporarily made by the Treasury of surpluses to meet deficiencies in certain cases, the departments concerned or the Treasury have come before the House and made their own statement of the case, and the House has always adopted the account without a word." Until after the passing of the Ex Com Pub. Accts. p. v., Com. Pap. 270, Com. Pap. 1865, v. 10. 1870, v. 10. W Rep. Come. Pub. Accts. Evid. 79-140, 272-288, Com. Pap. 1865, v. 10. F on such Attention of Parlia rected to excess of expenditure. chequer and Audit Act of 1866, no Appropriation Act had ever been adjusted under parliamentary impulse in any way, and it is there that the appropriation check was really defective.'* In 1877, the Committee on Public Accounts again. ment di- expressed their satisfaction with the general working of the system established by the Exchequer and Audit Act. But they urged that the attention of Parliament should be specially directed to all cases in which an excess of expenditure had been incurred beyond that sanctioned by Parliament. And that the excesses should be reported upon by the committee, before they are voted in supply." But the year 1868-9 may be considered as marking the commencement of a new era in our financial history. The appropriation accounts of the sums granted by Parliament for civil services, and for the revenue departments for that year, included reports of the comptroller and auditor-general upon every one of those services. These reports, together with observations thereon by the Treasury, were referred to the Committee of Public Accounts, who reported observations upon every irregularity which had been noticed by the auditor-general. They were happily enabled to state, that the errors in the several accounts adverted to by that officer had been for the most part adjusted, or were in course of adjustment; and that certain surrenders to the Exchequer, which he had mentioned as due in relation to particular votes, had since been made. In other cases of difference between the Audit Office and the Treasury, the committee expressed their own opinions, and gave recommendations for the future guidance of both departments. By this means the House of Com Evid. of Mr. Macaulay, 140. First Rep. Com*. Pub. Accts. p. viii. Com. Pap. 1877. v. 8. First Rep. Come. Pub. Accts. Com. Pap. 1870, v. 10. exercised of the mons is now enabled to exercise an effectual control Control over the public expenditure, without infringing upon by means the functions of responsible ministers; that is to say, Public through the instrumentality of a standing committee of Accounts its own members. We have now, therefore, to consider the origin and functions of the last tribunal by means of which Parliament, and more especially the House of Commons, is enabled to exercise its constitutional control over the public expenditure with vigilance and success, viz. :— 4. The Standing Committee on Public Accounts. From the period of the revolution of 1688, the House of Commons have exercised the right of enquiry, by committees of their own, into the public expenditure; and of auditing the public accounts either by members or persons named by their own House. The appointment of commissioners of audit, to be nominated by the crown under the authority of Parliament, has not in any degree impaired the powers of the Commons in this respect; for it is competent to this House to examine into, and to correct, abuses in the expenditure of the civil list revenues, as well as in every other branch of the public revenue, whenever it shall appear expedient to the wisdom of this House so to do.' a Com mittee. With a view to obtain the co-operation of the House of Commons in the important task of economical retrenchment and reform, it has been customary for the government from time to time to call upon the House to appoint what were termed finance committees, with Finance authority to enquire into the revenue and expenditure mittees. of the country in every branch of the public service. The first instance of the appointment of such a com Com. Jour. v. 37, p. 763. Clode, Mil. Forces, chaps. vii. xxiv. com Com mittee. Finance mittee was during the administration of Mr. Pitt, in 1786. From this date, similar committees, composed of men selected for their talents and knowledge of finance, without distinction of party, but including some members of the existing ministry, were appointed about once in every ten years, until 1828, when twenty years to 1848-elapsed without the nomination of such a committee, if we except one in 1834, which was confined to colonial military expenditure. A committee on a portion of the public expenditure was obtained in 1778, on motion of a private member. But this was partial in its operation, and did not review the entire finances of the country. When Sir R. Peel was requested, in 1835, to consent to the appointment of a finance committee, he replied that, while he did not object to such committees, 'he was certainly of opinion that they ought not to be too frequently appointed.' On February 22, 1848, on motion of the chancellor of the exchequer, two select committees were appointed, one on military expenditure, and the other to enquire into the expenditure for miscellaneous services. And on February 18, 1873, a select committee was appointed, on motion of Mr. Gladstone (the prime minister), to enquire into any possible reductions in the expenditure for civil services. In introducing the system of committees on the public accounts into colonial assemblies, the practice of the Imperial House of Commons has been sought to be followed. The House of Representatives in New Zealand adopted a series of resolutions in 1870, to define the functions and powers of this committee, which, though they have not been carried out, in their entirety, either in that or in other colonies, may be suitably quoted, as embodying constitutional practice in this particular.1 also 3 Hats. p. 187. • Mir. of Parl. 1835, p. 62. 203. Mir. of Parl. 1828, pp. 199, p. 291. proper Such committees, though not professedly secret, being intended to receive information from government which it would not be expedient to divulge to members generally, have been usually empowered to conduct their enquiries in secret, and to exclude from publicity any evidence which it might be important Beneficial to abstain from disclosing. And, in consenting to the if confined appointment of these committees, the government have within been careful to stipulate that their enquiries should be limits. restricted within constitutional limits, and that, while reporting their opinions in regard to retrenchments in the public expenditure and economical reforms, they must not encroach on the functions of the executive government, who are alone responsible for deciding as to the number of men required for the army or navy, or any other branch of the public service, in order to maintain due efficiency therein.h Public Com In the year 1845, as we have already seen, a de- Origin of partmental committee of the Treasury reported their Accounts opinion that efficient control over the public expendi- mittee. ture could only be secured by the examination of the audited accounts by a committee of the House of Commons. But this recommendation was not carried out; and the country is mainly indebted for the introduction of this important feature into the political system of England to the timely counsels of the Committee on Public Moneys, who, in their report in 1857, advised that the principle of the concurrent audit, or appropriation check, should be extended to all accounts of public income and expenditure to which it had not yet been applied; that the whole of the public accounts finally audited should be presented to Parliament before the close of the year succeeding that to which they relate; and that these audited accounts should be Peel in Hans. D. v. 96, pp. 1007, 1063. h Ib. p. 1073; and v. 101, p. 713. |