of a new representation in 1867 and 1868, we have entered upon Beginning a new era, wherein the democratic element will unpolitical doubtedly be in the ascendant, and under which we may expect to find all our institutions, both in church and state, severely tried. era. It seems fitting, at such a time, to point out, to those who are now entrusted with political power, the practical operation of that system, wherein the various excellences of the monarchical and aristocratical elements have hitherto harmoniously combined, with those of popular representation, to ensure a vigorous and stable government, to promote the national welfare, and to maintain the liberty of the subject unimpaired. The continuance of these blessings to the British nation, under their extended franchises, must depend upon their holding fast their allegiance to those fundamental principles of government which form the unwritten law of the constitution, and embody the wisdom and experience of many generations. By a recognition of these principles, the authority of the crown, and the influence of property, have each been permitted a legitimate share in controlling the deliberations of the House of Commons, which has now become the centre of supreme political power in the state. A House of Commons wherein the executive is strong—and wherein the advisers of the crown can administer the government, and guide the course of legislation, upon a definite policy, known and approved by an adequate majority of that chamber is the last refuge of the ancient monarchy of England. But in order to secure this result, the House of Commons itself must be free; not subservient to the fluctuating will of the people, or hampered by pledges in respect to its future actions. Otherwise, it cannot give an intelligent support to the Queen's government, by whomsoever it is administered, or rightly fulfil its appointed functions. A House of Commons dependent upon popular caprice, and swayed to and fro by dema gogues out of doors, will inevitably produce a ministry which will be a reflex of its own instability, and which will attempt to govern without having a fixed policy, and as the mere exponent of the will of an unenlightened and tyrannical democracy." I cannot more appropriately conclude this chapter than by quoting the words of one of the most eminent expounders of representative government, whose ideas, though elaborated in the closet, have been tested and confirmed by practical experience in Parliament. In one of his latest speeches to the House of Commons he says: 'When a popular body knows what it is fit for, and what it is unfit for, it will more and more understand that it is not its business to administer, but that it is its business to see that the administration is done by proper persons, and to keep them to their duties. I hope it will be more and more felt that the duty of this House is to put the right persons on the Treasury Bench, and when there to keep them to their work. Even in legislative business it is the chief duty-it is more consistent with the capacity—of a popular assembly, to see that the business is transacted by the most competent persons: confining its own direct intervention to the enforcement of real discussion and publicity of the reasons offered pro and con; the offering of suggestions to those who do the work, and the imposition of a check upon them if they are disposed to do anything wrong. People will more value the importance of this principle the longer they have experience of it.' This wholesome advice has been given at a very seasonable time; and it may be hoped will not be disregarded by the representatives of the people in the Reformed Parliament. See an able and instructive article on 'Democratic Government in Victoria,' in the West. Rev. v. 33, p. 481. Mr. J. S. Mill, June 17, 1868; Mr. Mill's timely ad vice to the House of Commons. Adminis trative departments. Re modelled CHAPTER V. THE DEPARTMENTS OF STATE-THEIR CONSTITUTION HAVING described the parliamentary duties and responsibilities of the ministers of the crown, we have next to consider their administrative functions. We therefore now proceed to examine the origin of the various departments of state, and the particular duties which devolve upon the ministerial officers in charge of the same. This enquiry is not intended to embrace a detailed account of the routine of business in the several public departments, but rather to point out the share allotted to each in the general government of the empire, the relations of the different departments to one another, and the method by which the separate parts of our political organisation are subordinated to the supreme authority of the crown, as exercised through the instrumentality of the cabinet. In reviewing the origin and growth of the principal departments of state, we cannot fail to observe how largely they have been indebted to parliamentary criticism for their present form and efficiency. For nearly by Parlia- one hundred years past," Parliament has persevered, with more or less earnestness, in the work of administrative reform. Numerous select committees of the House of Commons have been appointed from time to time to investigate the internal condition and management of the ment. a Commencing with the efforts of economic reform. See May, Const. History, v. i. p. 200. public departments. In the light of the information thus obtained, successive administrations have devoted themselves to the task of improving this portion of our national polity, and of bringing it into stricter harmony with the general principles of constitutional government." From the period of the war with Russia in 1854, the process of departmental reconstruction has been going forward at an accelerated pace; and if the future labours of Parliament, in this direction, are characterised by the same spirit of cordial and enlightened co-operation between the ministers of the crown and the representatives of the people which they have hitherto exhibited, we may confidently hope that they will serve to detect and remove the defects which still disfigure certain parts of our executive system, and which are attributable mainly to the want of sufficient vigour in the controlling authorities, and to an excessive adherence to routine. THE TREASURY, which first claims our attention, is the The chief and most important department of the executive Treasury. government. It ordinarily consists of a board of five members, who are officially known as the Lords Commissioners for executing the office of Lord High Treasurer.' The board comprises the first lord of the treasury (who is usually the prime minister), the chancellor of the exchequer, and three junior lords. d The lord high treasurer (whose badge of office was the white staff) was anciently the sole head of the Treasury, and the most powerful minister of state in England; but no one has been appointed to this high office for more than a century and a half. The last person upon whom it was conferred was the Duke of Shrewsbury, who was appointed by Queen Anne on July 30, 1714, only two days previously to her death. The circumstances of this appointment were very remarkable, b Mr. Gladstone, Hans. D. v. 203, p. 1613; v. 204, p. 386. See ante, p. 219. p. 538. Macaulay, Hist. of Eng. v. iii. Board. First lord of the treasury, and have been already mentioned in a former chapter. On the 13th of the following October, George I. nominated the Earl of Halifax and four other persons, of whom the chancellor of the exchequer was one, to be 'Lords Commissioners for executing the office of Lord High Treasurer'; and the office has continued in commission ever since. According to the terms of the patent (in which respect it is identical with that of the Board of Admiralty, which was first put into commission about the same time), the several members of the board are on a footing of perfect equality. The practice of putting these great offices of state into commission originated long before the Revolution, but it did not become invariable, in respect to the Treasury, until the accession of George I. From the fragmentary Account of the Court of George I.,' written by Mr. Wortley Montagu, who was one of the lords of the treasury in 1714, we learn that the commissioners used all to be men of considerable importance up to that period, and were never dependent upon the first lord, or nominated by him, but by the king himself, until the time of Lord Oxford, who was first lord in 1711, and chose all his colleagues upon the board. In 1715 the celebrated Robert Walpole became first lord, since which period the junior lords have always been subordinate to and dependent upon the first lord; and although the terms of the patent remain unaltered, nevertheless the position of the junior lords has become, by usage, one of inferiority and subordination. The position and duties of the First Lord of the Treasury will first claim our attention. Ever since the year 1806 this important office has been filled by the premier or first minister of the crown. Although, as Ante, p. 139. cliffe, 3rd edit. 1861, v. i. pp. 120, 140. |