Ministerial Bills. declared, while at other times they have taken a stand and refused, at all hazards, to comply therewith." The persistence of either House in a declaration of opinion, upon any important question, in which ministers do not concur, must ultimately assume the shape of confidence or non-confidence in the administration. We have next to enquire, how far the inability of defeats on ministers of the crown to control the course of legislation on public questions should be taken as an indication that they had lost the confidence of the House of Commons. It has been already shown that whereas, by modern constitutional practice, ministers are required to initiate Bills upon all questions affecting the public welfare-it being in the power of private members likewise to introduce similar measures-it is customary and expedient that considerable latitude should be granted to the legislative chambers in amending or rejecting the ministerial measures, without it being assumed by any such proceeding that they have withdrawn their confidence in the advisers of the crown.* In proof of this position, precedents have been adduced, in the preceding pages, of important public measures brought in by ministers, which were rejected by Parliament, or so amended as to lead to their abandonment. Also, of Bills of a constitutional character introduced by private members, and carried through one House, notwithstanding the opposition of ministers.a But we find no example of any Bill being permitted to pass through both Houses to which ministers were persistently opposed. Where the opinion of Parliament For a discussion of this point, See ante, vol. 1, pp. 204, 205. Church Appropriation question, May, a Ante, pp. 372, 382. d terial has been unequivocally expressed in favour of a parti- Minis cular Bill, regardless of objections thereto expressed by defeats on ministers, it has been the invariable practice for minis- Bills. ters either to relinquish their opposition, in deference to that opinion, and to lend their aid to carry the measure, with such amendments as might be necessary to conform it to their own ideas of public policy, or else to resign. Every successive administration, under parliamentary government, has thus been enabled to maintain-with more or less adherence to their party principles, or to their political programme-the constitutional control over the proceedings of Parliament in matters of legislation which appertains to their office: a control which the majority ordinarily possessed by ministers of the crown in the legislative chambers enables them to exercise without infringing upon the independence of Parliament. If, however, a Bill is introduced, or an amendment carried, in either House, to which ministers are unable to agree, and they are unwilling to permit it to pass that House upon the chance of its being rejected by the other, a ministerial crisis must ensue ; and ministers will either request the House to reconsider its vote, unless they are prepared to take the consequences of defeating the ministry upon a vital question, or they will at once appeal to the country or retire from office.f A mere defeat, or even repeated defeats, in the House of Commons, upon isolated questions, would not necessarily require the resignation of a ministry which retains the general confidence of Parliament. But if See ante, pp. 372, 383. d Resignation of the Russell ministry in 1851, on a Franchise Bill, and in 1824, on a Militia Bill being carried against them; ante, vol. 1, p. 219. e See ante, vol. 1, pp. 213, 800, 801; Ld. J. Russell, Hans. D. v. 116, g pp. €32-634; and see Ib. v. 151, pp. See ante, vol. 1, p. 218. See ante, vol. 1 (defeats of Sir R. Peel's ministry), pp. 196–199; (defeats of the Melbourne ministry) 202; (defeats of the Aberdeen ministry), Defeats on financial 6 h ministers declare that they regard the passing of a particular measure, in a certain shape, as a matter of vital importance, the rejection of their advice by Parliament is tantamount to a vote of want of confidence, and must occasion their resignation. For if the ministers of the crown do not sufficiently possess the confidence of the House of Commons to enable them to carry through the House measures which they deem of essential importance to the public welfare, their continuance in office under such circumstances is at variance with the spirit of the constitution.'1 Furthermore, while, as we have already noticed, questions. questions of finance and taxation are especially within the province of the House of Commons to determine, and they should be free to act in relation to such questions without being hampered with the possible effect of their votes upon the stability of the ministry,* yet, as regards the estimates, it is otherwise. When ministers assume the responsibility of stating that certain expenditure is necessary for the support of the civil government, and the maintenance of the public credit, at home and abroad, it is evident that none can effectually challenge the proposed expenditure, to any material extent, unless they are prepared to take the responsibility of overthrowing the ministry. 'No government could be worthy of its place if it permitted its estimates to be seriously resisted by the opposition; and important changes can be made therein only under cir Hans. D. v. 133, p. 1075; Ib. v. 135, Govt. ed. 1864, p. 113; Ed. Rev. v. 95, p. 228; Hearn, Govt. of Eng. pp. 221-233, and ante, vol. 1, p. 204. h See ante, vol. 1, pp. 200, 216, 227, 236. Resol. H. of C. June 4, 1841 (ante, vol. 1, p. 203). See also Mr. Disraeli and Lord J. Russell's observations, Hans. D. v. 101, pp. 704707, 710. See ante, vol. 1, p. 798. cumstances which permit of the raising of the question of a change of government.' 1 tion or dis After the defeat of ministers upon a vital question, Resignain the House of Commons, there is but one alternative solution? to their immediate resignation of office-namely, a dissolution of Parliament, and an appeal to the constituent body. This alternative, however, is not constitutionally available whenever a majority of the House of Commons has condemned a ministry; it should only be resorted to under certain circumstances, to be presently explained." a dissolu While the decision of the House upon any question Threats of which is calculated to affect the relations of ministers tion. towards the House of Commons is pending, it is highly irregular and unconstitutional to refer to a dissolution of Parliament as a probable contingency, with a view to influence the conduct of members upon the particular occasion. For the Houses of Parliament should always be in a position to exercise an unbiassed judgment upon every question brought before them, fearing neither the crown on the one hand nor the people on the other.° should But after an appeal to the country has been deter- When a mined upon, the dissolution should take place with the dissolution least possible delay; that is to say, as soon as the take place. necessary business before Parliament has been disposed of; the opposition meanwhile aiding the ministry in completing the same, and refraining from any further attempt to embarrass them." By necessary business is to be understood such measures as are imperatively required for the public service, 1 Mr. Gladstone, Hans. D. v. 191, p. 1747. See ante, vol. 1, p. 747. m See Russell's Life of Fox, v. 2, pp. 54, 95; Gladstone, Hans. D. v. 192, p. 1606. See post, p. 504; Toulmin Smith, Parl. Rememb. 1859, p. 74; Ed. Rev. v. 128, p. 575. See Hans. D. v. 9, pp. 346348, 435, 449, 588; Romilly's Life, v. 2, p. 194: Mir. of Parl. 1841, p. 2113; Hans. D. v. 150, pp. 1076, 1085; v. 153, p. 1256; v. 198, pp. 103, 120. P See ante, vol. 1, pp. 208, 220. Dissolution. When it may be advised. or as may be proceeded upon by common consent. In 1868, however, this wholesome constitutional rule was departed from, by common consent, for reasons of public convenience,s and the supplies were voted for the whole fiscal year (ending March 31, 1869) although a dissolution of Parliament was agreed upon early in June. The prorogation took place on July 31, the diss tion in November, and the new Parliament met on December 10, 1868.t And here it may be suitable to notice the particular occasions upon which, by constitutional usage, a minister is justified in advising the crown to exercise its prerogative of dissolving Parliament. Firstly, a dissolution may properly take place in order to take the sense of the country in regard to the dismissal of ministers by the sovereign, as in 1783," in 1807, and in 1834." 'The sovereign cannot, indeed, impose a policy, either upon his minister or his Parliament, but he can dismiss his minister, and he can appeal to the country against the judgment of Parliament. George III. was strictly within his rights when he dismissed the Coali Sir R. Peel, Mir. of Parl. 1841, pp. Ib. pp. 1126. 1223, 1602. supply was voted for fiscal year of July 1 following, though Parlt. was on eve of dissolution by reason of effluxion of time. u See ante, vol. 1, p. 143. See ante, vol. 1, p. 160. V W Ib. p. 196. |