This rule has been carried out of late years very strictly. For example, in 1861, out of 15,000l. voted to enlarge the Military College at Sandhurst, 5,000l. only was expended within the year. Accordingly, next session, the balance of 10,000l. was again included in the estimates. This time the House of Commons refused to vote the money. Some days afterwards, however, the government induced the House to recommit the resolution, for the purpose of reconsidering their decision. Upon this occasion the vote was agreed to. It is only very lately that the civil service votes and miscellaneous estimates have been subjected to the same rule. In 1857 the Committee on Public Moneys reported a recommendation, that all unexpended balances should be surrendered, and grants unapplied, but required for the completion of the services to which they had been appropriated, should be revoted.'s The Committee on the Miscellaneous Estimates in 1860 made a similar recommendation; as also did the Committee on Public Accounts, in 1861, in their fifth report. On June 24, 1861, the under-secretary to the treasury informed the House that the government were making arrangements to carry out these suggestions. The new system was partially introduced in the same year, but it was not universally adopted until the following session." On March 31, 1863, for the first time in our financial history, all the services were required to surrender the balances standing to their credit' into the Exchequer. The votes are now taken for ser- Votes now vices coming in course of payment during the year,' taken for instead of, as heretofore, for the services of the year.'" within the income, but was raised by annuities, · Hans. D. v. 165, pp. 1124, 1419, 1554. Rep. Com. on Pub. Moneys, p. 7, Com. Pap. 1857, sess. 2, v. 9. See observations thereon in Ty. Hans. D. v. 164, p. 315. First Rep. Com*. on Pub. Accts p. iv. Com. Pap. 1862, v. 11. And see ante, vol. 1, p. 760. payments year. Difference between of Audit of Works on this point. By this means, the highly objectionable system of allowing running balances to go from year to year has been stopped, and the control of Parliament over the public expenditure has been practically guaranteed. Inasmuch as the Appropriation Act of 1862 was the the Board first Act in which the votes were taken to meet the exand Board penditure coming in course of payment within the financial year, it is worthy of mention that there was a difference of opinion between the Board of Audit and the Board of Works as to the interpretation which should be put upon this Act. The Board of Works held that it was not intended to deprive them of the power of using balances which had accrued upon votes of Parliament anterior to 1862. On the other hand, the Board of Audit contended that all such balances should be surrendered, and that no credits but those granted in 1862 were available for expenses coming in course of payment in the year 1862-63. The adjustment ultimately made by the Treasury in regard to these accounts fell very far short of that which, in the opinion of the Board of Audit, should have taken place. This adjustment, however, was based on the assumption that the estimates presented to Parliament by the Board of Works for the year 1862-63 were framed on the principle of appropriating to the service of the year the balances remaining on account of former grants—that the sums voted represent only the estimated expenditure founded on that principle-and therefore that it was the intention of Parliament that the new arrangement for the surrender of balances remaining at the close of the financial year should take effect from March 31, 1863. But it appears that the Board of Works have continued to spend their arrears of balances, which had accrued before 1862, up to 1865, thereby making use of money without a parliamentary vote. These facts were communicated to the Committee of Public Accounts in 1865 by the secretary of the Board of Audit. the House regard to In communicating the foregoing particulars to the Duty of committee, Mr. Macaulay remarked that it was the of Comnatural and proper function of the House of Commons mons in to see that the adjustment of the accounts as proposed Accounts. by government is in accordance with the requirements of the Appropriation Act.' Hitherto no such adjustment has been made by the House of Commons except through the instrumentality of the Committee of Public Accounts." 3. The Application of the System of Audit to the 7. THE ORDINARY DUTIES OF THE BOARD OF AUDIT. We now proceed to consider the provision which has been made by Parliament for the examination and audit of the public accounts. From an early period in our constitutional history, the attention of the House of Commons has been directed to the importance of securing an efficient audit of the public expenditure. Acts were passed in the reigns of William III. and of Queen Anne, appointing commissioners of audit, by whose exertions flagrant abuses and misappropriations of public money were brought to light, from time to time, and the offenders subjected to censure and punishment, at the instigation of the Commons. But in the two succeeding reigns the Commons relaxed in their vigilance. Not only did they refuse to pass an Audit Act, but in two instances they gave to the crown an unlimited vote of credit, or power to apply the whole supply of the year as the Crown might direct. In 1780, however, in consequence of Mr. Burke's efforts in the cause of economic reform, an Act was passed appointing audit officers, Rep. Come. Pub. Accts. Evid. 79-140, 270, &c. Com. Pap. 1865, v. 10. And see post, p. 65. Clode, Mil. Forces, v. 1, pp. 110, 126. Origin of the system of audit. named by the crown, and not, as heretofore, chosen by ballot out of the House of Commons. At length in 1785 a permanent board of commissioners for auditing the public accounts was constituted by the Act 25 Geo. III. c. 52. The duties of the board were defined and enlarged by several subsequent statutes." Nevertheless, up to the time of the recent change Defective in the constitution of the Audit Board by its amalgamafirst esta- tion with the Exchequer department, its position and system at blished. Board of Audit dependent on the Treasury. functions were confessedly anomalous and unsatisfactory. Presided over by commissioners who were nominally independent of the Treasury, the duties of the board were discharged, not by the auditors themselves, but by clerks appointed by the Treasury, and subject to the direction and control of that department-a position which naturally unfitted them for exercising an impartial investigation into the operations of the Treasury itself. It has, indeed, been alleged that the Treasury refrained from any interference with the board in the fulfilment of the duties assigned to it by statute; and that with regard to accounts examined under the appropriation audit,' which is conducted on behalf of Parliament, the Treasury and the Board of Audit were equally agreed that the latter should receive no instructions from the former, which would be inconsistent with the performance of their duty to Parliament.b a Notwithstanding its parliamentary origin and peculiar responsibilities, the Board of Audit was undoubtedly a department of the executive government, dependent upon the Treasury for the regulation of its strength, resources, and organisation; and as regards the examination of accounts under the administrative audit, it p. 133. See Clode, Mil. Forces, v. 2, Come. Pub. Accts. Evid. p. 37, Com. * Ib. c. 24. • See Treasury minute, Com. Pap. 1857-58, v. 34, p. 385. Rep. b Rep. Come. Pub. Accts. Evid. 1191-1200, Com. Pap. 1865, v. 10. was likewise dependent upon the Treasury. But by the gradual extension of the principle of the appropriation audit, the department has been elevated into a more independent position. As soon as the main functions of the auditors shall be, not to act on behalf of the Treasury as a check upon the transactions of Treasury accountants, but on behalf of the House of Commons as a check upon the pecuniary transactions of the Treasury itself, of the other great departments of state, and of the executive government generally, the auditors will probably become, in fact as well as in theory, the servants of the House of Commons, and dependent upon the House, not only for guidance as to what duties they should perform, but for the means of performing those duties efficiently. a mere tion. Still, it is important to remember that the Audit Is in fact Office was never designed to exercise any direct control board of over the public expenditure. In the words of Mr. verificaGladstone, it is a board to ensure truth and accuracy in the accounts of the public expenditure, and might properly be termed a board of verification.' To attempt to confer upon it coercive and controlling powers, or a right to judge of the propriety or expediency of any such expenditure, would be to transfer to it what strictly belongs to the House of Commons. It is as an auxiliary to the labours of the Standing Committee on Public Accounts that the investigations of the Audit Office are mainly important, and are capable of being made increasingly valuable." d By the Act of 1866, for consolidating the Exchequer and Audit Offices, the duties and responsibilities of the Audit branch of the new department are considerably increased. It will now be required to examine the |