this change.

A statement of savings and deficiencies upon the grants for army services for the year 1862-63-together with copies of the correspondence between the War Office and the Treasury for authority to incur expenditure that would occasion an excess on a particular vote-was communicated to the Committee on Public Accounts for 1864. These accounts are the first that were prepared under the altered system introduced by the Appropriation Act of 1862, by which the Treasury were empowered to give a temporary sanction only to applications for leave to make use of surpluses to defray excesses upon other services, and were required to submit to the consideration of Parliament the final deBenefits of termination thereupon. The committee reported that the effect of this change had been very beneficial to the public service, and that the great object of the alteration in the Appropriation Act had been accomplished. Heretofore it had not been customary for the departments to apply to the Treasury to authorise transfers until the time for closing the account was at hand, which afforded no opportunity to the Treasury of exercising any judgment upon such applications. 'Now, before any excess of expenditure is incurred, the departments apply to the Treasury for their sanction as soon as the necessity for it arises.' In many cases it is impossible to tell, until the account is squared, what the amount of excess or deficiency will be; the application for the Treasury sanction is therefore ordinarily deferred until the account is made up. But any large excess must be foreseen, and no excess would be sanctioned which could not be covered by the aggregate vote.

All tem

The committee carefully considered the important porary ad- constitutional point, as to the mode in which these

х

Rep. Com. of Pub. Accts. Evid. 409-429, Com. Pap. 1865, v. 10. But from the Second Rep. of this Come. in 1869, p. 20, Com. Pap. 1868-9, v. 6, we learn that it is not

unusual for the Treasury sanction to be given in anticipation of an expected surplus, which may turn out to be non-existent.

be sub

the sanc

Commons.

'temporary advances' should be submitted for the sub- vances to sequent sanction of the House of Commons. They de- mitted to clared their opinion that, as soon as the accounts ascer- tion of the taining the deficiencies and savings on the votes for House of army and navy services had been laid before the House, no time should be lost in seeking the sanction of Parliament to the temporary advances' authorised by the Treasury, by a vote, which ought to receive the most formal consideration and sanction of the House.' 'A vote in the form of a resolution of a committee of the whole House would be the proper mode of effecting this object, and of complying with the provisions of the Appropriation Act.' This resolution to be embodied as a clause in the Appropriation Act."

Accordingly, on July 18, 1864, the reports of the navy and army expenditure, for the year ending March 31, 1863, were considered in committee of the whole House, and resolutions agreed to-(1) setting forth the savings effected in the grants on behalf of these services, and also the amounts of expenditure in excess of the said grants, which had been temporarily defrayed,' under the authority of the Treasury, out of the surpluses; and (2) That the application of so much of the said surpluses be sanctioned.' The effect of asking the House to pass these resolutions was explained by the chancellor of the exchequer as intended simply to give them the opportunity, if they thought fit, of disapproving of any of these transfers from one vote to another'; and that, if the House did not approve of the manner in which the government had exercised the discretionary power entrusted to them, they might pass a vote of censure." The resolutions above mentioned were afterwards embodied in the Appropriation Act for 1864."

No trans

fers al

the civil

service votes.

Similar proceedings have taken place, in subsequent sessions, in regard to the transfers of army and navy expenditure for the past financial year. These resolutions customarily pass through the House without debate, and are embodied in the Appropriation Acts.

b

d

In the case of expenditure on behalf of the Civil lowed on Services, the Treasury have no authority to apply any surplus from one civil service vote to meet deficiencies in another. All surpluses are obliged to be surrendered to the Exchequer, and all deficiencies to be voted by Parliament. Each vote has its own special account in the books of the payınaster-general, and a balance of debit and credit is struck every week. When an issue is applied for, the votes on account of which the issue is required are always specified. The consequence is, that a civil service vote can never be exceeded, the balances at the end of the year are surrendered, and there are no transfers; except from one subhead to another, of the same vote, a proceeding which is still permitted, and for which Treasury sanction is generally, if not invariably, required.

In 1873 the Committee on Public Accounts suggestede that transfers of surpluses on votes for certain important public works and buildings to meet deficiencies in similar undertakings, should be authorised for a particular reason, explained in their report. But in the following session the committee reviewed this suggestion and substituted for it the advice that the public departments should endeavour to secure a closer agreement between estimates and expenditure,' so as to render any change of the kind contemplated unnecessary.' f Nevertheless, in the matter of the grants for educational purposes, by a system of minutes in council, issued without the cognisance of Parliament, it was, until recently, in the power of the crown to enter into engagements which would have the effect of involving Parliament in additional expenditure beyond the sums

'f

actually voted on behalf of education, and from which the House could not honourably extricate itself. But in 1862, the subject was brought under the notice of Parliament, and regulations adopted to prevent the continuance of this objectionable practice.

But all such cases would come under the review of Parliament, through the appropriation audit; and must be explained to the satisfaction of the House of Commons. It is within the power of the Treasury to transfer a saving upon one sub-head to meet an excess upon another, and even in urgent cases to create a new sub-head for an expenditure distinctly analogous to that which is sanctioned by Parliament under the vote. But in 1872 the Committee on Public Accounts expressed a hope that hereafter expenditure may take place more closely in accordance with the programme as exhibited in the votes. At the same time, there is a fund, called the Civil Contingencies Fund,' to meet unforeseen civil expenditure in special cases, pursuant to the recommendations contained in the Fourth Report of the Committee on Public Accounts in 1861; which fund is limited, as has been already stated, to the sum of 120,000l.i

A vote in Committee of Supply is in the nature of a maximum. It is not imperative on the government to spend the whole or any part of the amount granted, but it is a matter of discretion; provided that any parties with whom the government should have entered into contracts to execute works authorised to be undertaken by parliament, would be entitled to claim compensation for losses incurred, if the government should afterwards decide to abandon such undertakings. On the other

See ante, vol. 1, p. 468.

See ante, p. 35. First Rep. Come. Pub. Accts. p. 23, Com. Pap. 1867, v. 10; Ib. p. 9, Com. Pap. 1870, v. 10; b. Second Rep. pp. 30, 95, Com. Pap. 1872, v. 7.

Second Rep. Come. Pub. Accts. pp. v. viii. 6, 29, Com. Pap. 1872, v. 7.

The whole

sum voted

need not

be ex

pended.

Votes to

excesses

hand no pledge should be exacted that a particular estimate should not be exceeded under any circumstances.'

If in addition to the sums voted by Parliament for make good particular services, further expenditure is unavoidably on grants. incurred thereon, an explanatory statement must be laid before Parliament, of sums required to be voted in order to make good excesses on certain grants for civil services' for the particular financial year, showing the causes of excess in every instance. In this statement. the savings upon the civil service grants for the same period will be stated and contrasted with the excesses, for which a further appropriation is required."

Balances

not ex

pended

In affording an explanation of the causes of variation between expenditure and grant, the terms' savings' and 'deficiencies' were objected to as misleading, and a new form of account was recommended by the Committee on Public Accounts."

This proceeding being essentially a matter of account, it is usual for the vote thereon to be taken in a lump sum. Votes for excesses should, if possible, be taken before the close of the financial year in which the expenditure has been incurred, so as to be included in a Ways and Means Bill to be passed before the year has expired.P

So far as relates to the army and navy estimates, it has for a length of time been the rule and practice within the that, if the money voted for any particular service be not expended within the year, the power of expenditure granted by the vote ceases, and the money cannot afterwards be made use of until it is re-voted by Parliament.a

year to be

surren

dered to the Exchequer.