Ministers expected to originate all important legislation. Precedents. without possessing the ability requisite for the adequate discharge thereof." But, in proportion to the enlarged scope of ministerial duty in the initiation of important public measures, greater latitude should be allowed to Parliament to criticise, amend, or reject the same, without it being assumed that their general confidence in ministers is consequently impaired. On the other hand it should be freely conceded to private members that they have an abstract right to submit to the consideration of Parliament measures upon every question which may suitably engage its attention, subject only to the limitations imposed by the prerogative of the crown, or by the practice of Parliament. Bearing this in mind, it must be admitted that the rule that all great and important public measures should emanate from the executive has of late years obtained The remarkable examples to increasing acceptance. the contrary, which are found in parliamentary history antecedent to the first Reform Acts, could not now occur, without betokening a weakness on the part of ministers of the crown which is inconsistent with their true relation towards the House of Commons. For example, the Militia Bill, brought in by Mr. Thornton in 1752; the Bill for Economical Reform, carried by Mr. Burke in 1782; the Currency Bill, carried by Mr. Peel, in 1819. Moreover, during the administrations of Mr. Pitt, and subsequently during that of Lord Grenville, there were repeated instances of important public measures (i.e. for the reform of Parliament and for the abolition of the slave trade) being introduced into the House of Commons by a minister of the crown ' as an individual member of Parliament without the responsibility of government being attached to them.' And so recently as December 2, 1830, a Bill to establish Local Courts of Justice throughout England was submitted to the House of Lords by Lord Chancellor Brougham, in his individual capacity as a peer, and without previous consultation with his colleagues in the government. But in a subsequent session, this Bill was again introduced as a government measure.s 6 By modern practice, no sooner does a great question become practical, or a small question great, than the House demands that it shall be "taken up" by the government. Nor is this from laziness or indifference. It is felt, with a wise instinct, that only thus can such questions in general acquire the momentum necessary to propel them to their goal, with the unity of purpose which alone can uphold their efficacy and [preserve their] consistency of character.' The effect of adverse amendments by either House of Parliament, to government Bills, upon the position of ministers towards such Bills, or towards Parliament itself, will naturally depend upon the circumstances of each particular case. ments to In 1830, a Bill to consolidate and amend the laws relating to Adverse forgeries, which was introduced into the House of Commons by Mr. amendPeel (the home secretary), having been amended, by the introduction minisof a clause abolishing the punishment of death for forgery, against terial his consent, he renounced all further responsibility for the Bill, which measures was then taken up by an opposition member (Sir James Mackintosh), who succeeded in passing it through the House. But the House of Lords amended the Bill so as to make it acceptable to the government. Whereupon Sir Robert Peel resumed the charge of it, obtained the consent of the House of Commons to the Lords' amendments, and it became law." In 1852 Lord John Russell (then prime minister), on moving for leave to bring in a Bill to amend the laws respecting the local militia, was met by an amendment proposed by Lord Palmerston, to omit the word 'local,' which was carried against the government. Regarding this as a determination on the part of the House not to allow the ministers of the crown to lay before them their plan for effecting an important administrative reform, but to insist upon the introduction of some other measure which ministers had not prepared, Mir. of Parl. 1830-31, p. 377. s Ib. 1833, p. 2500. And t Ed. R. v. 126, p. 565. see Hans. D. v. 200, p 931; v. 214, p. 1007; v. 218, pp. 1745, 1770. u Mir. of Parl. 1830, pp. 2195, 2245, 2956, Allowable amendments. Factories of which they knew nothing, and for which they were not willing to be held responsible, Lord John Russell declined to bring in the Bill, and three days afterwards the ministry resigned. Subsequently, the order of leave was read, and members of the new administration were ordered to prepare and bring in the Bill." The nature and extent of the responsibility which now appertains to ministers of the crown, in matters of legislation, will be rendered more intelligible by a consideration of the following precedents : In 1841, Lord John Russell, in defending his administration against Sir R. Peel's motion for a vote of want of confidence, protested against a government being expected to carry all the measures they may submit to Parliament, or to possess the same general and uniform support on the part of the House of Commons which was required when ministers had merely acts of administration to perform.' 'If,' said he, on the one hand, new duties have been imposed on ministers, and you require them to carry through Parliament measures which they deem of essential importance, so, on the other hand, you must make a fair allowance for the effect of discussion, and the expression of the deliberate opinions, first of members of this House and secondly of our constituents, which will inevitably occasion the alteration of some measures and the rejection of others." In 1844 Sir R. Peel's administration was defeated in committee of the House of Commons, on the Factories Bill, the House affirming, by three distinct votes, each of which was strenuously opposed by ministers, the expediency of reducing the hours of labour in factories to ten instead of twelve. Ministers, however, tried the question a fourth time, on a motion which involved the same principle, and succeeded in reversing the former decision, by a majority of seven. The effect of these adverse votes was to place the Bill in a state of inextricable confusion. Shortly afterwards, the home secretary (Sir James Graham) expressed to the House, for himself and colleagues, their sense of the imperative duty of ministers to accept what they deemed to be a deliberate expression of the opinion of the House, provided only that they were not thereby called upon to advocate what they believed to be opposed to the public interests. Such being their opinion in regard to the vote of the House in favour of a restriction of factory labour to ten hours, he moved for leave to withdraw the Bill, and introduce another, which, while it embodied various points to which the House had acceded, nevertheless See ante, vol. 1, p. 219. Hans. pp. 267, 281. "See ante, vol. 1, p. 205. upheld the principle of twelve hours' labour. Lord John Russell opposed this motion, and deprecated the course of ministers, in seeking to compel the House, unless they were prepared to overthrow the government, to sanction the introduction of a new Bill, to contain a principle which the House had already pronounced to be objectionable. He did not think it would be for the public advantage if a government should consider itself bound to carry every measure in the House exactly in the shape they had proposed it, and he hoped that, with respect to questions of legislation affecting the whole body of the people, of whose feelings so many members must be cognisant, the House would retain some of its legislative authority. In reply Sir R. Peel acknowledged 'that with respect to many great measures, the sense of the legislature ought to prevail; and that if no great principle be involved, and very dangerous consequences are not expected to result, the government ought not to declare to Parliament that they stake their existence as a government on any particular measures, but are bound, on certain occasions, to pay proper deference to the expressed opinions of their supporters.' And, when making such concessions, they ought not to be taunted with yielding their own opinions and adopting those of a majority. As to his asking the House to accept a new Bill, containing the objectionable provision above mentioned, Sir R. Peel said, the constitutional practice was to permit opportunities of frequent deliberation on legislative measures, and not to consider one or two decisions of the House, carried by small majorities, to be conclusive. Thus, it has been expressly provided that there shall be a number of stages through which every Bill must pass, in order that when opinions are divided, or nearly balanced, there may be an opportunity for reconsidering a decision. Whereupon the first Bill was withdrawn, and a new one ordered. In committee on this Bill, Lord Ashley again moved to insert a clause restricting the hours of labour; but Sir R. Peel having stated that, if this motion were agreed to, ministers would resign, it was negatived by a large majority, and the Bill became law.a On May 28, 1866, under Earl Russell's administration, an instruc- Reform tion to make provision against bribery in the new Reform Bill was Bills, carried, in the House of Commons, against ministers. Nevertheless * Hans. D. v. 73, pp. 1482–1493. ▾ Ib. p. 1638. And see Ld. Howick's remarks, Ib. v. 74, p. 931. Hans. D. v. 73, pp. 1639, 1640. See Lord Howick's observations in reply to this argument. Ib. v. 75, p. 1051. * Ib. v. 74, pp. 899, 1094, 1104. But in 1847, during Lord John Rus sell's administration, a Ten Hours' Proceedings on Scotch and Irish Reform Bills. the government determined to proceed with the Bill, but left it to the mover of the instruction to frame the bribery clauses. This course, however, was objected to by the opposition, who contended that it was the duty of ministers to consider how this matter could be best disposed of. But soon afterwards, ministers were again defeated on this Bill, when they resigned office, and the Bill was withdrawn. The proceedings in the House of Commons on the English Reform Bill, brought in by the Derby administration in 1867, afford a striking example of the extent and importance of the modifications to which ministers may be induced to consent, in a measure submitted by them to the judgment of Parliament. The unnatural position of the ministry at this time, in having accepted office when their party was in a minority in the House of Commons, and in continuing to hold office upon the sufferance of their political opponents, coupled with the necessity, admitted on all sides, that a measure of reform should be carried through Parliament at this juncture, was the excuse if not the justification of ministers for consenting that their Reform Bill should be virtually remodelled by the votes of opposition members.c A similar excuse may be urged in extenuation of the proceedings which took place in the House of Commons in the following session, upon the Scotch and Irish Reform Bills. Upon this occasion a new element of confusion was added, namely, that ministers, having obtained permission from the Queen to dissolve Parliament upon the question of the Irish Church, were practically debarred from making their appeal to the constituent body until the Acts for enlarging the representation of the people should have gone into operation. This involved a delay of several months, during which time they retained office without being able to insure the adoption of their measures by Parliament, and were compelled to submit to a far more extensive alteration of those measures than was consistent either with the respect due to their position as ministers of the crown, or with the healthy action of parliamentary government. These anomalous proceedings, it may be hoped, will not be again repeated, else they must inevitably lead to the destruction of the most important securities against the abuse of power, either on the part of b Hans. D. v. 183, pp. 1348, See H, Cox, History of the d See Park's Dogmas, p. 40. See attempts made in 1871 to compel ministers to proceed with certain clauses of the Army Regulations Bill, which they desired to withdraw, and Sir R. Palmer's observations thereon. Hans. D. v. 206, pp. 20042010. |