control. Treasury beyond what existed during the former periods of peace. Each department naturally endeavours to exalt its own importance, and wishes to promote its general efficiency, and to have everything in it complete and perfect; hence the desire to secure these objects, rather than the exigency of the public service, has had too much influence. over a great part of the public expenditure.' Again: The establishment of an effectual control in the hands of the Treasury is nothing more than the restoration to the Treasury of its ancient authority. It is necessary that this control should be constantly exercised in determining the amount of expenditure to be incurred by each department, in securing the application of each sum voted in the annual estimates to the service for which it has been voted, in regulating any extraordinary expenditure which, upon an emergency, may be deemed necessary within the year, although not included in the estimates; and in preventing any increase of salary or extra allowance, or any other emoluments, being granted without a minute expressive of the approbation of the Board of Treasury. The committee have further to observe, that it is expedient not only to restore this control, but to secure it from being again set aside, which cannot be effected, except by the House of Commons constantly enforcing its application, by holding the Treasury responsible for every act of expenditure in each department.' This expression (every act of expenditure) must not be taken too literally. The Treasury authorities consider that it merely claims for the Treasury 'a certain degree of responsibility for every excess or surplus in the estimate sanctioned by Parliament'; requiring that every such excess should be made known to the board. The chancellor of the exchequer is the minister who is responsible to Parliament for the entire estimates, and who is liable to censure if the calculations in his budget, though founded in great measure upon the proceedings of other departments, should prove deficient. Never Come. Pub. Accts. Min. of Evid. 954, 970, Com. Pap. 1862, v. 11. theless, the heads of other departments of expenditure, e.g. the naval minister, or the secretary for war, are called to account in the House for their several estimates, when they are under discussion.w The foregoing recommendations set forth, with sufficient clearness, the nature and extent of Treasury control which would appear to be necessary to ensure a proper responsibility in financial matters, and to check extravagant and unauthorised expenditure.* They were not, however, attended with any immediate result. Nevertheless, in the time which has elapsed since the date of these reports, they have mostly been adopted, so far as is consistent with the freedom of action that properly belongs to the great executive departments. audit of The first reform which was effected was at the instance of Sir James Graham, who, when first lord of the admiralty, in 1832, introduced and caused to be embodied in the Act 2 & 3 Will. IV. c. 40, sec. 30, what Approis termed the appropriation check. This valuable de- priation partmental reform will be fully discussed in a subsequent naval exsection (post, p. 57). It will suffice here to state that penditure. the appropriation check, or audit, was a regulation requiring the Admiralty to make up an annual account of expenditure under the several heads of service specified in the Appropriation Act, and submit the same to the commissioners of audit, to be compared with the vouchers. The commissioners to certify the correctness of the said accounts, and to note under each head whether the expenditure had exceeded or fallen short of the vote of Parliament. The certified account to be annually laid before the House of Commons. Up to 1845, none of the departments appear to have applied to the Treasury for authority to exceed any vote Com. Pap. 1862, v. 11, p. 295. Evid. 1001-1003. * Further recommendations, with a view to enforce the superintending control of the Treasury, were made the Treasury over other pub lic depart ments in financial matters. included in their estimates. In that year, a Treasury Committee on Ordnance Expenditure reported an opinion that efficient control over the public expenditure could only be established by the examination of the audited Control of accounts by a committee of the House of Commons; but that, in the absence of such a committee, they considered that a control should be exercised by the Treasury, as being the department primarily responsible for the regularity of the public finances. Parliament, in assigning to the commissioners of audit the duty of reporting on the public accounts, had reserved to itself a right of revision; but hitherto no action had been taken by the House of Commons on these reports; it was therefore expedient to consider whether this task ought not to be undertaken by the Treasury. This recommendation was concurred in by the lords of the treasury, who, on January 13, 1846, issued a minute, declaring that No executive department is authorised to exceed the sum appropriated by Parliament under each general head or vote in their respective estimates, or to apply any surplus which may exist under one vote to supply the deficiency on others without the express previous sanction of the Treasury, to be given on a written representation of the circumstances which render the adoption of such a course indispensable for the public service.' This opinion was endorsed by the House of Commons in a resolution of March 30, 1849, that when a certain amount of expenditure for a particular service has been determined upon by Parliament, it is the bounden duty of the department which has that service under its charge and control, to take care that the expenditure does not exceed the amount placed at its disposal for that purpose. And by a clause which was first intro See Gen. Balfour's Paper, in 145; Rep. of Com. on Misc. Expenditure, Min. of Evid. p. 6, Com. Pap. 1860, v. 9. may em army de their sur duced into the Annual Appropriation Act for the year Treasury 1846-7, the Treasury are empowered to meet emergen- power the cies in the navy and army departments by authorising navy and the appropriation of any surpluses or grants in the same partments department towards making good any deficiency caused to use by such emergencies, provided that the aggregate sum plus funds voted for each department for the year be not exceeded. good defiThis Act was followed up by Treasury minutes, intended ciencies. to explain more minutely the manner of giving effect to the same, and of ensuring to the Treasury the right of appeal and ultimate control in all cases of unforeseen and unprovided expenditure." But the Treasury were required, by a clause in the Appropriation Act, to inform the House of Commons of all such transactions, and to lay before the House copies of applications for transfers, in order to afford to members an opportunity of canvassing any breach of the strict rules relating to the appropriation of public money." ment. to make The appropriation clause above cited was, until recently, so framed as to confer on the Treasury the power of finally appropriating surpluses on particular grants to cover deficiencies on others within the same departIt so continued from 1846 to 1861. Meanwhile much controversy arose as to the true intent and meaning of the clause itself. Notwithstanding the obvious meaning of the Act of Parliament, the Board of Admi- Practice ralty as a general rule refused, until recently, to recog- miralty in nise the supreme authority of the Treasury, and claimed this matthe right, under their own patent, of directing their own expenditure. And in complying with the directions of the statute, and seeking the formal sanction of the Treasury to transfers of votes, the Board did not afford to the Treasury sufficient information to enable them to of the Ad ter. Treasury exercise a proper control. Their applications, morecontrol over, were usually made after the unauthorised expenAdmiralty diture had been incurred." The Treasury refrained over expendi ture. from the attempt to compel a recognition of their right to control this department in the details of expenditure. A large proportion of almost every vote consists of expenditure abroad, so that it is impossible to know beforehand whether any vote will be exceeded or not. It was, therefore, contended that, unless the Treasury are prepared to take the whole responsibility of the conduct of the navy, they cannot possibly take such management of the details.' The first lord of the admiralty for 1862 declared his view of the matter to be that the Admiralty should have the power of spending under each vote (the naval estimates being ordinarily divided into seventeen separate votes) the whole of the sum taken under that vote; that, if we want to transfer from one vote to another, we should go as we have gone at the time, and submit it to the Treasury.' d e In this view the Treasury have not concurred. They now require that even the sub-heads of a vote, corresponding with the detailed estimates submitted to the House of Commons, shall not be exceeded without their express sanction.f And even so, it was claimed that the previous sanction required by the Treasury must be understood to mean a formal sanction to the transfer, which is not necessarily or usually given before the expenditure has been incurred. Construc. It was urged that no other construction of the rule was practicable or consistent with the secresy and despatch so often necessary in carrying out the directions of sanction to government, conveyed through a secretary of state, and that if the first lord of the tion of the rule requiring Treasury all extra expenditure. Rep. on Pub. Accts. Min. of a Ib. 1442, 1495, Com. Pap. 1862, e Ib. 1500, 1519. See debate on Sir H. Wil admiralty were to loughby's motion respecting appropriation of public moneys, on March 11, 1861. Hans. D. v. 161. Rep. Come. Pub. Accts. Evid. 1520-1522, Com. Pap. 1862, v. 11. |