for the army sup 2. A practice which had prevailed for a number of Advances years in the War Office, of making purchases of army purchase supplies for the Indian and colonial governments, out of certain of moneys voted in supply for similar services for the plies. imperial army. These purchases had been made for reasons of public convenience, and were considered as advances to the governments aforesaid, to be repaid by them to the War Office. The money had been punctually repaid; nevertheless, the committee were of opinion that such a practice unavoidably occasioned great perplexity and derangement in the accounts, and was, moreover, open to the objection made to it by the accountant-general of the army, that it is wrong in principle, that money distinctly granted for one purpose by Parliament should be appropriated without parliamentary sanction or knowledge to another purpose.' The committee accordingly recommended the subject to the consideration of her Majesty's government; observing that if it be thought necessary that these stores and other advances should be supplied out of moneys voted by Parliament,' they consider that distinct provision should be made for them in the estimates, and that all receipts on account of such advances should be paid into the Exchequer.'" There still remain two unauthorised sources of supply, which, however convenient in practice, and unobjectionable, or even expedient, in the abstract, are nevertheless, until sanctioned by Parliament, opposed to an admitted constitutional principle. The one is the Cash 'cash account' of the paymaster-general, which is the account of receptacle of various sums and deposits which, though masternot placed by Parliament at the disposal of the govern And see Second Rep. Come. Pub. see Com. Pap. 1875, v. 50, p. 47. vii. the pay. general. Salaries in the revenue departments. ment, are regarded in practice as available sources of supply for the working accounts of the paymaster. For instance, sums realised from the sale of old stores, sums which are deposited with the paymaster for safe-keeping or investment-as, for example, moneys paid in respect of the Crown's Nominee Fund, or the Mercantile Marine Fund-sums remitted home on account of fees received by consuls abroad, or in respect of the obligations of certain colonies to the mother country for military protection, &c.; all such sums and deposits are carried to the credit of the paymaster's cash account, and are used to supply his working account with funds; which are not legally available for public purposes. The Committee on Public Accounts has suggested that such moneys should be transferred to the Exchequer, or invested, or kept in deposit, as the circumstances of each case might require; and that they should in no case be used for public purposes." The other instance of money being used to defray voted services without the sanction of the legislature, is that of the receipts of revenue. The salaries of the various revenue departments are never paid, in the first instance, out of the votes, but out of the revenue such advances being afterwards repaid from the votes. This practice is pursued by collectors of revenue throughout the kingdom in reference to certain payments on account of the public service at the several localities in question; the advances being subsequently repaid to the revenue from the votes applicable to such services. The Committee on Public Accounts, though cognisant of the mode in which these temporary advances are made from the revenue, have not objected to it; and the Mr. Macaulay's Paper, Rep. Come on Pub. Accts. p. 141, Com. Pap. 1865, v. 10. See further, as to 'extra receipts,' and money realised from sale of old stores, Rep. Com. Pub. Accts. Evid. 444-518, Com. Pap. 1866, v. 7. The Naval Stores Act 1869, Hans. D. v. 195, p. 672. existing practice, both as regards the receipts of revenue We now proceed to consider the second branch of our enquiry, viz. the mode in which the constitutional control of Parliament over the public expenditure is conducted, through the instrumentality of the responsible department of the Treasury. 2. The Functions of the Treasury in relation to the Public Expenditure. of the By immemorial custom, the lords commissioners of Functions the Treasury have been constitutionally empowered to Treasury control all the other departments of the state, in matters in controlof finance and public expenditure. In various Acts of lic expenParliament, and reports of committees of the House of Mr. Macaulay's Paper, appended to Rep. Come. on Pub. Accts. 1865, p. 142, Com. Pap. 1865, v. 10. And see ante, vol. 1, p. 736. Also in regard to extra receipts and the regulations concerning them, post, p. 75. And Rep. Come. Pub. Accts. ling pub diture. control. Treasury Commons, this authority has been from time to time. recognised and enforced. By degrees, however, this wholesome control had been gradually relaxed, and the various public departments, more particularly those in charge of naval and military affairs, had begun to act independently of the Treasury, incurring expenses beyond the votes of Parliament, without previous reference to this supreme authority. In order to check the growing extravagance in the public service, and to introduce a proper responsibility in regard to public expenditure, committees of the House of Commons recommended that the ancient control of the Treasury should be again exercised. In 1817, the Finance Committee adverted to the subject in the following terms: Feeling, as your committee do strongly, the necessity of bringing all financial subjects officially within view of the Treasury,' they suggest whether-in addition to the 'unrecorded and confidential intercourse which must at all times exist on the part of the first lord of the admiralty, and the master-general of the ordnance, and the chancellor of the exchequer respectively, on all matters which they may feel it their duty to bring under the consideration of their colleagues in the cabinet,'-might it not be advisable that it should be made a rule of the Privy Council, whenever orders in council are in contemplation to regulate the establishment of any public department, that every proposition involving an increase of public expense should, according to the nature of the case, either be submitted to a committee of council, consisting of such members as may be connected with the Treasury, or be made by the Council Office the subject of a direct reference to, and report from, the Treasury to that office before it is presented to his Majesty for his final approbation. By this arrangement, which will combine the forms which have from the earliest times prevailed in the practice of our government, with that essential control which your committee judge it necessary to place in the financial ministers alone, they hope that the results which they have so often recommended may be attained.'t Pursuant to the foregoing report, a Treasury minute was issued on March 13, 1818, embodying a memorandum agreed upon by the Earl of Liverpool (first lord of the treasury), the first lord of the admiralty, and the master-general of the ordnance, and approved of by the prince regent, to carry into effect the recommendation of the Finance Committee, in their fourth and sixth reports, that no department of large expenditure ought ever to be placed beyond the controlling superintendence of the Board of Treasury.' That minute established various regulations for checking naval and military expenditure which are now obsolete, one of which required the working heads of the army and navy departments to attend the Treasury whenever that board wished for verbal in addition to written information on any financial subject connected with their departments." Treasury ling pub Ten years afterwards, a committee of the House of Functions Commons called the attention of the House to the fact, of the 'that the ancient and wise control vested by our financial in controlpolicy in the hands of the Treasury over all the depart- lic expen ments connected with the public expenditure has been diture. in a great degree set aside. Although it is the practice to lay the annual estimates before the Board of Treasury, the subsequent course of expenditure is not practically restrained as it ought to be by one governing and responsible power, but remains too much under the separate management of the departments. The want of a constant check over the expenditure, which is the consequence of the departure from the old and constitutional course, has established a scale of expense greatly Sixth Rep. Com. on Finance, 1817, quoted in Rep. of Come. on Pub. Accts. Com. Pap. 1862, v. 11, Evid. 665, 769, 943. u Ib. Min. of Evid. 943. |