matic corruption), that an Act was passed whereby a great number of inferior officers were excluded from the House of Commons. Further reforms in this direction were effected by various statutes passed in the reign of George III., so that in the first Parliament of George IV. there were but 89 office-holders, exclusive of gentlemen. holding commissions in the army or navy. Since then, the number of placemen sitting in the House of Commons has been further reduced by the abolition and consolidation of offices. In 1833, there were only 60. members holding civil offices or pensions, exclusive of 83 having naval or military commissions. In 1847, the total number of offices of profit which might have been held at one time, by members of the House of Commons, was stated to have been only 46, and in 1867, but 43; exclusive of certain offices in the royal household occasionally conferred upon members of Parliament, and which may be held in connection with a seat in the Commons, after re-election upon acceptance thereof.* by law into House of Com mons. But inasmuch as the principal offices in the adminis- Ministers tration are not new offices' in the contemplation of the admitted statute of Anne, and for the most part were in existence long before that enactment, the holders of them are exempted from its disqualifying operation. But whenever the exigencies of state have required the creation of additional crown offices-as, for example, the new secretaries of state for India, and for war, in our own dayit has been necessary to obtain the sanction of Parlia ment to the introduction of these new officers within the walls of the House of Commons. And this sanction has been afforded, in every instance, by a statute rendering the office-holder in question eligible to be elected, and May, Const. Hist. v. 1, pp. 309313; Gen. Index, Com. Jour. (17141774) verbo Members, xxiv.; Hearn, Govt. of Eng. p. 244; Act 15 Geo. II. c. 22. And see Mr. Brougham's speech, * Return, in Com. Pap. 1867, v. p. 31. Com. Pap. 1833, v. 12, p. 1. Early use of nomi nation to sit and vote in the House of Commons, but not dispensing with the necessity for the re-election of a member upon his first appointment to any such office.' By requiring every member who should accept a nondisqualifying office to return to his constituents for a renewal of their suffrages, in his altered position as a minister of the crown, security is afforded against the undue influence of the crown in appointments to office. Owing to the acknowledged diminution of such influence in our own day, the necessity for this provision has become less obvious. It undoubtedly creates much delay and confusion in ministerial arrangements, without appearing to confer any equivalent advantage. But, as will be hereafter shown, Parliament has hitherto refused to countenance the frequent attempts that have been made to procure the removal of this restriction; although they have been advocated by statesmen of the highest authority. It is worthy of notice that, from the moment that the of the ministers of the crown in the House presence boroughs. of Commons was legalised, the leading statesmen of England began to avail themselves of the so-called ' nomination boroughs,' as a means of entry into Parliament. Thus, Lord Mahon states that in the times of Queen Anne, as in ours, all the eminent statesmen of the age, with scarcely one exception, owed to the smaller boroughs, now disfranchised, either their introduction into public life, or their refuge during some part of it.'m It is no sufficient explanation of this circumstance to say that it was to save themselves the trouble and expense of contesting a larger constituency that prominent statesmen so freely availed themselves of the small boroughs. As has been already remarked, the smaller boroughs tion served a more important purpose than this. They were Nominathe resort of public men when suffering from the effect of boroughs. transient popular ill-will, whether arising from local or general causes; and they have been mainly instrumental in affording stability to successive administrations, when assailed by political animosity; and have also contributed to relieve those who have undertaken official duty from the cares which must largely engross the attention of the representatives of populous constituencies." It was a peculiar advantage attending the system of nomination boroughs-a system which must now be reckoned amongst the things that are past-that its benefits were not confined to any creed or party. While, anterior to the first Reform Bill, the Treasury could count on some 30 or 40 seats as available for the benefit of the existing administration, others were at the disposal of peers or wealthy proprietors, either as simple property, or as the result of dominant local influence. In either case, it was for the manifest interest of the proprietors of these boroughs to make choice of candidates likely to reflect credit on their patrons, by an able and successful parliamentary career. Moreover, a certain number of these boroughs were generally to be purchased or leased for a round sum of money, say for 5,000l. or upwards, and in this way men who had amassed a fortune abroad, or by trade, and who were desirous of a seat in the House of Commons, but averse to a public canvass, or wholly destitute of personal or political influence, could find an entrance into Parliament, where they often rendered themselves conspicuous by their talents or usefulness, and were afterwards eagerly sought for by more prominent and influential constituencies.P Hallam points out, with his usual sagacity, the evil • See ante, vol. 1, p. 13. P See Sir H. L. Bulwer's Hist. Char v. 2, pp. 207-210. And Hare on the Election of Representatives, Advantages of having in Parlia ment. consequences which most certainly would have attended upon the exclusion of the advisers of the crown from ministers the House of Commons, and the immense advantages which have resulted from their immediate connection with that assembly. Nothing could have been devised more calculated to unite statesmen, of every shade of opinion, in the defence of the liberties of Parliament, or to secure for the Commons a preponderating share in the control of the executive administration, than the fact that it is in Parliament, and more especially in the House of Commons, that all great questions of public policy must, in reality, be decided. The only road to ministerial success is the approbation of Parliament. A minister may frame the most judicious schemes of administrative or economical reform, but he must be able to satisfy Parliament that his views are sound and practicable before he is permitted to carry them into execution. The publicity which necessarily attends all proceedings of government, in consequence of the presence of ministers in Parliament to explain or defend the conduct of public affairs, at home or abroad, while it is liable to abuse, is nevertheless of immense advantage to the country. This obtains for the action of government the approbation of Parliament, and the sanction of public opinion, and it is this which gives peculiar significance to the foreign policy of the British crown, and to the declarations of English statesmen upon foreign affairs. The pulse of Europe beats according to the tone of our Parliament; the counsels of our kings are there revealed, and by that kind of previous sanction which it has been customary to obtain, become as it were the resolutions of a senate; and we enjoy the individual pride and dignity which belong to republicans, with the steadiness and tranquillity which the supremacy of a single person has been supposed peculiarly to bestow." The presence 1 Hallam, Const. Hist. v. 3, p. 259. And see Macaulay, Hist. Eng. v. 4, pp. 339-341. Hatsell's Precedents, v. 2, p. 66. of cabinet ministers in Parliament has moreover contributed largely to enhance the importance which is properly attached to the possession of a seat in the legislature. Members of Parliament excluded from office would become mere members of a debating society, adhering to an executive'; and this is not a position. calculated to gratify a noble ambition, or to stimulate zeal for the public welfare. A first-rate man would not care to take such a place, and would not do much if he did take it." Story, in his commentaries on the Constitution of the United States (§ 869), points out very forcibly the evils which have resulted from the clause in the constitution which excludes all officeholders, including the president's ministers, from a seat in either House of Congress. The introduction of the executive into Congress has been strenuously urged by able American writers. But it could only be accomplished by completely revolutionising the American political system. The These are some of the benefits which have flowed from the formal introduction of the principal servants of the crown into the two Houses of Parliament. public officers to whom this privilege is accorded comprise not merely the cabinet ministers, but also certain other functionaries who, although not of the cabinet, preside over important departments of state, or serve as political secretaries in certain executive offices which require to be specially represented in Parliament. But Exclusion other subordinate officers of government are very pro- manent perly excluded from the arena of political strife. The officials. result of their exclusion is virtually to render their tenure of office that of good behaviour. And in the permanent officers of the crown the state possesses a valuable body of servants who remain unchanged while cabinet after cabinet is formed and dissolved; who in ▾ Bagehot, Eng. Const p. 31. • North Am. Rev. v. 111, p. 330. * Ib. v. 124, p. 21. And a paper VOL. II. 6 on responsible government in Ame- K of per |