ON PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT IN ENGLAND. CHAPTER I. PARLIAMENTARY CONTROL OVER THE ISSUE AND control over issue HAVING explained in the first volume the constitutional Parliaprocedure in respect to the grant of public money for mentary the service of the state, we have next to consider the regulations which have been established by law for the purpose of preventing the illegal issue or expenditure of public thereof. Strange as it may appear, there has always been a marked contrast between the jealous susceptibility displayed by the House of Commons in asserting their exclusive right to grant the supplies, and the indifference with which (until very lately) they have abandoned the final appropriation of the supplies, when granted, to the unchecked discretion of the executive government.' Of late years, however, the constitutional control of Parliament over the public expenditure has been exer VOL. I. a Com. Pap. 1865, v. 10, p. 123. B and expenditure money. , Control over the issue of public money by the Exchequer depart ment. cised with great vigilance and effect. In the fulfilment of this important function, the House of Commons is assisted by three distinct tribunals, each of which has appropriate duties to discharge. These are: 1. The department of the Exchequer and Audit; 2. The Treasury; and 3. The Standing Committee on Public Accounts. The sphere of action which belongs to these several departments will be apparent, as we proceed to consider their respective functions. The subject will naturally divide itself into four heads. 1. The control which is exercised over the public revenue, its receipt, custody, and issue, by the department of the Exchequer and Audit; an office which was newly consolidated and regulated by the Act 29 & 30 Vict. c. 39, passed in 1866. 2. The control which is exercised over every branch of the public expenditure by the lords commissioners of her Majesty's Treasury. 3. The operation of the system of audit, which is now applicable to all accounts of past expenditure, in every department of state. 4. The supervision over the issue and expenditure of public money which is exercised by the Standing Committee on Public Accounts. 1. The Control over the Public Revenue by the Department of Exchequer and Audit. The check upon unauthorised expenditure is primarily effected by vesting the power of issue in the Exchequer, an office which is quite independent of the Treasury, and is presided over by a comptroller-general, who is appointed during good behaviour, and is in fact a parliamentary officer, responsible to both Houses, and liable to impeachment, as well as to dismissal, upon their joint address." b Act 4 & 5 Will. IV. c. 15, sec. 2. This statute, under which the ancient office of the Exchequer was remodelled and reformed, was passed 6 The office of the Receipt of her Majesty's Exchequer has, from time immemorial, been regarded as a check upon the Treasury, and a protection both to the sovereign and to the subject, in the custody and payment of the public money. The whole revenue of the country, with the exception of certain deductions from the gross receipts which are authorised by law, is required to be paid directly into the Bank of England, or of Ireland, to the account of her Majesty's Exchequer ';" and from this office authority is given to issue money, in conformity with the appropriations of Parliament. The comptroller-general himself has no power of making issues from the bank; his duty is confined to the granting of credits, or making transfers to the accounts of persons named in the Treasury warrants. Returns are made daily to the Treasury, showing all the sums paid to the Exchequer account at the banks aforesaid. These banks also send to the Treasury daily accounts of their receipts and issues, in pursuance of Exchequer credits and transfers. With this complete information, the Treasury can exercise a daily check over all Exchequer transactions; which has heretofore rendered it unnecessary to subject the Exchequer accounts to the special examination of the Board of Audit.a The functions of the Exchequer, as defined by the commissioners of public accounts in 1831, consist in(1) the receipt and safe custody of the public treasure; (2) a control over the crown and its ministers in relation thereto; (3) the duty of record. at the recommendation of a commission of inquiry into the public accounts, in 1831. Com. Pap. 1857, Sess. 2, v. 9, p. 569. See debate in House of Commons, on office of comptroller of the exchequer, on Feb. 27, 1840. Treasury Minute, Dec. 23, 1858. Com. Pap. 1860, v. 39, pt. 1, p. 174. Com. Pap. 1860, v. 39, pt. 1, Second Rep. Com. Pub. p. 189. Accts. Com. Pap. 1863, v. 7. p. 517. Rep. Com. of Pub. Accts. on Functions chequer. of the Ex Functions of the Ex chequer. Formerly, the exercise of the functions of the Exchequer was a very complex affair, owing to the excessive number of officers, and the cumbrous forms which had to be resorted to, in order to put its authority in operation. But in 1834, pursuant to the recommendations of the commissioners aforesaid, a statute was passed which abolished several of the subordinate officers, simplified the machinery of business, and transferred to the comptroller-general all the prescriptive powers and duties previously exercised by other functionaries in this department. The essential powers which are now possessed by the Exchequer have been thus described-It is the great conservator of the revenues of the nation. It does not exercise any authority over the administrative departments of receipt, nor over the departments of payment further than to guard against the illegal application of any portion of the public income. The constitutional functions of its officers, who hold their situations for life, are to provide for the safe keeping and proper appropriation of the public money. For this purpose it is charged with the receipt of the revenues, which are vested in its name, and deposited in its care, until issued under the authority of Parliament for the service of the state; and it is armed with a power of denying its sanction to any demands upon it, from whatever minister or department they may be made, unless those demands are found in accordance with the determinations of the legislature." Moreover, the office of comptroller of the exchequer renders it absolutely necessary that Parliament should be assembled at least once in every year, and that it should not be prorogued before the passing of an Act f Rep. Com. on Pub. Moneys, 11-13. Other duties of the Exchequer, which are not material to the present enquiry, are described in Murray's Handbook of Church and State, p. 135. |