Commerce of the United States.

The fact of Great Britain being an intermediary, as far as it is true, being then the result of the natural course of trade, left to itself, is a proof that it is the interest of the United States that she should stand, in the cases supposed, in the relation in which she does stand, between us and other foreign countries. There is, therefore, nothing of weight in the observation, that the quantities of our commodities which Great Britain receives, and re-exports, are greater than " reason or nation-employment of our own capital, but from the conal interest would dictate."

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Commerce of the United States.

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of necessaries and comforts so important to us, and to be relieved from the inconvenience and expense of getting them by the circuitous route of Europe; an advantage to which we were left by the system of France, as far as it could be executed. Its having been in a great degree frustrated by Colonial relaxations and contraband practices, does not alter the complexion of that system.

It follows, from what has been said, that Great Britain is our best furnisher, as well as our best customer.

NAVIGATION.

To lessen the importation of the commodities vantage to have a direct supply from the islands of Great Britain, as far as it may be practicable, we must have recourse to prohibitions or to duties, so much higher than those paid by other countries on the like articles, as to counterbalance the disadvantages they labor under, in the competition for our market. Either method will operate as a bounty upon the commodities of certain foreign nations, to the prejudice of others, which bounty will be paid at the expense of our citizens. Á prohibition, by lessening the competition of foreign nations, and of course the quantity of goods brought to market, would increase the price of the goods of those nations to whom the monopoly was given; our citizens would consequently pay dearer In all the points upon which the comparison of for their supply, and would sustain a positive ex- our commerce with Great Britain and France has pense to support, not their own industry and manu-hitherto turned, the advantage is on the side of factures, but those of other countries. The same that which we carry on with Great Britain. effect would happen in the case of additional du- The only point of further comparison respects our ties; they would either exclude the articles of the navigation. countries upon which they were laid, and operate as a prohibition, or, if they did not, they would tend to raise the prices of all articles of the same kind, from whatever country brought; those who import the highly dutied articles would endeavor to incorporate the duty with the price, because they could not afford to do otherwise. The importers from the other countries would take advantage of this circumstance to increase their profit, and would add proportionally to the price of their commodities. But the very necessity of laying high duties to favor the competition of other countries, supposes that they cannot afford to sell their commodities of equal quality as cheap as the country on whose commodities the duties are laid, and aims, by rendering these dearer, to bring them at least to the level of those which were before undersold. It results, that the people of the United States will have to pay higher prices than formerly, and this, as already observed, not for their own advantage, but for that of foreigners. Among the contrivances used to depreciate the value of our commercial connexion with Great Britain, is this, that the credit which she gives us is pernicious, by inducing as to run in debt. As well might it be said, that the credit which a settler of new land obtains, upon the land which he has purchased, or that which a tailor gets upon the cloth which he works up, in the course of his trade, is prejudicial. The truth is, that credit, though liable to abuse, is the substitute for capital in all trades, and that it serves to foster them, and increase the mass of industry, though the slothful and extravagant suffer by it. In a young country, like ours, it is an essential nutriment.

If we turn to the West Indies, there, too, the comparison as to our supply is in favor of Great Britain. While, from the French West Indies, the permanent system of France allows us to have nothing but molasses and rum, that of Great Britain allows us not only to have those articles, but, in addition to them, sugar, coffee, cocoa, ginger, pimento, and salt, and that directly from the islands; while the general rule is, that they cannot be carried directly to any other foreign country. It ought to be deemed no inconsiderable ad.

In the trade immediately between the United States and Great Britain, as far as respects our own commodities, our ships are upon the same footing with those of Great Britain, (with the exception, only, of 1s. 9d. sterling per ton, for light and Trinity dues, paid more on ours than on British vessels, in all the ports of England, but London,) and on a better footing than those of other foreign Powers; for, while they pay, upon the carriage of several of their own commodities, additional duties, called alien duties, our ships are exempt from them. This is a discrimination of some consequence in our favor, beneficial not only to our navigation, but to our agriculture. It is, to a certain extent, a departure, in our favor, from the principle of her Navigation Act.

In the trade between the United States and France, our ships are upon the same footing with the most favored nations, not better. So far, therefore, the comparison is in favor of the system of Great Britain. But France allows us to carry thither foreign commodities in our bottoms, which Great Britain does not permit. This is an advantage, but it is one which we enjoy in common with other nations, and its importance, in fact, has hitherto not been very great, though it has been rendered greater than it would naturally be, by the disordered state of her West India affairs.

The point truly interesting to us is the carriage of our own commodities. From the British West Indies our vessels are entirely excluded, (except in the instance of salt from Turk's Island,) while France admits into her islands our vessels of sixty tons and upwards, in common with the like vessels of other foreign countries. The comparison, therefore, in respect to the West Indies, is entirely in favor of France. It may not be improper to remark, incidentally, that it is far more important to us to have our navigation upon a good footing with the European dominions of Great Britain than with her West India possessions. This is evinced by considering that our exports to her West Indies are, upon an average, less than a third of our exports to her European_dominions. But, upon the whole, the system of France may be considered as more favorable to our navigation

Commerce of the United States.

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Commerce of the United States.

[JANUARY, 1794.

hinder our commerce from running into another channel, as to prevent collisions which might be mutually injurious. These are the true features of the systems of both countries, as to motives. If we are unprejudiced we shall see in neither of them either enmity or particular friendship; but we shall see in both a predominant principle of self-interest, the universal rule of national conduct.

Having completed my comparison of the two systems of France and Great Britain towards this country, I shall now extend it to those of other countries, in order to mark the principal differences.

[Here Mr. SMITH described the situation of our commercial relations with the United Netherlands, Sweden, Spain, Portugal, and Denmark, and drew the conclusion that the system of Great Britain, not only as compared with that of France, was entitled to our preference, but that it was also greatly to be preferred to that of all the beforementioned nations, except, perhaps, the United Netherlands.] He then continued his speech as follows:

sixty tons burden, to carry to those free ports wood of all kinds, pit coal, live animals, salted beef, but not pork, salted cod fish, rice, Indian corn, vegetables, green hides in the hair or tanned, peltry, turpentine, and tar, and to take from the same ports molasses, rum, and merchandises, which had been imported from France, charging the articles which are permitted to be imported with the duties stated in the table. The steps which succeeded that ordinance, calculated to narrow its operation in regard to the articles of fish, have been already noted so particularly as to render a recapitulation unnecessary. It is sufficient to repeat that they manifested on this point a decided disposition to exclude, as far as possible, foreign from a competition with their own fish. It appears, then, that the general principle of the Colony system of France, like that of Great Britain, was a system of monopoly, and that some temporary deviations from it were from time to time made, from necessity or the force of circumstances. In like manner the Navigation Act of Great Britain gives the mother country a monopoly of the trade of her Colonies, not only as to navigation, but as From the view which has been taken, this geto supply; but the force of circumstances has led neral reflection results, that the system of every to some deviations. The deviations of France country is selfish according to its circumstances, have extended partially to navigation, as well as and contains all those restrictions and exclusions to supply. Those of Great Britain have extended which it deems useful to its own interest. Befurther than those of France, as to supply, but sides this, a desire to secure to the mother country have been narrower as to navigation. Neither, a monopoly of the trade of its Colonies, is a predohowever, has deviated further than particular situ- minant feature in the system of almost every ation dictated. Great Britain has been less relaxed country in Europe. Nor is it without foundation on the article of navigation than France, because in reason. Colonies, especially small islands, are the means of navigation possessed by the former usually maintained and defended at the expense were more adequate than those possessed by the of the mother country, and it seems a natural relatter. France has been more restrictive on the compense for that service, that the mother country article of exports than Great Britain, because her should enjoy, exclusively of other nations, the behome market was more adequate to the consump-nefit of trade with its Colonies. This was thought tion of the productions of her islands than that of reasonable by the United States, while Colonies, Great Britain to those of her islands, and because even after their disputes on the point of taxation the latter found advantages in allowing a free ex- had begun; and however the question may stand port to the United States as an article of exchange. between the mother country and its Colonies, beFrance permitted the introduction of salted beef tween the former and foreign nations, it is not and fish into her islands, because she could not easy to see how the equity of the exclusion can be sufficiently furnish those articles herself; she pro- contested. At any rate, its being the most prehibited flour and pork, because she thought herself vailing system of nations having Čolonies, there is competent to the supply of them. Great Britain no room for acrimony against a particular one prohibited fish, because she knew herself able to that pursues it. This ought not to dissuade the furnish it, and, like France, was jealous of an in- United States from availing itself of every just terference with her fisheries, as a main support of and proper influence to gain admission into the her navigation. She permitted flour, because she Colony trade of the nations concerned; but this knew herself unable to supply it. As far as the object ought to be pursued with moderation, not measures of France may have had a conciliatory under the instigation of a sense of injury, but on aspect towards this country, she was influenced the ground of temperate negotiation and reasonaby the desire of sharing more largely in our trade, ble equivalent. and diverting it more from her ancient rival. As far as the measures of Great Britain may have made any concession to us, they have proceeded from a sense of our importance to her as a customer, from the utility of our supplies to her, from a conviction that it was necessary to facilitate to us the means of re-exchange; that it was better to take our commodities which were paid for in commodities, than those of other countries which she might have to pay for in specie; that it was good policy to give us some douceur, as well to

These observations ought to produce two effects, to moderate our resentments against particular nations and our partialities for others, and to evince the impracticability and Quixotism of an attempt by violence, on the part of this young country, break through the fetters which the universal policy of nations imposes on their intercourse with each other.

to

Our moderation in this respect ought to be excited by another reflection-does not our own system present a number of exclusions and restrictions

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to the forming a proper treaty of commerce with that nation?

Why, then, is Great Britain selected, but that it is most in unison with our passions to enter into collisions with her?

similar to those of which we complain? Let us look into our impost and tonnage acts; do they not exhibit a number of instances of duties prohibitory in their principle and extent? Do they not, by additional duties on foreign vessels and on goods brought in foreign vessels, secure a decided If retaliations for restrictions, exclusions, and superiority to our ships in the navigation between burdens, are to take place, they ought to be dealt this country and all those to which they are per- out, with a proportional hand, to all those from mitted to go? If duties on goods of one country, whom they are experienced. This, justice and imported into another, are oppressions and grie- an inoffensive conduct, require. If, suffering equal vances, (as the Secretary of State seems frequent-impediments to our trade from one Power as anly to suppose,) how few are the foreign articles brought into the United States, on which considerable duties are not laid.

The Secretary of State, after pointing out the exclusions, restrictions, and burdens, which prevent our enjoying all the advantages which we could desire in the trade with foreign countries, proceeds to indicate the remedies; these are counter-exclusions, restrictions, and burdens.

The reason of the thing and the general observations of the Secretary of State, would extend the regulations to be adopted to all the nations with whom we have connexions in trade; but his conclusion would seem to confine them to Great Britain, on the suggestion that she alone has declined friendly arrangements by treaty, and that there is no reason to conclude, that friendly arrangements would be declined by other nations.

other, we retaliate on one and not on another, we manifest that we are governed by a spirit of hostility towards the Power against whom our retaliation is directed, and we ought to count upon a reciprocation of that spirit. If, suffering fewer from one than from another, we retaliate only on that party from whom we suffer least, the spirit of enmity, by which we were actuated, becomes more unequivocal. If, receiving a positively better treatment from one than another, we deal most harshly towards that Power which treats us best, will it be an evidence either of justice or moderation? Will it not be a proof either of caprice, or of a hatred and aversion, of a nature to overrule the considerations both of equity and prudence?

Whatever questions may be raised about the preference due to the British commercial system, as compared with that of France, there can be none, comparing it either with that of Spain or Portugal.

Where, then, is the justification of the attempt to produce a war of commercial regulations with Great Britain, passing over greater objections to the policy observed towards us by other nations?

Commercial regulations ought to be bottomed on commercial motives: but, if political grievances are to be implicated, is there no Power proposed to be exempted, of whom we have cause to complain?

The suggestion with regard to Great Britain, appears not to be well founded, if we are to judge from the correspondence of the British Minister, Mr. Hammond, communicated by the PRESIDENT to the House. Mr. Jefferson asks him, if he is empowered to treat on the subject of commerce; he replies, that he is fully authorized to enter into a negotiation for that purpose, though not as yet empowered to conclude. Upon further difficulty and objection on the part of Mr. Jefferson, Mr. Hammond renews his assurance of his competency to enter on a negotiation, which he rests on his commission, as Minister Plenipotentiary, and his The propositions, (which may be considered as instructions; Mr. Jefferson requires a communi- a commentary on the report,) do every thing but cation of his full powers for that purpose, and de-name Great Britain. Professedly confined to the clines the negotiation. This was by no construction a declining on the part of the British Minister. Forms were the obstacle with the Secretary of State, whose zeal, at best, was not greater than Mr. Hammond's.

Powers with whom we have no treaties of commerce, the articles selected, as the objects of regulation, have scarcely any application but to Great Britain. This is but a flimsy cover; the design will be mistaken by no one, and there would have been much more dignity in naming the party with whom it was meant to contend.

But with regard to Spain, these observations occur. A secret article with France, stipulated for Spain a right to become a party to our com- The idea of an apportionment of retaliation to mercial treaty with France, on the same terms. grievance is rendered impossible by our treaties. She has never availed herself of the right. Do These contain precise stipulations of mutual priwe not know, that measures have been since pur-vileges, and in each case the general principle of sued towards forming a treaty of commerce with the party being on the footing of the most favored her? Do we not know that none has been formed? nation. Have we not reason to suspect, that such a treaty, on eligible terms, could not be obtained but at a price which we should be unwilling to pay for it? Have no measures been pursued towards effecting a commercial treaty with a power so interesting to us as Portugal? What was the object of sending a Minister there? How happens it, that there is no return? Is not there reason to conclude, from the long delay, that there are serious obstacles

But at least it might be done with regard to the Powers with whom we have no treaties, and the not proposing it will be considered as a clear proof that the ostensible object is one thing, the real object another.

Will it be believed out of doors that all this proceeds from a pure zeal for the advancement of commerce and navigation? Have the views of our public councils been uniform on this point?