The English Constitution : and Other Political EssaysD. Appleton, 1889 - 468 páginas |
Dentro del libro
Resultados 1-5 de 49
Página 37
... Parliamentary institutions , the par- tizanship of members of the Legislature never comes in manifest opposition to the plain interest of the nation ; if it did , the nation being ( as are all nations capable of Parliamentary ...
... Parliamentary institutions , the par- tizanship of members of the Legislature never comes in manifest opposition to the plain interest of the nation ; if it did , the nation being ( as are all nations capable of Parliamentary ...
Página 42
... Parliamentary Minister is a man trained by elaborate practice not to blurt out crude things , and an English Parliament is an assembly which particularly dislikes anything gauche or anything imprudent . They would still more dislike it ...
... Parliamentary Minister is a man trained by elaborate practice not to blurt out crude things , and an English Parliament is an assembly which particularly dislikes anything gauche or anything imprudent . They would still more dislike it ...
Página 47
... Parliamentary Republic , of a Republic where Parliament appoints the Minister , is made in a nation which has , to say the least of it , no peculiar aptitude for Parliamentary Government ; which has possibly a peculiar inaptitude for it ...
... Parliamentary Republic , of a Republic where Parliament appoints the Minister , is made in a nation which has , to say the least of it , no peculiar aptitude for Parliamentary Government ; which has possibly a peculiar inaptitude for it ...
Página 48
... Parliamentary Government is impossible too , because the Parliament can neither choose men nor measures . The French assemblies under the Restored Monarchy seem to have been quieter , probably because being elected from a limited ...
... Parliamentary Government is impossible too , because the Parliament can neither choose men nor measures . The French assemblies under the Restored Monarchy seem to have been quieter , probably because being elected from a limited ...
Página 49
... Parliamentary Republic - of a Republic where the Parliament appoints the Executive - is being tried in France at an extreme disadvantage , because in France a Parliament is unusually likely to be bad , and unusually likely also to be ...
... Parliamentary Republic - of a Republic where the Parliament appoints the Executive - is being tried in France at an extreme disadvantage , because in France a Parliament is unusually likely to be bad , and unusually likely also to be ...
Otras ediciones - Ver todas
Términos y frases comunes
action administration American argument aristocracy assembly better Bill cabinet government called chamber choose constitutional monarch course defect despotic difficulty eager effect elected electors England English Constitution evil excitement executive Executive Government fact fancy feeling foreign function George George III give greatest hereditary House of Commons House of Lords ideas imagination influence intellect interest judgment king labour leader legislation legislature Lord Brougham Lord Palmerston matter ment mind minister ministry modern monarch nation nature never opinion Parlia Parliament parliamentary government party peculiar peers perhaps persons political popular premier present President presidential government presidential system principle Queen questions Reform rule rulers scarcely seems Sir George Lewis Sir Robert Peel society sort sovereign speak statesman sure theory things thought tion Tory treaty truth vote Whig whole wish
Pasajes populares
Página 142 - Having once given her sanction to a measure, that it be not arbitrarily altered or modified by the Minister; such an act she must consider as failing in sincerity towards the Crown, and justly to be visited by the exercise of her Constitutional right of dismissing that Minister.
Página 319 - After five years' work I allowed myself to speculate on the subject, and drew up some short notes. These I enlarged in 1844 into a sketch of the conclusions which then seemed to me probable. From that period to the present day I have steadily pursued the same object. I hope that I may be excused for entering on these personal details, as I give them to show that I have not been hasty in coming to a decision.
Página 168 - Since the Reform Act the House of Lords has become a revising and suspending House. It can alter Bills ; it can reject Bills on which the House of Commons is not yet thoroughly in earnest — upon which the nation is not yet determined. Their veto is a sort of hypothetical veto. They say, We reject your Bill for this once or these twice, or even these thrice: but if you keep on sending it up, at last we won't reject it.
Página 78 - The efficient secret of the English Constitution may be described as the close union, the nearly complete fusion, of the executive and legislative powers.
Página 318 - Ou my return home, it occurred to me, in 1837, that something might perhaps be made out on this question by patiently accumulating and reflecting on all sorts of facts which could possibly have any bearing on it. After five years...
Página 106 - No feeling could seem more childish than the enthusiasm of the English at the marriage of the Prince of Wales. They treated as a great political event, what, looked at as a matter of pure business, was very small indeed. But no feeling could be more like common human nature as it is, and as it is likely to be.
Página 466 - This task specifies not only what is to be done but how it is to be done and the exact time allowed for doing it.
Página 248 - In an ordinary despotism, the powers of a despot are limited by his bodily capacity, and by the calls of pleasure ; he is but one man ; — there are but twelve hours in his day, and he is not disposed to employ more than a small part in dull business : — he keeps the rest for the court, or the harem, or for society.
Página 143 - To state the matter shortly, the sovereign has, under a constitutional monarchy such as ours, three rights — the right to be consulted, the right to encourage, the right to warn. And a king of great sense and sagacity would want no others. He would find that his having no others would enable him to use these with singular effect.