seven days, costing the company $7 besides his funeral expenses. In the other steel-mill cases the funeral was the only expense to the employer, amounting to about $75 in each case. Deaths at the rate of $75 each are not going to be a matter of serious economic concern to a present day corporation, however they may appeal to it on ethical grounds. One of the coal company cases cost the company nothing, the funeral being met by a collection. among friends. The man in the other case belonged to a relief association, and by the terms of his contract the employer paid $75 at his death.

Certainly it is not sensational or extreme to say that more attention would be given to the inspection of chains and hooks, that more care would be taken to provide adequate signal systems for men working in defenceless positions, if this sort of killing "came higher".

We have criticised the present distribution of industrial accident losses on the ground that it is poor national economy, that the basis and underlying principle of it is unjust, that in actual operation it wastes and scatters resources, that the voluntary institutions which have become part of it do more harm than good, and that it is of little use in preventing accidents.

In planning new legislation along this line, we must have constantly in mind these evils. We should therefore require of any new system which we adopt :

I. That it make compensation for injury and death from industrial accidents compulsory upon employers. Any scheme which leaves the alternative with the employer fails to recognize and correct the injustice of the present distribution.

2. That it make this compensation uniform and definite, and sufficient in amount (a) to shift a considerable

portion of the loss from the injured workman to the employer (and thus ultimately to the public), and (b) to encourage the greatest care in the employer.

3. That such compensation shall not depend upon a contract between employer and employed. For in such a contract there are dangers to the actual freedom of the workers, dangers against which the law cannot protect them.

WHAT FORM OF WORKINGMEN'S ACCIDENT INSURANCE SHOULD OUR STATES

ADOPT?

M. O. LORENZ.

One year ago Prof. C. R. Henderson read a paper before the American Association for Labor Legislation in which he told of the educational endeavors of the Illinois Insurance Commission. Such has been the progress in public opinion that today we may take for granted the desirability of accident insurance and ask,—What form of law should our legislatures adopt? I shall attempt to answer that question, especially with reference to conditions in Wisconsin, not with the thought that the answer is in all respects correct, but with the hope that the discussion which follows will be focused upon certain difficult points.

In order, however, to justify the plan to be submitted, I think it may be well to summarize the arguments which may be adduced in favor of a system of accident insurance for workingmen, and without dwelling on them at length for the reason stated.

I. One of the strongest arguments is that such a system would be of great assistance in the prevention of accidents, both because of the full knowledge we should get about accidents, and because the administrative machinery of a system of insurance can do much to prevent them. Note, for example, that the rules of the accident fund of the South Metropolitan Gas Company of London give as the objects of that fund,-first, prevention, and secondly, compensation. In bold faced type, we read:

"Prevention is the chief object. 'Prevention is better than cure'. How poor a substitute for prevention is money compensation. The directors hope, with the hearty coöperation of all officers and workmen, to reduce accidents to the smallest possible number. All are requested to exercise all possible care and forethought, and to report without loss of time, any defects in plants or appliances to the foreman in charge of the work or to the engineer of the station.

"The directors thankfully acknowledge this coöperation in the past, for since this scheme was started in 1897 the proportion of accidents per 1000 subscribers to the fund has been greatly reduced, as is proved by the following figures:

In this particular accident fund, the device of a jury of workmen to investigate each accident, and the grading of the workmen's contribution at each station according to the number of accidents in that station, are thought to work toward prevention.

It appears, therefore, that these two objects are not wholly distinct, and we may legitimately mention the desirability of preventing accidents as one of the strong arguments in favor of a system of compensation, even though more direct ways of prevention are also desirable.

2. The wasteful character of our system of damages for negligence is another important consideration. Take an illustration from the Wisconsin Supreme Court cases of this year. A man was severely injured for life by falling into a trench filled with hot water. The damages were $6500, of which the sum of $3500 was paid to his attorneys, and it is said that his expenses due to the acci

dent are about equal to the balance. This case did not determine any important point of principle. The fact that the man was severely injured while at work was not disputed. The legal contest cannot be said to have served any good purpose. This case is typical, not of any rapacity on the part of lawyers, for such cases may require much work, but of a fault inherent in the system.

Another evidence of waste in our present system is found in the financial statements of the liability insurance companies. In 1907, according to their report to the Wisconsin Insurance Commissioner, about thirty-eight per cent of the premium was paid for losses, although this covers other forms than employers' liability insurance. In all of their business the casualty companies report commissions and dividends as being about three-fourths as much as their losses paid. These facts are not a criticism of the financial management of those companies, nor proof that they are not to some extent beneficent social institutions. The question is simply whether we cannot devise a better system.

3. The present system is unjust because there is no pretense of distributing damages according to needs or merit. The general rule in fatal or serious cases is to pay the smallest amount that will bring a release.

4. The present system undoubtedly creates ill-feeling between employers and employed. The principle of, get what you can out of the employer in case of an accident, makes each side suspicious of the other. I have in mind one workman whose hand was injured in a Milwaukee factory who said, "My employer kicks every time I come around and ask him for five dollars." Contrast this with the German system, where the employee receives from the post office his regular allowance as a matter of right.