JANUARY, 1794.] Commerce of the United States. point, he remarked, that no other nation with which the United States carried on commerce had a Navigation Act similar to that of Great Britain. With respect to the intercourse between the United States and Great Britain, there was, he insisted, a want of reciprocity throughout, that must strike the most superficial observer. In the article of navigation this had been sufficiently pointed out, and, being admitted on all sides, need not be repeated. In the trade between the two countries, our best staples, wheat and flour, fish and oil, salted provisions, which amount to considerably more than one-third of our exports, were shut out of her markets; whilst all her best staples, her woolens her cottons, her manufactures of the metals, of leather, and of silk, were admitted on moderate duties, and enjoyed in a manner a monopoly of our market. In the articles of superfluity mutually admitted, there was nothing to compensate the inequality in other cases. Our tobacco paid a tax of four or five hundred per cent., our rice fifty or sixty per cent., and our manufactures of every sort would not be admitted, if we were ever so able to send them. On the other hand, her superfluities were received under duties which in general did not exceed from seven and a half to fifteen per cent. In the West India trade, besides the exclusion of our vessels, whilst her own were left free, there were a number of our productions which were not admitted into the market there, whilst our laws refused nothing that was brought into the market here. He next turned his attention to the injuries and losses we suffered in other respects. As he had not possessed himself of the evidence, he should, he said, leave it those who had to show how far the Indians were or were not spurred on to war against us by the agents or partisans of Great Britain. It was a sufficient ground of complaint that the posts were wrongfully detained; that the detention had a baneful influence on the sentiments and conduct of the Indians; and that the supplies for their warfare were derived from a trade authorized by the British Government, and protected by the posts which of right were ours, and ought to be used for our defence. He combined this proceeding of Great Britain with the lawless seizure of our vessels under her instructions of the 8th of June last, observing, that whilst on one side she violated the laws of nations by carrying on a trade in contraband articles with those at war with us, she was on another side violating the laws of nations by intercepting our trade with those at war with her, in articles not contraband. The Indian war, he observed, cost us annually a sum, exceeding by one million the sum that would probably be sufficient for the defence of our frontiers if the posts were in our hands. The fur trade depending on the posts might, he thought, be fairly valued at two hundred thousand dollars [H. OF R. not immediately pointed against us, it must have been known that our trade would be the victim. The evil, therefore, may at least be charged to an unfriendly disregard of our interests, if not to a positive hostility to them. The pecuniary amount of this evil cannot be rated at less than the expense of the armament proposed as a remedy. This is stated at six hundred thousand dollars for the outfit, and he did not expect that the annual expense would average much less; to which may be added, at a very low computation, for insurance, remaining after the armament, two hundred thousand dollars. The spoliations committed on our neutral commerce, by Great Britain must be of considerable, though very uncertain amount; and the consequential detriment to our trade in general, from these interruptions and dangers, of a very great, though equally uncertain amount. In order to bring both within a safe estimate, he said he would state the former at the limited sum of one hundred and fifty thousand dollars, and the latter at no more than four hundred thousand dollars. In addition to the foregoing estimates, he said there was another item which, though of a different character, fell under a comprehensive view of our situation; and, being reducible to an amount tolerably definite, ought to find a place here. He referred to the statement before quoted, from a Report of the Secretary of State, which showed that the loss to the United States, from a dependence on British bottoms for the carriage of their produce, was no less, annually, in time of war, than three millions two hundred and fifty thousand dollars; and, in war and peace, averaged no less than one million three hundred and ninety-two thousand eight hundred and fifty-seven dollars. Allowing about one-third of this carriage for the reasonable share of Great Britain, (and, for reasons formerly derived from the character of our exports, this was a full share,) the annual loss from the dependence might be called about one million of dollars. These calculations he recapitulated thus: Indian war Fur trade Algerine depredation Insurance not reduced by naval armament British spoliations Consequential detriment to our trade Dependence on British bottoms 1,000,000 200,000 600,000 200,000 150,000 400,000 1,000,000 $3,550,000 From this view of things, it was impossible to deny that, however prosperous the United States might be in some respects, they were in others laboring under violations of their rights and interests which demanded the serious attention of the Legislature. Besides the unreciprocal footing of their commerce, and the indignities offered them, it was seen that they were burdened with an enormous extra expense, and involved in unjust losses, amounting to more than three and a half millions of dollars a year; a tax nearly equal to the heavy one they had been obliged to impose on themselves. Having taken this view of our situation, he pro H. OF R.] Commerce of the United States. ceeded to consider how far a remedy was comprised in the resolutions before the Committee, by tracing the probable operation of them, if passed into a law. In this stage of his observations, the hour of adjournment being nearly arrived, he sat down, with an intimation that the subject would be renewed.] [JANUARY, 1794. as well as Great Britain; and some of them were rigorously attached to the principles of the Colony system; yet not a single one of these nations had refused, whenever a trade was permitted at all between the Colonies and another country, to make the carriage common to the vessels of both the parties. Great Britain alone had attempted a monopoly in such cases for her own vessels. Her On the next day, Mr. M. resumed the train of his observations, and proceeded to explain the re-example, therefore, was an innovation on the medial operations of his propositions: First. They will make the British nation sensible that we can, by just and pacific means, inflict consequences which will make it her interest to pay a just regard to our rights and inte rests. To enforce this tendency, he enlarged on the ideas he had formerly expressed in relation to the dependence of Great Britain on the commerce of the United States, and the obvious and essential dependence of the British West Indies on the supplies of the United States. Colony system, as well as an infraction of the rights of reciprocity. In answer to the second position of Mr. AMES, he denied that permanent supplies of provisions and lumber could be derived from any other part of the world than the United States; not from the Northern parts of Europe, which either did not produce or were too remote to send them; not from the Southern parts of Europe, which depended themselves on the Northern parts and on America; not from Great Britain, which imported bread for her own use, amounting, one year with another, according to the report of the committee of the Privy Council, to the sum of near three On the latter subject, he entered into a particular reply to the member from Massachusetts, [Mr. AMES] who had argued that the British regula-hundred thousand pounds sterling, and was certion of the trade between the United States and the West Indies was conformable to the principles of the Colony system, as established by the commercial nations of Europe, and could not therefore be reasonably complained of. 2d. That the West Indies could obtain supplies from other quarters, and did not therefore depend on the United States; nay, that there was danger, by forcing these supplies into other channels, of our losing that branch of trade altogether. 3. That the trade would hardly employ more than a dozen brigs, and was therefore not worth contending for. In answer to the first argument [of Mr. AMES,] Mr. MADISON undertook to show that Great Britain had not pursued but violated the principles of the Colony system. The true spirit of this system, he said, was to confine the trade between the parent country and the Colony to their own vessels, and to allow as little trade as possible between the Colony and foreign countries; but when a trade with a foreign country became necessary to the Colony, to allow the foreign vessels the same carrying privileges allowed to their own. Colonies, he said, were to be considered as parts of a common empire. The trade between one part and another, as between London and Kingston in Jamaica, was to be considered equally an internal trade with the coasting trade between London and Liverpool, or the trade between different ports of the United States; and might, if deemed expedient, be equally restrained to domestic bottoms. But when a trade was opened between a Colony and a foreign country, the case was changed: the foreign country became a party, and had a reciprocal claim to the use of its bottoms, as much in the trade with the Colony as with any other part of the empire to which the Colony belonged. In support of this doctrine, Mr. M. referred to the example of every nation in Europe, except that of Great Britain which had American Colonies. Denmark, Sweden, the United Netherlands, France, Spain, and Portugal, had their Colonies, tainly not an exporter of lumber; not from Ireland, which could not pretend to rival the United States in any article but that of salt provisions; and this was so much dearer that a prohibition alone of ours could gain a market for hers. The gentleman had relied on the capacity of Ireland to extend her cultivation of wheat, so as to spare supplies of this article also. Such a revolution in her interior state was not very probable. But he ought at least to have remembered that, as the pasture lands of Ireland should be turned into wheat fields, her exports of beef would decrease in proportion as she might be enabled to export bread. It was a waste of time, Mr. M. said, to disprove, by minute inquiries, the possibility of supplying the British West Indies from the old Continent, on terms that would not be worse than abandoning them altogether. The truth was, that the gentleman [Mr. AMES] had, in this particular, gone beyond the most sanguine advocates of the British policy, Mr. Knox and Lord Sheffield themselves, who limited their ultimate hopes of supporting the West Indies, without the aid of the United States, to the remaining possessions of Great Britain on this Continent. He would proceed, he said, to show what foundation there was for the opinion of these gentlemen, and the gentleman from Massachusetts, in favor of this resource. And he was able to give the most full and decisive evidence in the case, by recurring to an authentic document of our own, from which it appeared that the Continental Colonies of Great Britain, instead of being able to furnish the West India Colonies, were themselves dependent, for the very articles wanted there, on the supplies of the United States. In the official statement of our exports for the year as late as 1791, most of the articles sent to the British Continental Colonies were of a sort and an amount so directly to the point that he hoped the Committee would excuse him for repeating them in detail. He stated them as follows: JANUARY, 1794.] Commerce of the United States. Horses Sheep Hogs Poultry, dozen WOOD. Shingles Staves and heading Handspikes Hoops Laths Blocks Oar-rafters Trunnels Oak planks and boards Pine, do. Maple and beach, do. [H. OF R. Britain in her political calculations and her pre315 sent views. He had heard the language of the 2,201 gentleman on this subject with astonishment. 32 That Mr. Knox and Lord Sheffield, British sub80,734 jects, viewing the prospect with British eyes, at 314 the distance of three thousand miles, in the year 26 1783, when little inquiry and no experiment could 1,418 assist them, should have run into the error, was 84 perhaps not so marvellous. But that an enlight27,197 ened citizen of America, seeing with American 2,515 eyes, living in the neighborhood, as it were, of 1,774 the scene, in a State whose wharves afford proofs 2,396 of the daily dependence of the British Continental 353 Colonies for the necessaries of life on the market 29,200 of the United States, should, in the year 1794, 364 adopt the opinion that those Colonies could sup20 ply the islands, after a trial of nine years had 525 probably forced the authors of the opinion, Knox and Sheffield themselves, to abandon it, would be heard without some surprise, and must be consi284 dered at least as the fullest proof that the gentle351 man had not given sufficient attention to the pre881 sent subject to claim that weight which was in 29,334 general due to his observations. 92,269 Mr. M. said he was not less surprised at the 561 second position of the gentleman from Massachu30 setts, viz: that the West India trade could be car33 ried on by a dozen brigs, and, consequently, was 5,720 not an object worth our pursuit. The plain an1,826 swer to this argument was, to state the fact that the shipping entered in one year from the British West Indies was not a dozen brigs, but 107,759 312 43,000 128,000 2 3,000 3,000 857 1,500 14,267 27,000 7,500 tons. 39 Besides the immediate importance of this aux1,517 iliary resource for our navigation, he remarked, 178 that there were two considerations which en361 hanced the value of the object: one, that as the West India articles could be brought cheaper in American vessels, they would come cheaper to American consumers; the other, that as our supplies would at the same time be carried cheaper to the West Indies, the people there could afford to consume the more of them. 100 It had been urged, that the proposed restrictions on the trade with Great Britain would produce clamors here as well as there, and that Congress might be obliged to recede, before the British Government would be under the necessity of doing so. To this Mr. M. replied, that he was under no such apprehension. He thought more favorably The total of the exports, including a few arti- of the good sense as well as virtue of his fellowcles under other heads, amounted to $270,259. citizens. On the side of Great Britain it had been Here, then, it is seen, that not only in the bread-shown there would be the greatest distress, and stuffs and meats of every sort, but in the articles the least ability to bear it. The people there of lumber and live stock, for which, by universal were not accustomed, like the people of the United acknowledgment, the West Indies must depend States, to self-denying regulations. They would either on the United States or the British Conti-not have the same confidence in the justice of nental Colonies, the latter are so far from being a their cause. And it was particularly worthy of rival to us, or a resource to the West Indies, that remark, that the people of Great Britain would they continue at this day to supply their own de- be disheartened, and the Government alarmed, by ficiencies from our market. reflecting, that their losses from the shifting of commerce into other channels, and not only of their manufactures, but manufacturers, to other places, would be permanent and irretrievable; whereas, on our side they would be temporary sacrifices for durable and valuable acquisitions. Mr. M. said that he should not have employed so much of the time of the Committee on this head, if the gentleman [Mr. AMES] had not attempted to revive the arguments with respect to Canada and Nova Scotia, which had misled Great H. OF R.J Commerce of the United States. [JANUARY, 1794, Secondly. The resolutions would have the effect perceive that they must have the like tendency of increasing our marine, and thereby at once with the other means by which manufactures had cheapening and securing the carriage of our pro- been promoted. If the duties already laid were ductions, and providing for our safety. These ad- calculated to produce this effect, an increase of vantages, having been already sufficiently explain- those duties, in any instance, must have a tended, need not, he said, be again developed. ency to increase the effect. In answer to the obIt had been remarked by a member from Mas-jection that a change in the policy of Great Britain sachusetts, [Mr. AMES,] that if, as stated by a Re- might put an end to the additional duties, and enport of Mr. JEFFERSON, Great Britain was so often snare those who should proceed under the influat war, her wars, by depriving us of her shipping, ence of them, he remarked: 1st. That the same would soon have the wished effect of replacing it might be said, in some degree, of the regulations with American shipping. This reasoning, Mr. M. now in force. A treaty with Great Britain might said, supposed what was contrary to prudence and stipulate changes which would affect our manuprobability. What merchants would build ships facturers. But, as there was a just confidence that which a peace, always more or less in prospect, the interests of this class of citizens would in this would throw out of employment, unless it were case be attended to by the Government, it might for special purposes, where the momentary gain be expected that equal attention would be paid to might outweigh the eventual sacrifice? them in any other case. 2d. The progress of things in this country, and the probable accession of foreign manufacturers, might be relied on to support whatever undertaking shall have once got a footing. It had been said that our tonnage was proved, by the official returns, to be increasing with an unexampled rapidity. To this Mr. M. answered, that the increase ought not to be compared with other examples, but with our own natural facul- Fourthly. The proposed resolutions would faties and reasonable expectations; that the increase vor an advantageous competition and distribuof our population required an annual increase of tion of our trade among the manufacturing nations at least five per cent.; that an assumption, by of Europe. At present, it may be said to be moforeigners, of American names, had probably in-nopolized by one, so great is the disproportion of creased the apparent quantity of our shipping; that the war, or preparations for it, by withdrawing foreign shipping, had probably also had some little temporary effect; that the principal cause of the increase was the extension of our trade with the French Dominions, which some members seemed so little inclined to secure and foster, by measures which appeared to him best fitted for the purpose. its manufactures which come to our market. That this is an evil has been admitted, and cannot be doubted. It exposes us to the greatest and most sudden embarrassments, from the caprice, the passions, the mistaken calculations of interest, the bankruptcies, and the wars, of a single foreign country. Many of these embarrassments are felt at the present moment. If it were possible to liquidate them into a pecuniary statement, it would be found that, in a permanent view of our interest, there would be economy in making very considerable temporary sacrifices, for the purpose of dividing our custom among a number of competitors, It was not true that Great Britain alone can supply the manufactures we want. France, the Unit He reminded the Committee of an argument which had on former occasions been much pressed by several mercantile members, for encouraging our own navigation, to wit: that American vessels, from a spirit of enterprise and a unison between private and public interests, would explore new fields of commerce and new markets for oured Netherlands, and several other nations, are produce, which foreign carriers would leave unattempted. The trade to China, opened by American vessels, had been often ascribed to this cause. Mr. M. said the argument seemed to be countenanced also by the present state of our Mediterranean trade, which had, since our Independence, been confined by the Barbary corsairs to foreign bottoms. Previous to the Revolution, when Ame rican vessels could be the carriers, the trade was very considerable. Since the exclusion of our vessels, though the carriage of our produce is safe in British and several other foreign vessels, yet this branch of trade had withered as much as most others have grown. In 1790, the exports cleared for the Mediterranean were but $21,726; and in the year following, the imports no more than $11,522. Thirdly, Another effect incident to the proposed measure would be an additional encouragement to domestic manufactures. A gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. DEXTER] had said he could read no such tendency in the propositions. Mr. MADISON thought it impossible to read the propositions with attention, and not capable of supplying us with a variety of articles, as well as the nations from which they now come; and, if invited to our markets, by prudent encouragements in the first instance, will soon learn to fashion their manufactures to the wants and tastes of this country. The policy of favoring particular branches of trade, even at some expense, in order to guard against the evil of depending on a single one, was exemplified by the conduct of Great Britain herself. Although he viewed her discriminations generally, respecting us, in the light he had explained, yet he thought it possible that, in the instance of naval stores and ship timbers, it might be her intention to foster a rivalship in a more distant quarter, in order to provide against a casual privation of the supplies of a nearer quarter. These articles are as essential to the marine of Great Britain, as her marine is essential to her greatness. Were she to have no resource but in the Baltic, a war with the Baltic Powers might be fatal to her. It may be wise in her, therefore, to keep open the American resource, even at the price of a tax on herself. In this case, she must JANUARY, 1794.] Commerce of the United States. quarrel with both the Baltic Powers and the United States at the same time, before the supplies will be cut off. A member from Massachusetts [Mr. DEXTER] had not, Mr. MADISON said, been very consistent in his reasoning on the subject. He had contended against all attempts to excite a beneficial competition, on the idea that no competition could be beneficial which would not spring up of itself; and yet he had warned us against the danger that Great Britain, by exciting a competition against the United States in those parts of Europe which most resemble the infant situation of our country, might establish new sources, from which supplies would afterwards spontaneously flow to her, without being ever again wanted from the United States. The same remark was applicable to the reasoning of the other gentlemen who had represented the danger of exciting a permanent rivalship for the West India market, in favor of Canada and Nova Scotia. [H. of R. supplied by the French West Indies. Out of 17,142,723 pounds imported, 9,321,829 pounds were received from that source. The residue came from the Danish, Dutch, and British Dominions, in the following proportions, to wit: Danish, 2,833,016 lbs.; Dutch, 2,707,231 lbs.; British, 2,280,647 lbs. That statement was taken from the imports of 1790, the only year he had been able to examine on this point. It had been said, why grant privileges before a mutual grant should be secured by positive stipulation? Why throw away, by a legal regulation, what ought to be the price of treaty? He answered, that the legal regulation threw nothing away, as it was always revocable; that, in the present instance, it was only meeting the legal regulations of which France had set the example; that, instead of being a bar to treaty, such a course of proceeding, more than any other, would smooth the way to it, by explaining the objects and establishing a confidence on both sides; that it would Fifthly. The plan of the resolutions tended to be happy if, in all cases where treaties are in view, conciliate nations in treaty, or disposed to be in this open and conciliatory process could take the treaty with us, into arrangements still more favor-place of that reserve and mysterious negotiation able to our commerce. This argument had pecu- with which the parties approach each other. liar weight in relation to France. It had been Were Great Britain desirous of forming amicable said that Great Britain was our best customer. arrangements by treaty, he asked, what readier or The fact, he said, was, that we were her best cus- more prudent step could she have taken for the tomer; but that France was our best customer. purpose, than to have followed the example set We consume more of British manufactures than her, by holding out in her laws the spirit in which any other nation in the world consumes. France she was willing to meet us in negotiation? consumes more of our productions than any other Having gone through these explanations, Mr. nation consumes. He referred to the statement MADISON entered into a view of the principal obhe had before offered for proof of this. Her con-jections to the resolutions proposed. sumption was also of the most valuable kind; and, under favorable regulations, would be a very growing one. It consisted of wheat and flour, salt provisions, and fish; articles which were not admitted by Great Britain; and which, without the market of France, would glut every other. Of our fish, she consumed five-eighths of the whole exportation. Her use of our live animals was another important consideration. It amounted, in the list of our exports, to $352,795, for the year 1791. In the same year, the British demand amounted to no more than $62,415. 1. It was said they would diminish the revenue and endanger the funds. With respect to the Public Debt, his general ideas had been expressed by several who had spoken before him. He acknowledged that he had disliked and opposed the modification given to it; but, after it had received the sanction of the law, he had entertained no other wish on the subject than that the Debt might be honorably discharged as fast as the circumstances of the country would permit. This, he was well satisfield, was the prevailing sentiment of the great The superior proportion of navigation we en- body of the people. He did not believe that there joyed in the French channels of intercourse had was a single State in the Union, or any consideralready been shown In examining the policy able part of a single State, that did not acquiesce of cultivating and securing the French market, (where they did not approve) in the provisions he said it ought not to be forgotten that the which had been made in behalf of the public creprofits and revenue arising from the rum distille- ditors. At the same time, he was equally sure ries depended on an article obtained almost, if that it never was either meant by Congress, or not altogether, from the French Dominions alone, understood by the public, that, in mortgaging the and which was the only raw material of any con- impost for their security, it was to be a hostage sequence imported into the United States. It was to foreign countries for our unqualified acquipaid for, also, as had been much urged on other escence in their unequal laws, and to be worn, as occasions by members on the opposite side, in the long as the Debt should continue, as a badge of worst fish, which could find a vent in no other national humiliation. The nature of the obligapart of the world. The molasses imported into tion could certainly import no more in favor of the United States, in one year, amounted to up- the creditors, than that the fund appropriated wards of seven millions of gallons, more than one-should be applied, as far as requisite, to their use, half of which went into the State of Massachusetts. He took notice, also, of the article of sugar, as rendered of great importance by our habits and our finances, and of which more than one-half was unless equivalent funds should be substituted; nor more against the public, than that all deficiencies in the funds should be made up, whether arising without or in consequence of a change in the |