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JANUARY, 1794.]

Commerce of the United States.

[H. of R.

credit-every where despondency-the pressure attracts too much capital for the circumstances of evils not only great, but portentous of civil dis- of the country. I cannot readily persuade myself tractions. These were the grievances; and what to think so valuable a branch of employment more was then desired than their remedies? Is it thrives too fast. But a steady and sure encouragepossible to survey this prosperous country, and to ment is more to be relied on than violent methods assert that they have been delayed? Trade flou- of forcing its growth. It is not clear that the rishes on our wharves, although it droops in quantity of our navigation, including our coasting speeches. Manufactures have risen, under the and fishing vessels, is less, in proportion to those shade of protecting duties, from almost nothing, to of that nation. In that computation, we shall such a state that we are even told it is safe to depend probably find that we are already more a navigaton the domestic supply, if the foreign should cease. ing people than the English. As this is a growThe fisheries, which we found in decline, are in ing country, we have the most stable ground of the most vigorous growth. The whale fishery, dependence on the corresponding growth of our which our allies would have transferred to Dun-navigation; and that the increasing demand for kirk, now traverses the whole ocean: to that hardy shipping will rather fall to the share of Americans race of men, the sea is but a park for hunting its than foreigners, is not to be denied. We did exmonsters; such is their activity, the deepest abysses pect this, from the nature of our own laws; we scarcely afford to their prey a hiding place. Look have been confirmed in it by experience; and we around, and see how the frontier circle widens, how know that an American bottom is actually preferthe interior improves, and let it be repeated, that red to a foreign one. In cases where one partner the hopes of the people, when they formed this is an American and another a foreigner, the ship Constitution, have been frustrated! is made an American bottom. A fact of this kind

But if it should happen that our prejudices prove stronger than our senses; if it should be believed that our farmers and merchants see their products and ships and wharves going to decay together, and they are ignorant or silent on their own ruin, still the public documents would not disclose so alarming a state of our affairs. Our imports are obtained so plentifully and cheaply, that one of the avowed objects of the resolution is, to make them scarcer and dearer. Our exports, so far from languishing, have increased two millions of dollars in a year. Our navigation is found to be augmented beyond the most sanguine expectation. We hear of the vast advantage the English derive from the Navigation Act, and we are asked, in a tone of accusation, Shall we sit still, and do nothing? Who is bold enough to say, Congress has done nothing for the encouragement of American navigation? To counteract the Navigation Act, we have laid on British a higher tonnage than our own vessels pay in their ports; and, what is much more effectual, we have imposed ten per cent. on the duties, when the dutied articles are borne in foreign bottoms. We have also made the coasting trade a monopoly to our own vessels. Let those who have asserted that this is nothing, compare facts with the regulations which produced

them:

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overthrows a whole theory of reasoning on the necessity of further restrictions. It shows that the work of restriction is already done.

If we take the aggregate view of our commercial interests, we shall find much more occasion for satisfaction, and even exultation, than complaint, and none for despondency. It would be too bold to say that our condition is so eligible there is nothing to wished. Neither the order of nature nor the allotments of Providence afford perfect content, and it would be absurd to expect in our politics what is denied in the laws of our being. The nations with whom we have intercourse have, without exception, more or less restricted their commerce. They have framed their regulations to suit their real or fancied interests. The code of France is as full of restrictions as that of England. We have regulations of our own, and they are the interests and circumstances of nations vary so unlike those of any other country. Inasmuch as essentially, the project of an exact reciprocity on our part is a vision. What we desire is, to have, not an exact reciprocity, but an intercourse of mutual benefit and convenience. It has scarcely been so much as insinuated that the change contemplated will be a profitable one-that it will enable us to sell dearer and to buy cheaper; on the contrary, we are invited to submit to the hazards and losses of a conflict with our customers-to engage Tons. Excess of Am. in a contest of self denial. For what? To obtain • 297,468

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tonnage.

32,352

88,747

123,011

171,067

Is not this increase of American shipping rapid enough? Many persons say it is too rapid, and

better markets? No such thing; but to shut up, forever, if possible, the best market we have for our exports, and to confine ourselves to the dearest and scarcest markets for our imports; and this is to be done for the benefit of trade, or, as it is sometimes more correctly said, for the benefit of France. This language is not a little inconsistent and strange from those who recommend a non-importation agreement, and who think we should even renounce the sea, and devote ourselves to agriculture. Thus, to make our trade more free, it is to be embarrassed and violently shifted from one country to another; not according to the interest of the merchants, but the visionary theories and

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capricious rashness of the legislators. To make trade better, it is to be made nothing.

So far as commerce and navigation are regarded, the pretences for this contest are confined to two. We are not allowed to carry manufactured articles to Great Britain, nor any products, except of our own growth, and we are not permitted to go, with our own vessels, to the West Indies. The former, which is a provision of the Navigation Act, is of little importance to our interests, as our trade is chiefly a direct one; our shipping not being equal to the carrying for other nations; and our manufactured articles are not furnished in quantities for exportation, and if they were, Great Britain would not be a customer. So far, therefore, the restriction is rather nominal than real. The exclusion of our vessels from the West Indies is of more importance. When we propose to make an effort to force a privilege from Great Britain, which she is loth to yield to us, it is necessary to compare the value of the object with the effort, and, above all, to calculate very warily the probability of success. A trivial thing deserves not a great exertion; much less ought we to stake a very great good in possession for a slight chance of a less good. The carriage of one half the exports and imports to and from the British West Indies, is the object to be contended for. Our whole exports to Great Britain are to be hazarded. We sell on terms of privilege and positive favor, as it has been abundantly shown, near seven millions to the Dominions of Great Britain. We are to risk the privilege in this great amount-for what? For the freight only of one half the British West India trade with the United States. It belongs to commercial men to calculate the entire value of the freight alluded to; but it cannot bear much proportion to the amount of seven millions. Besides, if we are denied the privilege of carrying our articles in our vessels to the islands, we are on a footing of privilege in the sale of them. We have one privilege, if not two. It is readily admitted that it is a desirable thing to have our vessels allowed to go to the English islands, but the value of the object has its limits; and we go unquestionably beyond them, when we throw our whole exports into confusion, and run the risk of losing our best markets, for the sake of forcing a permission to carry our own products to one of those markets; in which, too, it should be noticed, we sell much less than we do to Great Britain herself. If to this we add, that the success of the contest is grounded on the sanguine and passionate hypothesis of our being able to starve the islanders, which, on trial, may prove false, and which our being involved in the war would overthrow at once, we may conclude, without going further into the discussion, that prudence forbids our engaging in the hazards of a commercial war; that great things should not be stated against such as are of much less value; that what we possess should not be risked for what we desire, without great odds in our favor; still less, if the chance is infinitely against us.

If these considerations should fail of their effect, it will be necessary to go into an examination of

[JANUARY, 1794.

the tendency of the system of discrimination to redress and avenge all our wrongs, and to realize all our hopes.

It has been avowed, that we are to look to France, not to England, for advantages in trade; we are to show our spirit, and to manifest towards those who are called enemies the spirit of enmity, and towards those we call friends something more than passive good will; we are to take active measures to force trade out of its accustomed channels, and to shift it by such means from England to France. The care of the concerns of the French manufacturers may be left, perhaps, as well in the hands of the Convention, as to be usurped into our own. However our zeal might engage us to interpose, our duty to our own immediate constituents demands all our attention. To volunteer it, in order to excite competition in one foreign nation to supplant another, is a very strange business; and to do it, as it has been irresistibly proved it will happen, at the charge and cost of our own citizens, is a thing equally beyond all justification and all example. What is it but to tax our own people for a time, perhaps for a long time, in order that the French may at last sell as cheap as the English ?-cheaper they cannot, nor is it so much as pretended. The tax will be a loss to us, and the fancied tendency of it not a gain to this country, in the event, but to France. We shall pay more for a time, and in the end pay no less; for no object but that one nation may receive our money instead of the other. If this is generous towards France, it is not just to America; it is sacrificing what we owe to our constituents, to what we pretend to feel towards strangers. We have indeed heard a very ardent profession of gratitude to that nation, and infinite reliance seems to be placed on her readiness to sacrifice her interest to ours. The story of this generous strife should be left to ornament fiction. This is not the form nor the occasion to discharge our obligations of any sort to any foreign nation; it concerns not our feelings but our interests, yet the debate has often soared high above the smoke of business into the epic region. The market for tobacco, tar, turpentine, and pitch, has become matter of sentiment, and given occasion alternately to rouse our courage and our gratitude.

If, instead of hexameters, we prefer discussing our relation to foreign nations in the common language, we shall not find that we are bound by treaty to establish a preference in favor of the French. The treaty is founded on a professed reciprocity-favor for favor. Why is the principle of treaty or no treaty made so essential, when the favor we are going to give is an act of supererogation? It is not expected by one of the nations in treaty; for Holland has declared, in her treaty with us, that such preferences are the fruitful source of animosity, embarrassment, and war. The French have set no such example. They discriminate, in their late Navigation Act, not as we are exhorted to do, between nations in treaty and not in treaty, but between nations at war and not at war with them; so that, when peace takes place, England will stand by that act on the same ground with our selves

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Mr. AMES proceeded to show, that if we expect by giving favor to get favor in return, it is improper to make a law. The business belongs to the Executive, in whose hands the Constitution has placed the power of dealing with foreign nations. He noticed its singularity to negotiate legislatively to make by a law half a bargain, expecting a French law would make the other. He remarked that the footing, of treaty or no treaty, was different from the ground taken by the mover himself in supporting his system. He had said favor for favor was principle. Nations not in treaty grant favors-those in treaty restrict our trade. Yet the principle of discriminating in favor of nations in treaty, was not only inconsistent with the declared doctrine of the mover and with facts, but it is inconsistent with itself. Nations not in treaty are so very unequally operated upon by the resolutions, it is absurd to refer them to one principle. Spain and Portugal have no treaties with us, and are not disposed to have. Spain would not accede to the treaty of commerce between us and France, though she was invited; Portugal would not sign a treaty after it had been discussed and signed on our part. They have few ships or manufactures, and do not feed their Colonies from us; of course there is little for the discrimination to operate upon. The operation on nations in treaty is equally a satire on the principle of discrimination. Sweden, with whom we have a treaty, duties rice higher, if borne in our bottoms, than in her own. France does the like, in respect to tobacco, two and a half livres the quintal, which in effect prohibits our vessels to freight tobacco, as the duty is more than the freight. He then remarked on the French Navigation Act, the information of which had been given to the House since the debate began. He said the mover had, somewhat unluckily, proposed to except from this system nations having no Navigation Acts, in which case France would become the subject of unfriendly discrimination as well as Great Britain.

[H. OF R.

seemed to be thought a merit to express hatred. It is common and natural to desire to annoy and to crush those whom we hate, but it is somewhat singular to pretend that the design of our anger is to embrace them. The tendency of angry measures to friendly dispositions and arrangements is not obvious. We affect to believe that we shall quarrel ourselves into their good will-that we shall beat a new path to peace and friendship with Great Britain, one that is grown up with thorns, and lined with men-traps and spring-guns. should be called the war-path.

It

To do justice to the subject, its promised advantages should be examined. Exciting the competition of the French is to prove an advantage to this country, by opening a new market with that nation. This is scarcely intelligible. If it means anything, it is an admission that their market is not a good one, or that they have not taken measures to favor our traffic with them. In either case our system is absurd. The balance of trade is against us, and in favor of England. But the resolutions can only aggravate the evil, for, by compelling us to buy dearer and sell cheaper, the balance will be turned still more against our country. Neither is the supply from France less the aliment of luxury than that from England. Their excess of credit is an evil which we pretend to cure: by checking the natural growth of our own capital, which is the undoubted tendency of restraining trade, the progress of the remedy is thus delayed. If we will trade, there must be capital. It is best to have it of our own; if we have it not, we must depend on credit. Wealth springs from the profits of employment, and the best writers on the subject establish it, that employment is in proportion to the capital that is to excite and reward it.

To strike off credit, which is the substitute for capital, if it were possible to do it, would so far stop employment. Fortunately, it is not possible; the activity of individual industry eludes the misjudging power of Governments. The resolutions would, in effect, increase the demand for credit; as our products selling for less in a new market, and our imports being bought dearer, there would be less money and more need of it. Necessity would produce credit. Where the laws are strict, it will soon find its proper level; the uses of credit will remain, and the evil will disappear.

But the whole theory of balances of trade, of helping it by restraint, and protecting it by systems of prohibition and restriction against foreign nations, as well as the remedy for credit, are among the exploded dogmas which are equally refuted by the maxims of science and the author

He remarked on the disposition of England to settle a commercial treaty, and adverted to the known desire of the Marquis of Lansdowne, (then Prime Minister,) in 1783, to form such an one on the most liberal principles. The history of that business, and the causes which prevented its conclusion, ought to be made known to the public. The powers given to our Ministers were revoked, and yet we hear that no such disposition on the part of Great Britain has existed. The declaration of Mr. Pitt in Parliament, in June, 1792, as well as the correspondence with Mr. Hammond, show a desire to enter upon a negotiation. The statement of the report on the privileges and re-ity of time. Many such topics have been advanced strictions of our commerce, that Great Britain has shown no inclination to meddle with the subject, seems to be incorrect. After tracing the operation of the resolution on different nations, he examined the supposed tendency to dispose Great Britain to settle an equitable treaty with this country. He asked whether those who held such language towards that nation as he heard, could be supposed to desire a treaty and friendly connexion? It

which were known to exist as prejudices, but were not expected as arguments. It seems to be believed that the liberty of commerce is of some value. Although there are restrictions on one side, there will be some liberty left; counter restrictions, by diminishing that liberty, are in their nature aggravations, and not remedies. We complain of the British restrictions as of a millstone; our own system will be another, so that our trade

H. OF R.]

Commerce of the United States.

(JANUARY, 1794.

may hope to be situated between the upper and | war, have increased their domestic supplies to a the nether millstone.

great degree. The now United States exported On the whole, the resolutions contain two great about 130,000 barrels of flour in 1773 to the West principles. To control trade by law, instead of Indies; Ireland, by grazing less, could supply leaving it to the better management of the mer-wheat; England also usually exports it, she also chants, and the principle of a sumptuary law. To play the tyrant in the counting-house, and in directing the private expenses of our citizens, are employments equally unworthy of discussion.

imports from Archangel. Sicily and the Barbary States furnish wheat in abundance.

We are deceived when we fancy we can starve foreign countries. France is reckoned to consume grain at the rate of seven bushels to each soul: twenty-six millions of souls, the quantity 182 mil

Besides the advantages of the system, we have been called to another view of it, and which seems to have less connexion with the merits of the dis-lions of bushels. We export, to speak in round cussion. The acts of States and the votes of public bodies, before the Constitution was adopted, and the votes of the House since, have been stated as grounds for our assent to this measure at this time. To help our own trade, to repel any real or supposed attack upon it, cannot fail to prepossess the mind; accordingly, the first feelings of every man yield to this proposition. But the sober judgment on the tendency and reasonableness of the intermeddling of Government, often does, and probably ought still oftener, to change our impressions. On a second view of the question, the man who voted formerly for restrictions may say, much has been done under the new Constitution, and the good effects are yet making progress. The necessity of measures of counter restriction will appear to him much less urgent, and their efficacy in the present turbulent state of Europe infinitely less to be relied on. Far from being inconsistent in his conduct, consistency will forbid his pressing the ex-doubled their numbers since the peace; and if, inperiment of his principle under circumstances which baffle the hopes of its success. But if so much stress is laid on former opinions in favor of this measure, how happens it that there is so little on that which now appears against it. Not one merchant has spoken in favor of it in this body; not one navigating or commercial State has patronized it.

numbers, five or six millions of bushels to all the different countries which we supply; a trifle, this, to their wants. Frugality is a greater resource. Instead of seven bushels, perhaps two could be saved by stinting the consumption of the food of cattle, or by the use of other food. Two bushels saved to each soul, is fifty-two millions of bushels, a quantity which the whole trading world perhaps could not furnish. Rice is said to be prohibited by Spain and Portugal to favor their own. Brazil could supply their rice instead of ours. Lumberhe stated the danger of despising Canada and Nova Scotia too much as rivals in the West India supply, especially the former. The dependence the English had placed on them some years ago had failed, partly because we entered into competition with them on very superior terms, and partly because they were then in an infant state. They are now supposed to have considerably more than stead of having us for competitors for the supply, as before, we should shut ourselves out by refusing our supplies or being refused entry for them, those two Colonies would rise from the ground: at least we should do more to bring it about than the English Ministry had been able to do. In 1772, 679 vessels, the actual tonnage of which was one hundred and twenty-eight thousand, were employed Mr. AMES then entered pretty fully into the in the West India trade from Great Britain. They consideration of the absolute dependence of the were supposed, on good ground, to be but half British West India islands on our supplies. He freighted to the islands; they might carry lumber, admitted that they cannot draw them so well and and the freight supposed to be deficient would be, so cheap from any other quarter; but this is not at 40s. sterling the ton, £128,000. This sum would the point. Are they physically dependent? Can diminish the extra charge of carrying lumber to we starve them? And may we reasonably expect the islands. But is lumber to be had? Yes, in thus to dictate to Great Britain a free admission Germany, and from the Baltic. It is even cheaper of our vessels into her islands? He went into de- in Europe than our own. Besides which, the hard tails to prove the negative. Beef and pork sent woods used in mills are abundant in the islands. from the now United States to the British West We are told they can sell their rum only to the Indies, 1773, 14,993 barrels. In the war time, 1780, United States: this concerns not their subsistence, ditto from England, 17,795. At the end of the but their profit. Examine it, however. In 1773, war, 1783, 16,526. Ireland exported, on an ave- the now United States took near three millions rage of seven years, prior to 1777, 250,000 barrels. gallons rum. The remaining British Colonies, Salted fish the English take in abundance, and Newfoundland, and the African Coast, have conprohibit it from us. Butter and cheese from Eng-siderable demand for this article. The demand of land and Ireland are but lately banished even from our markets. Exports from the now United States, 1773: horses, 2,768; cattle, 1,203; sheep and hogs, 5,320. Twenty-two years prior to 1791, were exported from England to all ports, 29,131 horses. Ireland, on an average of seven years, to 1779, exported 4,040 live stock, exclusive of hogs. The coast of Barbary, the Cape de Verds, &c., supply sheep and cattle. The islands, since the

Ireland is very much on the increase. It was, in 1763, 530,000 gallons; 1770, 1,558,000 gallons; 1778, 1,729,000 gallons.

Thus we see a total stoppage of the West India trade could not starve the islanders. It would affect us deeply; we should lose the sale of our products and of course not gain the carriage in our own vessels. The object of the contest would be no nearer our reach than before. Instead, however,

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of a total stoppage of the intercourse, it might happen that each nation prohibiting the vessels of the other, some third nation would carry on the traffic in its own bottoms. While this measure would disarm our system, it would make it recoil upon ourselves. It would in effect operate chiefly to obstruct the sale of our products. If they should remain unsold, it would be so much dead loss; or if the effect should be to raise the price on the consumers, it would either lessen the consumption or raise up rivals in the supply. The contest as it respects the West India trade is in every respect against us. To embarrass the supply from the United States, supposing the worst as it regards the planters, can do no more than enhance the price of sugar and coffee, and other products. The French islands are now in ruins, and the English planters have an increased price and double demand in consequence. While Great Britain confined the Colony trade to herself, she gave to the Colonists in return a monopoly in her consumption of West India articles. The extra expense arising from the severest operation of our system, is already provided against two-fold. Like other charges on the products of labor and capital, the burden will fall on the consumer. The luxurious and opulent consumer in Europe will not regard and perhaps will not know the increase of price nor the cause of it. The new settler who clears his land and sells the lumber, will feel any convulsion in the market more sensibly without being able to sustain it at all. It is a contest of wealth against want; of self-denial, between luxury and daily subsistence, that we provoke with so much confidence of success. A man of experience in the West India trade will see this contrast more strongly than it is possible to represent it.

[H. OF R.

the prospect, I have nothing to say to it. It is an amusement which it is not my intention either to disturb or to partake of. I turn from these horrors to examine the condition of France in respect to manufacturing capital and industry. In this point of view, whatever political improvements may be hoped for, it cannot escape observation, that it presents only a wide field of waste and desolation. Capital, which used to be food for manufactures, is become their fuel. What once nourished industry, now lights the fires of civil war, and quickens the progress of destruction. France is like a ship, with a fine cargo, burning to the water's edge, she may be built upon anew, and freighted with another cargo, and it will be time enough when that shall be, to depend on a part of it for our supply; at present, and for many years, she will be not so much a furnisher as a consumer. It is therefore obvious, that we shall import our supplies either directly or indirectly from Great Britain. Any obstruction to the importation will raise the price which we who consume must bear.

That part of the argument which rests on the supposed distress of the British manufactures in consequence of the loss of our market, is in every view unfounded. They would not lose the market in fact, and if they did, should we prodigiously exaggerate the importance of our consumption to the British workmen? Important it doubtless is, but a little attention will expose the extreme folly of the opinion, that they would be brought to our feet by a trial of our self-denying spirit. England now supplants France in the important Levant trade, in the supply of manufactured goods to the East and in a great measure to the West Indies, to Spain, Portugal, and their dependencies. Her trade with Russia has of late vastly increased; and she is treating for a trade with China; so that the new demands of English manufactures, consequent upon the depression of France as a rival, has amounted to much more than the whole American importation, which is not three millions. British manufactures exported in 1773, amounted to

1774

1775

1789

1790

1791

1792

£9,417,000

10,556,000

10,072,000

13,779,000

14,921,000

16,810,000

18,310,000

One of the excellencies for which the measure is recommended is, that it will affect our imports. What is offered as an argument is really an objection. Who will supply our wants? Our own manufactures are growing, and it is a subject of great satisfaction that they are. But it would be wrong to overate their capacity to clothe us. The same number of inhabitants require more and more, because wealth increases. Add to this the rapid growth of our numbers, and perhaps it will be correct to estimate the progress of manufactures as only keeping pace with that of our increasing consumption and population. It follows that we shall continue to demand in future to the amount of our The ill effect of a system of restriction and propresent importation. It is not intended by the re-hibition in the West Indies has been noticed alreasolutions that we shall import from England. Hol-dy. The privileges allowed to our exports to land and the North of Europe do not furnish a sufficient variety or sufficient quantity for our consumption. It is in vain to look to Spain, Portugal, and the Italian States. We are expected to depend principally upon France; it is impossible to examine the ground of this dependence without adverting to the present situation of that country. It is a subject upon which I practise no disguise, but I do not think it proper to introduce the politics of France into this discussion. If others can find in the scenes that pass there, or in the principles and agents that direct them, proper subjects for amiable names and sources of joy and hope in

England may be withdrawn, and prohibitory or high duties imposed. Mr. A. observed that not one of our articles is a monopoly, and noticed the effect of counter regulations on our products. He adverted particularly to pot and pearl ashes, and observed on the value of the extensive sale of that article, as it advances the clearing and settlement of our new lands; he said, the best encouragement for agriculture is a good market.

The system before us is a mischief that goes to the root of our prosperity. The merchants will suffer by the schemes and projects of a new theory. Great numbers were ruined by the convulsions

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