SENATE.]

Admission of Michigan.

[JAN. 4, 1837.

doubts that where, in the language of the declaration of independence, "any form of government becomes destructive of the rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, the people have a right to alter or abolish it.” But is it not an insult to the understanding of any man to cite such an authority as a warrant for the proceed. ings in Michigan? Is it not the very point of the objection which is made to the present bill, that the principle involved in it is revolutionary, while it professes to be an act of regular government? Does the case of Michigan present one in which the people, laboring under grievous oppression upon the part of their Government, which, in its form and practice, is destructive of the rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, are seeking to alter or abolish that form of government? No, sir. The question simply is, whether portions of the people of that State, having a regular Government, in which is vested the legislative power, have the right, by assembling in voluntary meetings, to call a convention empowered to bind the State in a time of profound peace, and as a measure of regular government. To state the question correctly is to refute it. And yet, sir, we have had an appeal made to the sacred right of revolution; and we who oppose the measure have been taunted as being opposed to the fundamental rights of the people, and to the principles of our great Revolution. We have had an effusion of the wildest and most inco

in the constitution of the society. And herein, sir, consists the great and essential difference between the constitution of a State and the constitution of the Federal Government. The first has all the powers that are not prohibited, the latter has no powers but those which are granted. The principle is all-important in the construction of the two instruments. The Federal Government is one of enumerated powers. There is no general delegation of the whole legislative power of the community, restrained merely by exceptions and limitations; but the delegation is of “all legislative powers therein granted." It is true that the same language might be used in a State constitution, and, in such case, would require the same construction. But when, as in the case of the constitution of Michigan, it is declared that "the legislative power shall be vested in a Senate and House of Representatives," it is the legislative power of the whole community, and has no practical limitation but what is to be found in other parts of the constitution. I mean, of course, as a rule of construction growing out of its own provisions. There is, also, as respects the States of this Union, another limitation, namely, the constitution of the United States. But the principle is the same, for the constitution the United States, having received the assent of the same people, may be considered as incorporated with, and forming, for the purpose of construction, a part of the State constitution, in the limitations it imposes on the exercise of State sovereignty. As it ap-herent notions of popular liberty, and our principles depears, then, that the object of calling a convention in Michigan was not to amend or alter the constitution, but to give its assent to what the legislative power might itself have assented to, namely, the enlargement of its territory, it follows that the power to call such a convention is a mere act of ordinary legislation, and the duty having been imposed by Congress to do so, it was the business and right of the Legislature of that State to perform that duty. It was the duty and right of the Legislature of Michigan to call the convention, because the people of Michigan, when they formed their constitution, declared that the Legislature alone should possess the right of expressing and binding the public will in matters of ordinary legislation. Upon the question whether a convention should be called, the time and place of its assembling, the mode of its election, the qualification of its electors, no portion of the community had the right to dictate to any other portion; nor could the will of the community be ascertained on those points in any other mode than that agreed upon in the constitution. And why, sir? Because the people of Michigan had previously agreed, each man with each and every other, when they adopted their constitution, that the Legislature should be the exponents of the public will in That any portion of the community, be it great or small, should call itself the people, and affect to express and bind the public will, under such circumstances, is a fraud upon the rights of every man in it, and a gross and manifest infraction of the social compact into which he entered when he agreed, with others, to form a sovereign State, and delegate the legislative power to a particular body. I say, then, sir, without the fear of contradiction, that when the people themselves, who cannot act in mass, delegate to their representatives, by their constitution, the legislative power of the community, each and every man of them parts with the right to express and bind the public will in any other mode than through their Legislature, in relation to matters falling within the scope of that power. Such is the compact, and it is they themselves who establish it.

such a case.

The case of revolution has been appealed to as estabJishing and illustrating the right of the people to alter or modify their Government, and control, by voluntary meetings, the will of the community. Nobody, sir,

nounced as those of the Stuarts and of the Bourbons. And what, sir, after all, is the position for which we contend? It is, that voluntary meetings of citizens, which may be nothing more than the proceedings of a few turbulent demagogues, have not authority, in a time of peace, and as a measure of regular government, to call a convention, which shall possess the sovereign authority, and be capable of binding the whole community. The converse of this proposition, I say, sir, is the principle involved in the case before us, and against which I shall contend at all times, and under all circumstances. The case of revolution supposes an end to all regular government, and its illustrations and its arguments have nothing to do with the one before us. And now, sir, we are called upon, here, here in the Senate of the United States, to sanction a principle which would be subversive of all regular government, and that, too, at a time when a spirit of misrule is abroad, when the country is full of scenes of personal violence, and we have seen men in a neighboring State insensible to the ties of social duty, willing to break down the whole social edifice, to subvert the entire Government, in order to accomplish a mere party purpose. It may be asked why Congress required the assent of a convention, since it had the power to establish the boundaries by its own authority. The answer would seem to be that, as the constitution presented by Michigan, and the desire to be admitted into the Union as a State, purported to proceed merely from the inhabitants of the peninsula, and as Congress did not think proper to grant the request that the peninsula alone should constitute a State, but added both population and territory, it became a matter of propriety to refer the subject back again to the people, to ascertain whether, under these circumstances, they still desired to become a sovereign State, and, as such, a member of this Union. But that is not now the question; the bill before us supposes that the provision was right, and affirms it to be true that the condition has been complied with. Is this true? What makes the matter still worse is, that the first convention called by the legislative authority expressly refused its assent, and we are now called upon to say that the second convention, assembled under the authority of voluntary meetings of citizens in some of the counties, was a legal convention, capable of binding the State, and that the

assent has been given which is required by the act. The resolution of the 26th January, 1836, referred to by the Senator from Pennsylvania, [Mr. BUCHANAN,] can have no bearing whatever on the present question, as indicative of the opinion of the Senate in relation to the power of the Legislature, since, at that time, there was clearly no legal authority on the part of Michigan to establish a State Government; but the act of the 15th of June, 1836, altered the case, by accepting, ratifying, and confirming, the constitution and State Government, and thus giving to both a legal existence.

[SENATE.

to repeal the third section of the act of June 15, 1836, which imposes the condition, and admit her at once. I have no apprehension of difficulty on the score of boundaries, having the most perfect conviction of the power of Congress to settle them, and that has been done by the express provisions of the act. But, sir, it will not do to pass this act, either with or without the preamble, unless in the latter case the third section of the act of June ❘ be repealed, because that provision still subsisting, to admit under the present circumstances would imply that Congress was satisfied that the condition had been fulfilled. This, sir, would be virtually to recognise and sanction the doctrine against which we contend, and which, if established, would in the end subvert all reg. ular government; and which, while it preserved the form of republican institutions, and affected to be based on the principle of popular rights and popular liberty, would involve in its practice the most odious tyranny. Mr. BROWN said it had not been his intention to participate in the debate which had arisen on the question then under consideration; but some doctrines had been. advanced in its progress which challenged their most serious consideration, and which he, as a member of that body, would not permit to pass without giving utterance to the sentiments of strong disapprobation with which they had been heard by him. He almost despaired, after the eloquent display of the gentleman from Delaware, [Mr. BAYARD,] who had just taken his seat, of saying any thing that would interest them, or of being able, in the course of his remarks, to gain that attention which that gentleman had so justly merited, as well from the matter as the manner of his address.

In the view which I have taken of this matter, num. bers are nothing. But it is contended that there were more votes given in favor of a convention at the elections held under the authority of the voluntary meetings than were given both for and against the former convention. And what does this prove! Might there not have been a great number of illegal votes given at the second election, when there was no authority of law for the government of those who undertook to conduct it? But as to the fact, which is paraded as a matter of moment, that there were at least eight thousand votes given for the second convention, does that prove, with reference to the mere weight of numbers, supposing that none voted but those who had a right to do so, that the people of the State, or a majority of the people, desired that a con. vention should be called, and were in favor of giving the assent required by the act of Congress? Far from it, sir. Upon turning to the census which was taken in the year 1834, it will be found that there was, in that year, in the peninsula of Michigan, a population of 87,273 souls, of whom there were upwards of 22,000 free white males above the age of twenty years, so that there must have been, at that time, at least twenty thousand voters. At the present time it is probable that there are at least thirty thousand voters; and yet eight thousand votes given without authority of law, and without the certainty that they were those of persons who had a right to vote at all, are here represented to be the voice of the people; and it is seriously contended that they had a right to elect a convention representing the sovereignty of the State, and capable of binding the whole community. This very case is itself the strongest proof of the danger and folly of departing from the true principles of the social system, and attempting to introduce and establish any other standard of the public will than that which the people themselves, in the formation of their constitution, bave declared shall be the exponent of that will, namely, the legislative power. In the one case, which is that of the regular action of Government, there can be no danger; and the people, having it always in their power to change their representatives, may secure a faithful assertion of their will; but in the other, which concedes to a portion of the people the right, by voluntary assemblies, to call and elect a convention capable of controlling the whole community, the very end of all govern-eral Government without its consent, and to establish ment is defeated, by giving to the strong and the crafty the means of controlling the weak and the timid without their consent; and while their proceedings boldly and insolently assume the form and the tone of public sentiment, they may in truth be nothing more than the machinations of designing demagogues, and prove in the end the worst species of tyranny. What, then, it may be asked, is to be done? There are two courses, either of which may be taken, and with either of which I shall be content. The one is to leave the matter to the further action of the State of Michigan. Let the Legislature of that State call another convention, and then, if it be true that the majority of the people are now in favor of coming into the Union upon the proposed terms, there cannot be a doubt but the required assent will be given. This course will require a little delay, but that will be attended with no material inconvenience. The other is

The admission of Michigan as a member of the Union had (said Mr. B.) been resisted mainly by those who oppose it on the ground that she is, at this time, a sovereign State, and that the convention which assembled in December last, and gave its assent to the terms proposed by the act of the last session of Congress, was not called into being by a law of the Legislature of Michigan, and is therefore to be considered as irregular and revolutionary in its nature, by assuming to act without such authority. He thought it required but a very slight examination of the subject for them to arrive at the conclusion that, on all questions of legislation by Congress touching her condition, she is to be contemplated and regarded as a Territory, and not as a State. Not having complied with the terms of the act of Congress passed at the last session for her admission into the Union, she is not a confederate State. If she exists, then, as a State at all, it must be in the character of a foreign and independent sovereignty. To maintain a doctrine so absurd as this was, and so utterly subversive of the authority of the General Government over its territory, its advocates must, of necessity, be driven to admit the right of the people of a Territory to throw off the power of the Gen

an independent Government at their own will and pleas ure. Whether a State may rightfully secede from the Union or not, is a question about which the ablest statesmen have differed; but that a Territory, having in itself no sovereignty, may rightfully withdraw from the authority of the Federal Government, (unless by that right acquired by successful revolution,) is a proposition so dis organizing in its tendency as to find scarcely a single advocate. It is true that Michigan has, for some time past, exercised the powers of a State, preparatory to her admission into the Union, which were simply permissive, and not by virtue of any rights she had as a State, independent of the authority of the General Government. She is, then, for all practical purposes, to be regarded in our legislation as still remaining in her ter ritorial condition. If this opinion be correct, then the santuary of State rights, for which so many apprehens

JAN. 4, 1837.]

Admission of Michigan.

[SENATE.

a convention, in their sovereign capacity, without subjecting himself to the charge of aiding to produce a revolution? Were bank corporations to be considered as imbodying in themselves the sovereign authority of the State, that it was thus dangerous to call in question their rights to existence, independent of the will of the people, whose legislative agents had created them? Gentlemen who entertain such exalted opinions of their attributes, he would say, carried their reverence much further than he could agree to do. They were opinions better suited, he would say, to the subjects of arbitrary Governments than to the citizens of a free republic.

it by the constitution, and none of the evils predicted had been realized. Sir, (said Mr. B.,) to those who are in the habit of speaking disparagingly of the intelligence of the great body of the people, it is sufficient to point them to the condition of the country to disprove the charge. It is to that public intelligence that we are indebted for what it is. It is under the guidance of that public will that it has attained its present unexampled prosperity. In instituting a comparison between that public intelligence which is so often derided and the political wisdom of that party who underrates it, a marked superiority must be acknowleged as due to the former. On the one hand, the party claiming a monopoly of all Mr. B., without undertaking to defend all the arguthe wisdom of the country, as numerous instances attest ments contained in this much-denounced letter, some of in our history as a nation, have often attempted to in- which he did not then recollect, not having the letter graft on our institutions principles hostile to our form of before him, would take occasion very explicitly to degovernment; while, on the other, the patriotism and in-clare his hearty and entire concurrence in the main contelligence of the American people have constantly inter-clusion drawn from them. That conclusion asserted the posed to preserve them in every great emergency. right of the people of Pennsylvania, acting through a What, he would ask, would have been the condition of convention, in their sovereign capacity, to annul and abour country, in all probability, at this day, if its political rogate the charter lately granted by the Legislature of destinies had been continued in the keeping of that par- that State to the Bank of the United States, for the term ty who, in their own imagination, have all the sagacious of thirty years. He well knew the ingenious subterfuge statesmen, and are almost exclusively endowed by Prov- by which professional astutenes had sought to escape idence with the gifts of intellectual greatness? Let the from the force of this, to his mind, plainly-established systematic efforts made by their leading statesmen, conclusion, by endeavoring to take shelter under that when in power, to introduce a system of administration | part of the constitution of the United States which deinto our Government, modelled on the plan of the Eng- clares that "no State shall pass any law impairing the lish monarchy, answer. Let the fate of those countries obligation of contracts." To maintain that bank charin which the energy of the popular will had been broken ters are "contracts," and thus to draw them within the down by the ascendency of titled orders answer. From meaning of that term, as employed in the constitution of the picture of what it most probably would have been the United States, the advocates of the doctrine that under such auspices, the friends of republican govern- they are irrevocable by any authority have been driven ment were cheered and animated in contemplating what to advance subtleties and refinements better suited to it is under the safer and wiser auspices of that general that age of ecclesiastical ingenuity in which the statutes intelligence which, united, forms the public will. of mortmain were sought to be evaded by that order of men, to perpetuate their ascendency, than to the present day of enlightened constitutional freedom. He did not believe that any of the eminent writers on law in England, in defining the nature and powers of corpora tions, had ever considered their charters in the nature of contracts between the sovereign authority granting them and the individuals of which they were composed. On the contrary, they had been uniformly treated by them as artificial bodies, to whom certain privileges and franchises are granted, for the purpose of doing that which they could not do in their individual capacities. Nor did he believe that any authority could be found among the American law writers, previous to the adoption of the present federal constitution, which maintained the doctrine that bank charters granted by the States were in the nature of contracts between the States and the individuals to whom they were granted. The universally received opinion before, that they were mere privileges or franchises, granted by the State or sovereign, is a most conclusive proof to show that the modern invention of the doctrine that they are contracts is an afterthought, a mere device, intended, by a change of phrases, to suit the case to the terms of the constitution, and to bring it to bear against State authority, in favor of the perpetuity of corporations. Mr. B. said, to his mind, the doctrine that a State, in its high and sovereign capacity, was absolutely impotent to rid itself of a great moneyed corporation, chartered for a term of thirty years, was a monstrous heresy, and, in his judgment, better suited to the notions of popular rights which prevailed in the arbitrary reign of the Stuarts, or to those of the Polignacs of France, than to an American statesman. No matter how absolutely certain they may be that such an institution may insinuate its power into every part of their State, and, when firmly fixed, prove utterly destructive to their liberties, yet, according to this doctrine, they have no power to relieve themselves,

The honorable gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. PRESTON] has expressed, in strong terms, his abhorrence of the doctrine contained in a letter lately published in the newspapers of the United States, and written by a distinguished gentleman, recently a member of this body. He had characterized them as disorganizing and of revolutionary tendency. In this he has been followed, much in the same strain, by the gentleman from Delaware, [Mr. BAYARD.] Mr. B. could not but feel some surprise at their course in bringing into discussion questions hav ing no bearing on proceedings here, and such as were connected alone with the domestic strifes of the States in which they had originated. He felt more especially surprised that gentlemen professing such a sacred regard for, and claiming, as some of them seemed to do, almost the exclusive guardianship of State rights, should be found invading the limits of Pennsylvania and Maryland, for the purpose of mingling in controversies which they were in no way called on to decide. He must be permitted to say that their course on this occasion was but a poor practical commentary on their doctrines. In the remarks which he should make on this subject, he but followed the example which had been set him. The gauntlet had been thrown down, and he, for one, was ready to join issue with gentlemen on the important question raised in the letter which had been so strongly denounced. He had the pleasure not only of a personal acquaintance with Mr. Dallas, the writer of the letter, but he flattered himself that he also enjoyed a portion of his personal friendship. Little could he have supposed that a gentleman universally respected for his mild and urbane manners in private life, and distinguished for wise and prudent deliberation as a statesman, would have been held up, here or elsewhere, as a revolutionist. Had it come to this: that a citizen of this republic could not express an opinion in favor of the right of the people of a State to abolish a bank charter, acting through

SENATE.]

Admission of Michigan.

[JAN. 4, 1837.

and their condition is irremediable, save only what is to While he felt the most sacred regard for the rights of be accomplished by the tardy efflux of time. In other words, it draws after it the startling consequence, that more secure than in this, yet he could not but express his the mere temporary agents of the people, appointed to strong repugnance to the extravagant and alarming legislate for them, may contract away the rights of the claims set up in behalf of individuals holding official supreme power of the State, and that supreme power, stations, and in behalf of chartered companies, under the no matter how improvident the act, no matter how ru plea of vested rights. If the extravagant extent which is inous in its consequences, no matter how much in oppo- contended for it of late is acquiesced in, it was quite clear sition to the public wiil, yet submission to it, without the to his mind that the people, under this ingenious device, hope of peaceable redress, is to be their unalterable would soon be divested of the greater portion of their doom! If this can be done for thirty years, why not for rights. In proportion as the wealth of the country increasfive hundred? If for five hundred, why not in perpetui. ed, the advocates of this doctrine were becoming more ty? Such are the absurd consequences into which the and more emboldened in their claims to power. Doctrines advocates of this doctrine are inevitably driven; a doctrine scarcely ventured to be hinted at some years ago are the practical effect of which is to put aside the will of now openly asserted, and those who consider it their duty to the supreme authority of a State, and to substitute in oppose them are denounced with overweening insolence its place a Government of corporations! Nothing, be as disorganizers and revolutionists. It is but an exhisaid, appeared to his mind more strikingly preposterous bition here of the same spirit that is to be found making than the idea that a State, which may change or abolish war against popular rights on the other side of the Atits fundamental law at pleasure, which may pull down and lantic. It is the same spirit here, advocating the extenreconstruct, in such way as it chooses, the legislative, ex- sion of the doctrine of vested rights, that is heard raising ecutive, or judiciary departments of its Government, its voice there in behalf of prescriptive rights, established cannot exercise the power of abolishing a charter created church, and titled orders. An alarm is attempted to be by an act of its Legislature. It has often been contend- gotten up by the advocates of these extraordinary doced that a judge appointed during good behaviour held his trines, (said Mr. B.,) by raising the cry that the rights of office in the nature of a contract between himself and the property are in danger. How, he would ask, and by whom, State, he, on his part, undertaking to perform certain are they endangered? The great body of the agricultural duties in consideration of a fixed salary, to be paid by the community are infinitely more interested in the value and State; yet few, if any, had been bold enough, in any of amount of property owned throughout the country, than the States, to deny that a convention of the people could all the stockjobbers and moneyed corporations put toabolish the office, if it was their pleasure to do so. 'If gether. The great body of the people are therefore, they possessed the power to do the one, which power at least, as much concerned in preserving law, order, and had been in many instances exercised in different States, the rights of property, as those who vainly imagine that it seemed to follow, as a necessary consequence, that they themselves constitute the country. If there be any they were competent to do the other. class of revolutionists in this country, it is not those who Mr. B. said, conceding for a moment to the advocates stand up in behalf of its ancient rights, against the new of this doctrine, that privileges granted to banking cor- claims to power set up under the plea of vested rights, but porations were in the nature of contracts, yet be con- they are the practical revolutionists who endeavor to subtended that it was of the very essence of those contracts,ject the Government of the people to a Government of and an implied condition which entered into them when made, that the people in their sovereign capacity could dissolve them when they saw fit so to do. This original right of the people of a State to judge of and abolish such measures as they may deem destructive of their liberties or happiness, is a principle which lies at the root of popular institutions; and, if surrendered, converts the Government of a State substantially into an oligarchy. If this doctrine were once established, then the citizens of a State, under our confederacy, would be, in that respect, in an infinitely worse condition than the subjects of the English monarchy. There the Parliament may dissolve corporations, in virtue of its legislative power, when, in its opinion, they are of mischievous tendency in respect to the public interests. And yet in no country on earth had the doctrine in favor of vested rights been carried further than in that. There the subject may be relieved, by the power of Parliament, from the burden of a corporation deemed ruinous to the public interests; but here the citizen, according to this modern doctrine, can find no relief, not even in a convention of the people.

No, one, he said, entertained a more sacred regard for the rights of private property than himself. It was the imperative duty of Government to protect it against either fraud or violence. The power contended for, to revoke charters, involved no such consequence. An act granting charters of incorporation was not a grant of property to the corporators, but simply a grant of privilege. Its repeal did not take from them their money or other property, but took from them merely the privilege to use it in a corporate capacity. It was undoubtedly the duty of the State to restore, in such events, whatever sum of money may have been paid it for such privilege.

corporations.

The remedy proposed by Mr. Dallas was in strict ace cordance with law and order. It was neither revolu tionary in its principles, nor did it in the remotest de gree resemble nullification. It did not maintain that a convention, in deciding on the powers of corporations, would execute its own decisions, independent of all other authority. On the contrary, it expressly looked to and acknowledged the Supreme Court of the United State as the tribunal possessing competent power to settle and adjudicate the case which might arise out of this question This much, Mr. B. said, he had deemed his duty to say, it defence of principles that he considered of vital importance, not to one State alone, but to all, and in defence of an absent gentleman, whose opinions he thought had been most uncourteously and unwarrantably assailed on that floor. He had too much respect for himself, as well as the State of Pennsylvania, to volunteer any opinion of He had only his as to the course she ought to pursue. argued to show what power a State might exercise rightfully in such a case; he not had expressed an opinion as to what she ought to do.

The honorable gentleman from South Carolina, [Mr. PRESTON,] and most of those who had followed him on the same side in this debate, after characterizing the proceeding which he had just reviewed as revolutionary and disorganizing, and likely to lead to the overthrow of reg ular government, endeavored to trace back the causes to the doctrines of the party friendly to the present adminis tration, and to hold them accountable to the country for the consequences. Mr. B. said that he must be permitted to say that lectures from that quarter on law and order came with no very good grace. From whom, he would ask, were the friends of the administration to be now in