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SENATE.]

Treasury Circular.

[DEC. 29, 1836.

lands, and give our votes accordingly on the resolution and the amendment.

tion. I have already alluded to them, so far as to show that they are not temporary in their nature; and if they are the true reasons, the order, in its full force, is as necessary now as it was at the moment when it was issued. But some of them call for further remark.

know how strenuously that law was opposed by those who are said to court and to enjoy an acquaintance with the most intimate sentiments and feelings, both of the re- In deciding upon the policy and the lawfulness of this tiring and the approaching Executive. It was denounc-order, the reasons as-igned for it demand our consideraed in terms the force of which they did not stop to measure, and we were warned, in various modes, up to the time when the amendment was offered in the House of Representatives, that the power of the veto would be applied to it. The President declares to us that he gave it his "reluctant approval," and an official organ has announced that it would have been refused, if the veto would have prevented its passage. I leave it to his advocates to defend that political morality and independence which fails to discharge a high official duty, upon the ground that he may be found in a constitutional minority. It comports little with the boasted energy and firmness of which the nation has heard so much, and by which many have been deluded. And may I not suggest to his defenders on this floor, whether it does become the dignity and respect for the laws which appertain to the first office of the country, by such a device, to defeat the full operation of a statute which has been passed by the votes of so large a majority of the Legislature, and to which the approval of the Executive, even though reluctantly, has been affixed? It was perfectly well known that the effect of the order would be to diminish the sums which would be received by the several States; less lands would be sold, less money would come into the Treasury, a less amount would be divided.

And, sir, notwithstanding the report of the Secretary, I cannot but suspect that the failure to receive a part, at least, of the money from the Bank of the United States, while it has still further diminished the amount to be divided, may have been induced by similar views. The Executive had no desire that that money also should come into distribution.

One of them is, in substance, to repress frauds, speculations, and monopolies, in the purchase of the public lands, to preserve them for the "actual settler," at a moderate price, and insure the more rapid settlement of the territory. It is doubtful whether the more rapid settlement of the country can promote its essential and permanent interests, and whether the speculations complained of do injuriously, if at all, impede its substantial progress in population and prosperity. But, I ask, what is meant by these frauds? And who have the legitimate power to apply the remedy for them? Who is a speculator, and what authority, under our system of Government, can limit his acquisition? Can the Executive determine what number of acres makes a man a speculator, and who shall be prohibited therefore from buying? He might as well decide how much grain a citizen should raise, buy, sell, or transfer in the market, or the number of yards of broadcloth that he should manufacture or import and dispose of. If there be any authority to control such matters, it is not executive, but legislative, and the Executive wanders from his proper sphere when he attempts to interfere with them.

66

It is true, as the Senator from Missouri tells us, that the word "speculator" is not to be found in the constitution; and is any other description or denomination of acts to be found there? Is his favorite actual settler" there? But, sir, there is a more important inquiry? Does the Senator mean to infer, because the speculator is not named, therefore his rights are not protected by the constitution, and the President may make any regu lation in regard to him which he may please? If the argument does not mean this, I can perceive neither its force nor application. If it do mean this, it is a bold claim for the extension of executive power. It proclaims that whoever and whatever is not named in and protect

But, be this as it may, the effect upon this bill was foreseen by the President and Secretary. Was it also desired by them? And was this a controlling motive for issuing the order? The law was passed on the 23d June, Congress adjourned on the 4th July, and on the 11th, while some of the members were yet on their way to their homes, an act is performed which is calculated to defeat, at least to weaken, the operation of the most important measure which had resulted from their joint de-ed by the constitution, may be dealt with, regulated, liberations. Is it the appropriate business of the Executive thus to counteract the decision of the Legislature, to deprive the people of the States of the large sums of money which would have been received from the sales of the public lands, and put at defiance not only the will of Congress, but of a large majority of the Union? How far the people may be disposed to bear it, without murmuring, I know not; but as a representative from one of the States which approves the law, and has been deprived of her full measure of benefit under it by this act of the Executive, it is my duty to express my disapprobation and her disapprobation; and no servility to power, no devotion to a name or a party, shall keep me from it.

Mr. President, this order may have had temporary objects, which may have been accomplished, but it had also permanent objects, which are yet to be accomplished. It may have relieved favorites, and it may have weakened an obnoxious measure, and lessened the amount which will be in the Treasury on the 1st of January, and which the States are to receive; but the Executive cannot, at this moment, repeal it. It would be an open avowal of motives which there is too much cunning and too little courage openly and on the public records to proclaim. The order must be continued, unless the power of Congress is brought to bear on its repeal. We must consider it as permanently operating upon the currency of the country and the disposition of the public

trampled upon, at executive pleasure. The Senator instructed us about the divine right of Kings; he had better turn his attention to the divine right of Presidents, who, by such a principle, may do, not what they are au thorized by the constitution to do, but every thing that is not forbidden.

Another reason assigned for the order is, to check bank issues, which had been made to a ruinous extent. That there has been a large extension of bank capital and paper currency since the financial notions of the present administration have had operation, is not to be doubted. That extension was the natural result of the course adopted by those who have had control on this subject, and has been principally effected by them. While they have talked about specie, and denounced the United States Bank and paper money, they have, in several of the States, occupied themselves in greatly increasing their bank capital and paper currency. causes and effects of this circulation have been clearly exhibited by the Senator from Massachusetts, [Mr. WEBSTER,] and I will not detain the Senate by repetitions less satisfactory than the original exposition. I beg, however, to say that, in forming my opinions, I do not rely on the calculations and estimates of the Secretary of the amount of actual currency, and especially of gold and silver; nor do I credit the estimate which he has given of the amount necessary for the convenience and interest of the country. The quantity of gold and silver manu

The

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factured in the nation, for articles of use and luxury, is immense. Our own mines do not furnish more than enough of gold to meet this demand for annual consumption; and much of the silver which comes from abroad shares the same fate. They are converted, not by pounds, but by hundreds of pounds; and it is doubtful whether all of both metals, taken from the mines of the world, increase, to any great extent, the specie in actual circulation among civilized nations. I feel quite sure that the actual circulation of specie here is below 25 instead of 28 millions of dollars. But if we rely on the estimate of the Secretary of the paper and specie, and place it at 148 millions, it is not much greater, in proportion to the demand, than it was in 1833 at 84 millions. The actual population and property of the country have grown in a ratio never before known in the history of nations. Its enterprise has been without parallel; its great staples alone have required 50 per cent. addition. Take an example. The cotton of about one million one hundred thousand bales, at the price in 1833, was worth about 52 millions of dollars, in 1836, the one million six hundred thousand bales, at 17 cents, are worth about 86 millions. The five or six transfers which are made of them, from the grower to the consumer, were to be met by some kind of circulation-specie, notes, or bills of exchange. And the derangement of the exchanges threw the demand with additional violence upon the paper currency. The same facts are true as to bread-stuffs, beef, pork, &c. Your bread-stuffs in 1833, at about $4 per barrel, required not more than 50 millions. In 1836, at $8 or $9, they called for about 110 millions. Your beef and pork, at $6 50 in 1833, wanted less than 80 millions; in 1836, at from $12 to $14, demanded nearly 200 millions; and all these, in the two or three transfers from the produ cer to the consumer, swelled enormously the circulation which was required. Pursue the calculation through all the elements which constitute the materials for an estimate, and it will be found that the currency at $6 50 for each individual in 1833, would have afforded accommodation to the business and wants of the people of the Union equal to the $10 at which the Secretary states it in 1836; and when to this we add the obstructions to exchange, it is not to be doubted that some inconvenience would have been felt. Yet it is in such a condition of our interests that the Secretary sets himself to work to shut up as much specie as he can, in about one tenth of the banks; to curtail the power of accommodation in all the rest; and we are called upon to wonder at the pressure.

But, Mr. President, it is not necessary, on this quest'on, to settle the amount of circulation which the interests of the country require. The pretence is, that we are to have that circulation confined chiefly to gold and silver. Is it practicable? and are those who talk of it sincere and well advised? To accomplish it, you must abstract from the circulation of other countries from fifty to seventy millions of specie. You could not coin it at your mints with sufficient rapidity to keep pace with the demand. You cannot buy and retain it in the country, unless your commerce will enable you to do it. Commerce will bring, and commerce will take it away. Why do not those who are the advocates of an exclusive specie currency tell us how we may accomplish the object? Let them give us a scheme; inform us where we shall procure it; how retain it; and how the business and employments of the country can be reduced to the point which such a currency would require. Until they do this, the intelligence of the people will be apt to suspect that there is more of pretence than sincerity on this point. It is by visionary and impracticable schemes like these that the real obstacles are thrown in the way of wise and prudent regulations; and we can never hope for sound legislation until they shall be removed from the countenance and support of those who are in power. VOL. XIII.-12

[SENATE.

But, Mr. President, while I dissent from the views of the Executive on these points, I do not wish to be misunder. stood as the advocate of an extension of our paper currency, nor as maintaining that it is in a sound and safe condition. Our whole currency is in imminent danger. There are no salutary checks and control. Banks are created often without reference to the necessities of the country, and sometimes made the rewards of partisan and party exertions. Issues, too, have not unfrequently been regulated by the wants and wishes of favorites. The constitutional control has been thrown aside, and ignorance and empiricism are meddling with matters which they do not understand. There is danger ahead of us, and we shall be fortunate if we escape without a convulsion in the currency which will agonize the country. It is time that this subject was under wiser management. But even this will be insufficient. Admit that our circulation is too great-that there is danger of over-issues by the banks-that gold and silver ought to be our only currency--and that it is the duty of the Governmnnt to look well to all these; yet the question seems, who has the authority to direct, regulate, and control them? The interference of the Executive, without the sanction and command of Congress, is usurpation of power. His right to legislate is not to be found in the constitution.

I pass to the effects which have been produced by this Treasury order. The President believes" that the country will find in the motives which induced that order, and the happy consequences which will have ensued, much to commend, and nothing to condemn." Let us examine these consequences, award all the praise which they merit.

The President says: "It checked the career of the Western banks, and gave them additional strength in anticipation of the pressure which has since pervaded our Eastern as well as the European commercial cities." The Senator from North Carolina also admits that there

is a severe and grinding pressure. The Senator from Mississippi does not seem to credit it; he regards it as another panic cry. I shall not attempt to settle the controversy between them, nor waste time in proving by facts and arguments that a pressure has prevailed. The man who doubts must labor under strange ignorance of the condition of the country-an ignorance very similar to that which could assert that our exchanges are in a better state than for several years past. His opinions will not be likely to mislead. But this order was given "in anticipation of the pressure." It certainly could have anticipated it but a very few hours, for the pressure commenced at the very moment that the existence of the order was known in the cities and in the country. They were as contemporaneous as cause and effect could be. In proof of the assertion that the order checked the career of the Western banks, and gave them strength, the Senator from Missouri [Mr. BENTON] attempts to prove that it has greatly increased the specie in the banks and the accommodation to the public. He seems to think that he has quite overwhelmed all opposition, and destroyed all resistance to his conclusions, by "the logic of figures," and his "appeal to the exact sciences." It is not the first time that this logic has satisfied that Senator without convincing others. It proved very conclu sively to his mind during the last session that there would be and could be no surplus to be divided among the States. The Secretary, however, has found about thirtyseven millions for this purpose, and that is far below what it ought to have been. The Senator, however, has a reason for the error of his conclusion from "the logic of figures." It is in substance this: If Congress would have made all the appropriations asked for, and made them in an early day in the session, the logic would have come out right. I do not doubt it, sir. If, in the early part of the session, we could have permitted

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- Difference,

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[DEC. 29, 1836.

$10,450,415 13 15,520,202 42

5,069,787 29

ourselves to be charged, both by the President and Sen- dations in proportion to its amount than the lesser capiator, with utter disregard of our duty, and wilfully, for tal in June did in proportion to its amount, it will be difparty purposes, permitting the country to be uncovered ficult to persuade us that the banks have been strengthwhile the clouds of war were gathering over her, and re- ened, the currency benefited, or the public more ac. mained silent, the long and excited debate upon the three commodated. A few statements will show how this is. million appropriation would have been avoided, and the Throwing away the fractions, we may call the capital in time spared, and the appropriations reached at an earlier June forty-six and a half millions, in November sevenday. If we will suffer the imputations against our patriotis.nty-seven and a half millions. and fidelity to the public, from all quarters, to go unanswer- In June the deposite banks had ed and unnoticed, and simply become the registers of In November the thousand efforts for squandering money which has been so profusely made, time will be saved, and there will be no surplus. The Senator is correct in his defence of the accuracy of his logic, if you leave him and an extravagant administration in unin'errupted possession of the means of verifying it. The appropriations last year amounted to about thirty-four millions of dollars, and we were urged to add many millions more. This would have swept the surplus pretty effectually, and left little, if any thing, to divide. But I thought that thirty-four millions was quite enough to be expended in one year by an economical and reforming administration; and the more so as it was but eight years since that the administration, of which I was an unimportant member, was denounced and discarded from public confidence, because it had expend-In November to ed about thirteen millions. There is some difference between thirteen and thirty-four millions in a single year. But times, sir, have changed; a new logic is in vogue: what was guilt then is virtue now.

But, Mr. President, let us see how the Senator applies this logic of figures. He takes the deposite banks alone, reads the amount of specie, and the accommodations before the Treasury order and after it—I believe he took the months of June and November last as his guides and finding more specie in the latter than the former period, in these banks, and more accommodations also, he not only attributes it to the order, but infers that the currency is more sound because there is more specie in the country. Non sequiturs do not belong to figures. The premises and the conclusion do not hold together. If there be more specie in the country, upon what principle shall we assign it to the Treasury order, in preference to the state of our foreign commerce and foreign exchanges? These may, and necessarily would, for the time, bring and keep specie here. But how the order could have had the slightest effect, it is difficult for others to see, and ought to be explained.

Again: there is manifest error in looking only to the deposite banks. The operation of the order would seem to be to bring specie into them, and take it away from the others; strengthen them, in this respect, while it weakened all the rest. To prove that they have more specie and more power to accommodate, only to establish the charge against the order for its unequal operation, unless it be also proved that more specie has been brought by it into the country and into the other banks also, so that the whole amount of the currency has been strengthened. These deposite banks are, I think, eighty-one in number, with some branches. There are

in the nation more than nine hundred banks. You do little for our paper currency, if you strengthen eightyone to the injury of eight hundred-benefit a few to the destruction of the rest.

But I do not understand the matter as the Senator does, even as to the deposite banks themselves. In June last there were thirty-three of them. After the passage of the deposite act, they were increased to eighty-one. In June the thirty-three had a capital of $33,418,092 83. In November the eighty-one had a capital of $77,576,449 67. To judge of their condition as to specie and accommodations, we must take their capital at the two periods, and compare the one with the other; and if the capital in November did not afford more of specie and accommo

But if forty-six and a half millions gave ten and a half,
then seventy-seven and a half ought to have given seven-
teen and a half-two millions more than they had in No-
vember. The deposite banks, in proportion to their
capital, were not as strong in specie by two millions as
they were in June before the order. A few of them,
doubtless, had more, because the operation of the order
was unequal; but while some were strengthened, accord-
ing to the ideas of the Senator, others were weakened.
The same result will be found in their accommoda-
tions, consisting of loans, discounts, and exchanges.
In June they amounted to

The increase being

$108,498,037 74 163,972,830 24

55,474,792, 50

But if the capital of forty-six and a half millions gave
about one hundred and eight and a half, the capital of sev-
enty-seven and a half ought to have given one hundred
and eighty millions of accommodation, being sixteen mil-
lions more than they did give. Why should there have
been this reduction? And if it were produced by this
order, have we not found one cause of the acknowleged
pressure?

Their circulation has been alluded to.
In June it was

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$27,967,152 40 41,482,897 82

In November
But in proportion to their capital, it ought, in Novem-
ber, to have been about forty-six and a half millions,
and was therefore about five millions less than it should
have been.

The Senator considers this a strong argument in their favor; but does he not perceive, that while they were curtailing their circulation and discounts, they were pressing the community severely? Nor am I satisfied that it was not their duty to the public, at least to continue, if not to enlarge, their accommodations. Their deposites had in the mean time increased nearly nineteen millions, from about fifty-seven to about seventy-six millions, almost two thirds of the capital which had been added to them, and not far from one fourth of their whole united capital. They had been placed in a condition of eminent control-they had it in their power to relieve the business of the country--their deposites were greatly increased-why did they not do it? The answer is, the Treasury order prevented. Take every species of accommodation which they afforded, and the result will make a strange exhibit. In June, loans, discounts, exchanges, and circulations, amounted to

In November to

Increase

$136,465,190 14 205,455,728 06

68,990,537 92

But if the capital in June gave one hundred and thirty-six millions, that of November ought to have given two hundred and twenty-seven; twenty-two millions more than it did afford, and this with the increase of deposites. We have often been amused, if we have not been edified, by lengthy lectures (I hope the Senate will excuse the word) about the curtailments of the Bank of the United States, and most patriotic indignation was exhibited against it, for this cause. It is to be regretted that some of the denunciations could not now be directed to anoth

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er quarter-to banks disciplined into worse conduct by illegal orders of the Secretary.

But, Mr. President, while this operation was going on, and these banks withholding the aid which they ought to have given, they were acquiring relations with other banks, which threw obstacles in their way, and were calculated to make them do the same thing. I have not all the means necessary to exhibit the actual conduct of the other banks; but if they did not curtail, it was no fault of the Treasury order or of the deposite banks. A severe check was held over them. In June there was due to the deposite banks from other banks $17,867,869 49 And they held their notes for 10,982,790 42 $28,850,659 91

In all .

In November, due Notes

In all

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$26,662,669 70 16,412,324 57

$43,074,994 27 A difference of $14,224,334 36 in the hands of the deposite banks, which they might demand at a moment, and for which their debtors were obliged to prepare, by withholding their accommodations.

Nor, while these effects were produced, does it appear, so far as specie alone, the panacea of the Senator, is concerned, that the circulation of these banks was any more safe. They had in June ten and a half millions of specie, to less than twenty-eight millions of circulation. In November, fifteen and a half to forty-one and a half of circulation--very nearly the same proportion.

But, should it be objected that it is not a fair test to apply such calculations to all the deposite banks, scattered so widely, and so various in their conditions, I answer that this is a question of currency; that which affects a part, affects all, in a greater or less degree; and the merit or the demerit of the Treasury movement must always be tested by its results upon the whole, and not on a part. Could it be proved that it had benefited the Western banks, which received the proceeds of the sales of the land, while it had injured the rest of the Union, it would be a conclusive argument against it.

But let us inquire what its effects have been there, and take the banks in Indiana, Illinois, and Michigan, which will test the value of this experiment as well as any others.

These in June last had a capital of
In November, of

Increase

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$1,928,121 88 2,648,275 00

$720,153 12 An addition of about $77,445, more than one third of its amount.

In June they had of specie In November

Being an increase of

$1,028,581 39 1,536,836 74

$508,255 35 Now, this increase is only about $114,000 more than they ought to have had, without the forcing process which was resorted to. It is a small sum, and at ordinary times might have been acquired in four months by a capital of two and a half millions, without alarm or distress. It was manifestly rather the means adopted than the result, which agitated the currency. It is to be regretted that we have not before been favored with the actual receipts of specie in the land offices, that we might compare them with former years, and learn two things: 1. What increase of specie there has been in the receipts over former years, in proportion to the whole amounts received on the sales. And, 2. What was the diminution in the sales created by this order. These points would furnish salutary guides in forming our judgments on this topic. By the report of the Secretary, received a few moments before I rose to address you, I

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[SENATE.

perceive that the receipts of the four months, including August and November, were only about $1,800,000. Can it be true, sir, that this was the whole amount received in those four most productive months? Were the sales diminished to such an extent, and by a mere executive order? If it be so, the device to diminish the sums to be received by the States under the deposite law has been eminently successful. How far its fairness and justice will be approved by the people of the Union, remains for them to decide.

By that report it appears that there was received for the sales of public lands in these four months, $1,802,939 In August, during one half of which payments were made in bank notes as well as specie $307,456 In September

In October
In November

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584,693

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Thus it appears that in all our land offices $11,419 were received under the operation of the order in November more than in August, during half of which it was not in operation. Was it worth while to derange the currency and produce distress and confusion for such a result?

It is apparent, I think, from this amount, that there has not been fair dealing in relation to these payments; and whenever we shall receive an account of the sales, I do not believe it will appear that less than two millions worth of the land was sold within that period.

The deposite banks in those three States gave accommodation, by loans, discounts, exchanges, and circulation,

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Thus it appears that while their capital was increased $77,445 82, more than one third, their accommodation was increased $186,117 60, less than one fourth. How does the Senator propose to answer and explain this fact? Will he not see in it another cause for the pressure? At the same time their relations with other banks stood in this condition: In June they held debts and notes amounting to $3,356,149 30; in November, to $4,045,755 52; a sufficient increase to be wielded with great power. In the meanwhile, also, their deposites had increased nearly $700,000.

In the review of these statements, it seems to me that the "logic of figures" proves little that the Senator from Missouri [Mr. BENTON] attempts to establish. It shows, on the contrary, that neither the specie in the deposite banks, nor their accommodations, have increased in proportion to their capital, and, instead of benefiting the operation of the Treasury, has injured the business and facilities of the country.

But, Mr. President, this is not the worst aspect of the order. When it was issued, the community and all the banks in the Union perceived that the desire to purchase public lands would create a strong effort to obtain specie, to be used for that purpose; and that whatever could be procured would be sent in that direction, and deposited, and shut up in a few banks in the new States. Individuals who possessed it retained it, in the confident hope that its value would appreciate. The banks retained it, because they could not tell what drafts would be made upon them for it, and whether a large amount of their ordinary circulation would not be thrown back upon them; and they feared to extend, but rather felt it necessary to contract their accommodations. All classes felt that it must derange the ordinary course of business and commerce, and, as a matter of necessity, not choice, they withheld the means from the use of others.

The Senator from Connecticut [Mr. NILES] seems quite indignant that the terms "tampering with the cur

SENATE.]

Treasury Circular.

rency" should be applied to orders and effects like these. What is it, sir, but tampering, when orders are issued without warning, without authority, affecting every dollar of money in the Union, and changing the course of business? There is an intimate, sensitive relation between the course of business and the currency. You cannot touch one part of it without affecting the rest. Diminish the specie or raise its price in New Orleans, and it is instantly felt in New York and Boston. And when the cause which touches it is the simple order of the Executive, the sensation is the more deep and appalling. They who feel it do not know, and cannot anticipate, what will come nex', nor how soon it will come; distrust, fear, apprehension, guards, are the consequen ces. It is far less so when the change is produced by the legislative power. Its action is more open, de liberate, less changeable, less dependent on local causes and the will of one or a few. This order did change the course of business. It required specie to be carried from the creditor to the debtor portions of the country; from the seats of business and wealth, where it was wanted, and in constant action, to points where it was not wanted, and could not be used, and, under express orders, was to be shut up.

[DEC. 29, 1836.

pate the mode in which it would be done. The Secretary has told us that it will amount to about thirty-seven millions. Then the law simply required the Secretary to place about nine millions of money in twenty-six States, or in places where those States would be willing to receive it, by the 1st of January. The law passed on the 23d of June, and the Secretary had six months to perform the operation. He had in the Treasury in June more than this amount, which was not needed for the immediate wants of the Government, and the revenue was constantly coming in, to supply the place of any sum the position of which might be changed. There was then no obstacle to a transfer and deposite of the shares of the States. And what amount of transfers were required? There were deposite banks in all the States, I believe, except four-New Jersey, Delaware, Illinois, and Arkansas. These deposite banks being in the States, chartered by them, and having their confidence, were the places where the States would have been willing to receive their money; and the Secretary had only to leave or place it there until it was put under the control and disposition of the State authorities. Now, of the twenty-six States, there were, as appears by the public documents, fourteen or fifteen which already had in It necessarily produced serious evil to the poor, while their banks their full share, and of course no transfers it operated less upon the wealthy. The man in moderate were necessary as to them. All the others (except the circumstances could not obtain his specie to buy his four mentioned before) had a greater or smaller proporsmall tract, but by going to a bank to procure it, adding tion of the amount, and the balance only was to be transgreatly to his trouble and expense. The rich man could ferred. And, with respect to several of these, the Secobtain his thousands, and make his purchases. He could retary knew, or ought to have known, that they would turn over and over again what he had, by paying a small prefer to receive their money exactly where it was when sum to the broker, who was near by. He could make the law passed, because drafts on it there were at an adhis $500 buy a tract; when deposited, he could borrow vance. There was not more than three and a half milthe same $500 again, at a business transaction premium, liens which it was necessary to move at all. And yet buy another tract, and repeat the operation until he was this is the operation which is charged with a derangesatisfied. A better device to oppress the poor, and sub-ment of the currency. Every dollar of it might have serve speculation, never was made. And there is no hazard in saying that less land has been bought by the poor and the actual settler, in proportion, than under the laws as before administered. The same effect has been felt wherever the order has reached. The wealthy have suffered little. Their money has been worth to them from two to five per cent. per month. It is an excellently good specimen of the value of those pretences which have misled popular opinion, temporarily. They have all terminated, sir, in making "the rich richer and the poor poorer"-which is one of the despicable phrases which disingenuous fraud so often uses in our country. There is no occasion for surprise at the state of the money market, and that perfectly solvent paper should sell for from 1 to 5 per cent. per month.

But we are assured that the evils which the country has experienced resulted, not from the Treasury order and executive interference, but from the deposite act of last session. I admit, Mr. President, that it was a combination of the order and the execution of the deposite bill, with other causes, which produced it; but I deny that the slightest inconvenience ought to have resulted from the execution of the latter. It was an offensive law to the Executive, and received a relectant approval; and it has been so treated as, if possible, to make it unpopular with the country; and, as one of its friends, I owe no thanks to the Department for the blundering and mischievous manner of its execution.

What was that law, and what did it require the Secretary to do? It provided that the surplus which should be in the Treasury on the 1st of January, 1837, should be divided among the States according to their number of electoral votes, and that one fourth of it should be paid on the 1st of January, one fourth on the 1st of April, one fourth on the 1st of July, and one fourth on the 1st of October. I was opposed to so great delay in the paymen', but was overruled; but I certainly did not antici

been made to fall in with the business of the country, and to give facilities to it. None, at least none to any amount, required actual manual transfer. The Senate knows how the Secretary has dealt with it. He has given transfer warrants to the bank which was to receive the money, and thus placed it in their power to call for it when and in what currency they pleased. The paying banks, of course, have been obliged to draw in their means, to be prepared for the payment. The result was inevitable. If, on the other hand, the Secretary had simply given notice to the paying banks that they must, by a given day, say 20th of December, place the sums required in the banks to which they were to be paid, it could have been done without difficulty or derangement. Take an example: New York had to place $100,000 in North Carolina; the bank in New York would purchase drafts on North Carolina, and by other means obtain a credit on funds there in the ordinary course of its operations. The drafts paid in the bank there would have deposited the money there at a profit, perhaps, to the paying bank, and to the benefit of the commercial and other relations between the two places. A simple notice that they would purchase drafts might have accomplished it And, once placed in the banks of the States, the States themselves, in their use of it, would have been bound, both by inclination and interest, so to have drawn it out and disposed of it as not to injure or embarrass their own institutions and their own citizens. The same process would have been sufficient for the subsequent quarterly payments.

Why, then, should this deposite act be charged with any derangement of the currency? with any part of the pressure? If it has occasioned any, it has arisen from the mismanagement or perverseness of the Secretary. He has made this law the means of playing a game of battledoor and shuttlecock with the currency of the country, and, during the process, he has added his

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