Oxford University Press, 1996 M03 28 - 400 páginas
This volume systematically examines how the basic constitutional structure of governments affects what they can accomplish. At a time when Americans are more and more disillusioned about government's fundamental ability to reach solutions for domestic problems, and when countries in the former Soviet block and around the world are rewriting their constitutions, the relationship between government and constitution is especially important. Political economist Dennis Mueller illuminates the links between the structure of democratic government and its outcomes by drawing comparisons between the American system and other systems around the world. Working from the "public choice" perspective in political science, the book analyzes electoral rules, voting rules, federalism, citizenship, and separation of powers, making it a valuable resource for anyone curious about the world's political environment.
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achieve actions allocative allocative efficiency allow arguments assembly assumption benefits bicameral Buchanan budget candidates Chap Chapter chief executive choice choose citizens citizenship coalition collective decision compromise Congress consensus constitutional contract constitutional convention constitutional rights constitutional stage contractarian corporatism corporatist decision-making costs defense deficits defined democratic direct democracy discussion district economic elected electoral example exists favor federal federalist function geographic governmental groups ideal point incentive income individuals interests issues judges judiciary legislative legislature ment normative number of votes optimal option outcomes Pareto optimal parliament parliamentary parliamentary system percent policies political institutions positions possible potential PR system preferences president procedure produce programs proportional representation proposal protect redistribution referenda referendum representative democracy representatives seats simple majority rule social contract supramajority Switzerland tion two-party system U.S. Constitution unanimity rule unicameral United utility voters voting by veto voting rule welfare
Página ix - Some men look at constitutions with sanctimonious reverence, and deem them, like the ark of the covenant, too sacred to be touched. They ascribe to the men of the preceding age a wisdom more than human, and suppose what they did to be beyond amendment.
Happiness and Economics: How the Economy and Institutions Affect Human Well ...
Bruno S. Frey,Alois Stutzer
Sin vista previa disponible - 2002
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