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or political sub-division thereof of its civil and criminal jurisdiction in and over such property, or impair the civil rights under the State or local law of the inhabitants on such property.
This provision amounts to a disclaimer on the part of the United States of any jurisdiction that might be available to it under State cession laws which are broad enough in scope to cover lands acquired as sites for such housing, as for instance, laws ceding jurisdiction over lands acquired for the erection of buildings for any government purpose.
However, the Act of Congress approved January 21, 1942, supra (56 Stat. 11), which amended the Lanham Act in certain particulars, provides: That the Administrator may, in his discretion, upon the request of the Secretary of War or Navy, transfer to the jurisdiction of the War or Navy Departments such housing constructed under the provisions of this Act as may be considered to be permanently useful to the Army or Navy.
The Comptroller General, in 23 Comp. Gen. 406, in holding that land transferred to the Navy Department under the provisions of the Act of January 21, 1942, supra, was removed from the operations of the Lanham Act, observed that such land “then becomes a part of the property permanently under the jurisdiction of the Navy Department.” And in a letter to the Secretary of War dated February 9, 1943, B-31987, the Acting Comptroller General commented that “in view of the fact, as pointed out by you, that the statute here involved does not contemplate a retransfer to the Administrator of the jurisdiction of housing transferred by him to the War or Navy Department under the above-quoted provisions of Section 4 of said act, there would appear to be no room for doubt that it was the legislative intent that such a transfer would be no less complete and permanent than a disposition by the Administrator, of Housing to private parties."
The question has arisen whether Federal jurisdiction may be acquired under existing State cession statutes over lands that have been transferred to the War or Navy Department pursuant to the Act of January 21, 1942, supra, and which are devoted to a use falling within the purview of such State statutes.
The Attorney General of the United States has not rendered an opinion on the subject. However, the Judge Advocate General of the Army, in an opinion dated February 5, 1944, had occasion to consider the matter in connection with an Arkansas statute which consented to the purchase by the United States of any site or ground for the erection of certain expressly named structures, “or other public buildings of any kind whatever." In holding that jurisdiction was available to the Government under the statute over certain lands transferred to the War Department pursuant to the Act of January 21, 1942, supra, the Judge Advocate General said: The land in question was originally acquired by the United States for a purpose within the scope of the Arkansas statute cited, and although the purpose for which the land was originally purchased changed, the land is still held for a purpose within the scope of the statute. Accordingly, it is believed that a notice of acceptance of exclusive jurisdiction on behalf of the United States over the area in question as provided for in Section 355, Revised Statutes, as amended, would be effective to vest such jurisdiction in the United States.
DIGEST OF STATE CESSION STATUTES
The following is not intended as a complete digest of State cession statutes. The information furnished is presented primarily to aid in locating the applicable State law. In every instance where an issue of jurisdiction is involved the statutes of the State concerned should be examined carefully to ascertain the latest expression of the State legislature applicable to the land involved.
Only those statutes of general application are discussed which it is believed might be involved in jurisdictional problems most frequently arising. In many instances, jurisdiction over a particular area has been relinquished by a special State statute applicable only to that area. Other statutes are applicable only to lands acquired for a single specific use. Such special enactments are not considered in this digest. Reference is made to many statutes which have been repealed or superseded. This is because jurisdiction originally may have beeen acquired pursuant to such statutes, notwithstanding they are no longer in force and effect.
ALABAMA The act of the Legislature of Alabama approved December 7, 1866 (Alabama Laws, 1866-67, p. 148) authorized the acquisition of lands for forts, arsenals, dockyards and other needful buildings; it provided that upon application, the Governor of the State may cede to the United States jurisdiction over such lands, and reserved the right to serve state process, both civil and criminal within ceded areas. It also expressly provided that the jurisdiction ceded shall not prevent the laws of the State from operating within said lands.
The provisions of the foregoing act, with the exception of the last mentioned provision purporting to continue the operation of State laws within ceded areas, appear substantially in Title 59 of the Code of Alabama, 1940, which was adopted by the Legislature of Alabama on July 2, 1940. Section 19 of that Title provides that with respect to lands thereafter acquired the State reserves the right to tax persons, corporations, etc., residing within such areas.
ALABAMA CASES: Pound v. Gaulding, 237 Ala. 387, 187 So. 468; Webb V. J. G. White Engineering Corporation, 204 Ala. 429, 85 So. 729; O'Pry Heating Co. v. State, 241 Ala. 507, 3 So. (2) 316; Brooke v. State, 155 Ala. 78, 46 So. 491; State V. Blair, 238 Ala. 377, 191 So. 237.
ARIZONA By Sections 1, 2 and 3 of the act of the Legislature of Arizona, approved May 8, 1912 (Laws of 1912, page 428) as reenacted by the act of April 29, 1913 (Laws of 1913, Chapter 17) consent was given to the acquisition by the United States of lands “by purchase, condemnation or otherwise for sites for custom houses, court houses, post offices, arsenals or other public buildings or for any other purposes of the government,” and jurisdiction was expressly ceded over lands acquired for such purposes, reserving to the State the right to serve civil and criminal process within such ceded areas. The act of April 29, 1913, contained an additional provision expressly ceding jurisdiction to the United States over certain military reservations therein mentioned.
The provisions of the foregoing statutes were carried into the Arizona Code of 1913 as Sections 4633 to 4635, inclusive. However, those provisions were omitted from the Code of 1928 and the Code of 1939. There are no existing cession statutes of the State as the Code of 1928 set up a new Code of laws.
ARIZONA CASE: Hunt v. United States, 278 U. S. 96; 18 Atty. Gen. 138.
ARKANSAS The act of the General Assembly of Arkansas approved April 29, 1903 (Acts of Arkansas, 1903, page 346) "consents to the purchase to be made or
heretofore made by the United States of any site or ground for the erection of any armory, arsenal, fort, fortification, navy yard, custom house, light house, lock, dam, fish hatcheries, or other public buildings of any kind whatever” and expressly ceded to the United States jurisdiction over lands acquired for such purpose. The act also reserved the right to serve civil and criminal process within such areas.
The act of the General Assembly of Arkansas approved February 21, 1866 (Arkansas Laws 1866-67, page 153) ceded jurisdiction to the United States over lands purchased by the United States for cemeteries established pursuant to the Resolution of Congress approved April 13, 1866.
ARKANSAS CASES: Arlington Hotel v. Fant, 278 U. S. 439, 73 L. ed. 447, 49 S. Ct. 227; Martin v. House, 39 Fed. 694; Williams v. Arlington Hotel Company, 22 F. (2) 669; Surplus Trading Co. v. Cook, 281 U. S. 647.
CALIFORNIA An act of the Legislature of California approved April 27, 1852 (Calif. Stats. 1852, page 149), consented to the “purchase" by the United States of lands for the erection of "armories, arsenals, forts, fortifications, navy yards, magazines, custom houses, light houses, and other needful buildings or establishments whatsoever.” This act was repealed by the act of March 12, 1872, which consented to the "purchase or condemnation" of lands "for erecting forts, arsenals, dock yards and other needful buildings,” and reserved the right to serve civil and criminal process within such areas. This latter act continued in force (Sections 33 and 34, Political Code of California) until 1939 when it was amended (California Stats. 1939, ch. 710) by providing that “the state reserves the entire power of taxation with respect to such tracts of land and may levy and collect all taxes now or hereafter imposed in the same manner and to the same extent as if this consent had not been granted.” As thus amended, the act appears as Section 34, Political Code of California, 1939 Supplement.
A California statute of March 2, 1897 (Calif. Stats. 1897, page 51), ceded to the United States exclusive jurisdiction over all lands "within this state now held, occupied, or reserved by the Government of the United States for military purposes or defense, or which may hereafter be ceded or conveyed to the United States for such purposes; provided that a sufficient description by metes and bounds and a map or plat of such lands be filed with the proper office of record in the county in which the same are situated.” The act reserves the right to serve civil or criminal process. It has never been repealed.
A California statute of March 9, 1897 (Calif. Stat. 1897, page 74), granted, released and ceded to the United States all right, title and interest of the State to all lands extending from highwater mark to 300 yards beyond low water mark, lying adjacent and contiguous to any island, title to which is in the United States, or which is reserved by the United States for military, naval or defense purposes, and reserved the right to serve civil and criminal process in such areas
CALIFORNIA CASES: Sharon v. Hill, 24 Fed. 926; United States v. Bateman, 34 Fed. Sup. 86; United States v. San Francisco Bridge Company, 89 Fed. 891; United States v. Watkins, 22 Fed. (2) 437; People v. Mouse, 203 Cal. 782, 265 P. 944; Allen v. Industrial Accident Commission, 3 Cal. (2) 214, 43 P. (2) 787; Martin V. Clinton Construction Co., 41 Cal. App. (2) 35, 105 P. (2) 1029; Standard Oil Co. of California v. California, 291 U. S. 242, 78 L. ed. 775, 54 S. Ct. 381; Pacific Coast Dairy Co. v. Department of Agriculture, 19 Cal. (2) 818, 123 P. (2) 442; Standard Oil Company v. Johnson, 10 Cal. (2) 758, 76 P. (2) 1184; Johnson v. Merrill, 126 P. (2) 873; Allen v. Industrial Accident Commission, 3 Cal. (2) 214, 43 P. (2) 787; Collins v. Yosemite Park Co., 304 U. S: 518, 58 S. Ct. 1009; Pacific Coast Da v. Department of Agriculture, 318 U. S. 285, 63 S. Ct. 628; Borax Consolidated v. Los Angeles, 296 U. S. 10, 56 S. Ct. 23; Johnson v. Morrill, 126 P. (2) 873.
An act of the General Assembly of Colorado approved April 9, 1907, Session Laws of Colorado, 1907, page 559 (Sections 3, 4 and 5, Chapter 168, Colorado Statutes Annotated, 1935), granted the consent of the State to the acquisition by the United States by purchase, condemnation, or otherwise, of any land in the State required for custom houses, court houses, post offices,
arsenals, or other public buildings whatever, or for any other purposes of the Government, and expressly ceded to the United States, jurisdiction over land so acquired, reserving the right to serve civil and criminal process of the State.
Governor to Execute Deed.--The foregoing act (Section 6, Chapter 168, Colorado Statutes Annotated 1935), provides that “When the Governor of this State shall be advised by the Attorney General of the United States or the attorney of the United States for the district of Colorado, that a valid title to the said land for the site of such building has vested in the United States, the said governor shall make, execute and deliver to the United States of America, a deed
containing apt, meet and proper words, clauses and covenants to fully cede, give, grant, transfer, confer and confirm such jurisdiction unto the United States of America
This provision has been construed by the Attorney General of Colorado as requiring a deed of cession by the Governor before jurisdiction shall vest in the United States.
COLORADO CASES: Colorado v. Toll, 268 U. S. 228, 69 L. ed. 927, 45 S. Ct. 505; Robbins v. United States, 284 Fed. 89; Canfield v. United States, 167 U. S. 518, 525.
An act of the General Assembly of Connecticut approved April 5, 1899, Public Acts, Connecticut 1899, page 1004 (Sec. 5064, General Statutes of Connecticut, Revision of 1930), granted the consent of the State to the acquisition by the United States by purchase, condemnation, or otherwise, of any land in the State required for custom houses, court houses, post offices, arsenals or other public buildings whatever, or for any other purpose of the Government, and expressly cedes to the United States jurisdiction over land! so acquired, reserving the right to serve civil and criminal process of the. courts of the State.
CONNECTICUT CASE: 13 Atty. Gen. 411.
By Section 3, Chapter 2, Title 2, Revised Code of Delaware, 1915 (reproduced in Code of 1935), the consent of the legislature of Delaware was given to the purchase by the Government of any parcel of land, not exceeding ten acres in any one place or locality for the purpose of erecting thereon light houses and other needful public buildings whatever, and of any parcel of land, not exceeding one hundred acres in any one place or locality for the purpose of erecting thereon forts, magazines, arsenals, dock yards and other needful buildings. The statute requires that all deeds, conveyances or other title papers shall be recorded in the county in which the land may be situated. The right to serve civil and criminal process of the State is reserved. (14 Del. Laws, Ch. 357; 21 Del. Laws, Ch. 1.)
By act of its General Assembly approved July 24, 1845, the United States was authorized and empowered to purchase, acquire, hold, own, occupy and possess such land or lands within the limits of the State as the United States shall adjudge expedient and shall seek to occupy and hold as sites on which to erect and maintain forts, magazines, arsenals, dock yards and other needful buildings, said acquisition to be by contract, or in case agreement cannot be reached with the owners, by condemnation as therein expressly provided. The act provided that “whenever the United States shall contract for, purchase, or acquire any land or lands within the limits of this state for the purpose aforesaid, in either of the modes above mentioned ar provided, and shall desire to acquire constitutional jurisdiction over such land or lands for such purposes, it shall and may be lawful for the Governor of the state
and the said Governor shall and is hereby authorized and empowered thereupon in the name and on behalf of this state, to cede to the United States exclusive jurisdiction over the land or lands so purchased or acquired and sought to be ceded.”
The foregoing act was not broad enough to authorize the Governor to cede jurisdiction over lands which had been set aside from the public domain. However, when the act was included with the Recodification of Laws of 1892, it was amended so as to authorize the Governor to cede jurisdiction over lands "heretofore lawfully acquired or reserved." With this modification the act of 1845 has been perpetuated in substantial form as Florida law. See Sections 5, 6 and 7, Compiled General Laws of Florida 1927, at pages 454 and 465, and Title II, Chap. 6, Sec. 6.02, Florida Statute 1941.
FLORIDA CASES: Valverde v. Valverde, 121 Fla. 576, 164 So. 287; United States v. Alford, 274 U. S. 264.
An act of the General Assembly of Georgia, approved December 22, 1808 (Georgia Laws Nov.-Dec. 1808, page 46), provided that “the Congress of the United States shall have and maintain jurisdiction in and over all the lands they have purchased or which has been ceded or otherwise acquired by them or hereafter may be acquired for the purpose of erecting forts or fortifications” in the State.
An act of the General Assembly of Georgia, approved August 18, 1906 (Georgia Laws 1906, page 126), gave the consent of the State to the acquisition by the United States by purchase, condemnation or otherwise of any lands "heretofore ceded or that may hereafter be acquired for sites for custom houses, court houses, post offices or for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dock yards and other needful buildings." The act expressly cedes exclusive jurisdiction over lands so acquired, reserving to the State the right to serve civil and criminal process of the courts of the State.
An act of August 23, 1927 (Georgia Laws of 1927, page 352), reenacted in substantial form the provisions of the act of August 18, 1906. However, when the provisions of this act were incorporated in the new code of Georgia, adopted by the General Assembly on March 24, 1933, a provision was included whereby “the state retains its civil and criminal jurisdiction over persons and citizens of this state.” (See Georgia Code 1933, Sec. 15.301 et seq.)
GEORGIA CASES: Battle v. United States, 209 U. S. 36, 52 L. ed. 670, 28 S. Ct. 422; United States v. Hopkins, 26 Fed. Case. 371, No. 15387a; Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U. S. 19, 83 L. ed. 455, 59 S. Ct. 442; Dicks v. Dicks, 177 Ga. 379, 170 S. E. 245; 23 Op. Atty. Gen. 254; 31 Atty. Gen. 262.
IDAHO An act of the Legislature of the State of Idaho approved February 7, 1891 (Session Laws of Idaho 1890-91, page 40), consented to the purchase of and ceded exclusive jurisdiction to the United States over all lands_ embraced within the military posts and reservations of Fort Sherman and Boise Barracks, together with such other lands in the State as may now be or hereafter acquired and held by the United States for military purposes, either as additions to the aforementioned projects or as new military posts or reservations which may be established for the common defense; and also all such lands within the State as may be included within the territory of the Yellowstone National Park, reserving the right of service of civil and criminal process of the State. (See Secs. 56-601 Idaho Code of 1932.) IDAHO CASE: McElvey v. United States, 260 U. S. 353.
ILLINOIS Sections 29, 30 and 31, Chapter 143, Illinois Revised Statutes, 1941, consent to the acquisition by the United States, by purchase, condemnation or otherwise of any land in the State which has been or may hereafter be acquired for custom houses, court houses, post offices, arsenals, or other public buildings whatever and for any other purpose of the Government, and expressly cede to the United States exclusive jurisdiction over land so acquired, reserving to the State the right to serve civil and criminal process of its courts.
ILLINOIS CASES: People ex rel. McCrea v. United States, 93 Ill. 30, 34 Am. Rep. 155; Knowlton v. Knowlton, 155 Ill. N. 8, 39 N. E. 95; Moline Water Power Company V. Cox, 252 Ill. 348, N. E. 1044; 20 Atty. Gen. 242; 31 Atty. Gen. 265.
INDIANA By the act of the General Assembly of the State of Indiana approved January 25, 1883, appearing as Sections 62-1001 and 62-1002 of Burns