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It follows, therefore, that any question involving the immediate jurisdiction of the Federal Government within a territory should be considered in the light of the powers expressly delegated by Congress to the territorial government.3
In commenting upon the Foraker Act,4 which provided local self-government for the people of Puerto Rico, the Supreme Court of the United States said in Gromer v. Standard Dredging Co.5
The purpose of the act is to give local self-government, conferring autonomy similar to that of the States and Territories, reserving to the United States rights to the harbor areas and navigable waters for the purpose of exercising the usual national control and jurisdiction over commerce and navigation.
The United States could have reserved control and exercised it as it does in instances, by the consent of the states, over certain places in the States devoted to the governmental service of the United States. We do not think, as we have said, that the United States has done so and that it has not is the view of the Executive Department of the government as expressed by the Attorney General.
The opinion of the Attorney General 6 which was discussed in the Gromer case, next above referred to, involved the question as to what extent the Navy Department could exercise jurisdiction over the lands of Subig Bay Naval Reservation, Philippine Islands, which had been set aside by Executive Order and “placed under the goverance and control of the Navy Department,” and whether such jurisdiction was of the character and extent to exclude the power of the Philippine Government within the reservation. The Attorney General, although recognizing that in such reservations "the military control up to the limit of the military necessities would be paramount," nevertheless observed that "a territorial statute is operative upon a military reservation within a Territory so long as it does not conflict with the laws of the United States or with the military administration and legitimate operations of the Government." He commented further that "the exer
' cise of local jurisdiction having ordinary municipal purposes oveu a reservation in a Territory is valid until and unless disapproved by Congress,” and concluded that the jurisdiction of the Navy Department was "not of such character and extent to exclude the civil powers of the Philippine Government relating to the imposition of taxes, the management and disposition of real and personal property, the running of ordinary civil writs, and, in general, the
3 Alaska; Act approved Aug. 24, 1912 (37 Stat. 512; U. S. C. Title 48 Sec. 21, et seq.). See Carscadden v. Territory of Alaska, 105 Fed. (2) 377. Hawaii: Act approved Apr. 30, 1900 (31 Stat. 141; U. S. C., Title 48 Sec. 491, et seq.). Philippines: Act approved Aug. 29, 1916 (39 Stat. 547; U. S. C., Title 48 Sec. 1001 et seq.) ; Philippine Independence Act approved March 24, 1934 (48 Stat. 456). See Asiatic Pet. Co. v. Insular Collector of Customs, 297 U. S. 666, 80 L. ed. 967, 56 S. Ct. 651. Puerto Rico: Acts approved Apr. 12, 1900 (31 Stat. 77), March 2, 1917 (39 Stat 951) and May 17, 1932 (47 Stat. 158) ; U. S. C. Title 48, Sec. 731, et seg.
Virgin Islands : Act approved March 3, 1917 (39 Stat. 1132; U. S. C. Title 48, Sec. 1391, et seq.).
4 Act approved April 12, 1900 (31 Stat. 77).
exercise of such civil rights as do not interfere with the naval use of the reservations."
In a recent Puerto Rico case 7 the issue involved was whether a summons personally served on a defendant in the United States Naval Base at San Juan conferred jurisdiction on the insular court where the action was filed against the person of the defendant. The trial court had dismissed the motion of the defendant that the summons be stricken and held that the jurisdiction of the Government of the United States over the naval base "is limited to such jurisdiction as may be necessary for the Federal Government to carry out and effectuate the purpose for which such lands were acquired." 8 The United States was not a party to the action, but because of the importance of the issue involved, it appeared as amicus curiae. It did not claim exclusive jurisdiction by virtue of any inherent or sovereign power over its own lands which were being used for governmental purposes, but rather because jurisdiction had been expressly receded by the People of Puerto Rico. The land had been conveyed to the United States by the Governor of Puerto Rico pursuant to an act of the Legislature of Puerto Rico authorizing such conveyance for military purposes. The United States asserted exclusive jurisdiction over the land pursuant to an act of the Legislature of Puerto Rico which consented to the acquisition by the United States "by purchase or condemnation" of lands within the Island of Puerto Rico, and which provided that when so acquired and possession thereof had been taken by the United States, “all jurisdiction of the People of Puerto Rico shall cease and determine." However, the Supreme Court of Purto Rico held that the transfer of the lands by the Governor did not constitute a "purchase" within the purview of the Puerto Rican statute and that the United States, therefore, had not acquired exclusive jurisdiction over the same.
From the foregoing it will be seen that the municipal laws of territorial and insular governments, which have been granted autonomy by Congress, are valid within Federal reservations, if they do not conflict with Federal law and their enforcement does not interfere with governmental functions. However, it should be remembered that such laws are always subject to the supervision of Congress.10 All powers of a territorial government are derived from and are subordinate to the authority of the Federal Government. 11 Its laws are always subject to annulment by Congress.12
* Earl L. Moore v. District Court of Judicial District of Bayoman, decided Dec. 22, 1941.
8 Citing United States v. Unzeuta, 281 U. S. 138; Ryan v. State, 186 Wash. 115, 61 Pac. (2) 1275; Fort Leavenworth v. Lowe, 114 U. S. 525. 9 Approved Feb. 16, 1903.
10 Hornbuckle v. Toombs, 18 Wall. 64, 21 L. ed. 266 ; Oklahoma K. & M. I. Ry. Co. v. Bowling Green, 249 Fed. 592.
11 Snow v. United States, 18 Wall. 317, 21 L, ed. 784; Reynolds v. People, 1 Colo. 179.
12 Wright v. Ynchausti & Co., 272 U. S. 640, 47 S. Ct. 229; 71 L. ed. 454; Brunswick First National Bank v. Yankton County, 101 U. S. 129, 25 L. ed. 1046.
FEDERAL STATUTES RELATING TO JURISDICTION WITHIN LANDS OF
THE UNITED STATES SITUATED WITHIN THE STATE Laws of States adopted for purchasing wrongful acts; effect of repeal.Sec. 468 of Title 18, U. S. Code (Criminal Code, Sec. 289) as amended by the act of Congress approved June 6, 1940, reads as follows:
Whoever, within the territorial limits of any State, organized Territory, or district, but within or upon any of the places now existing or hereafter reserved or acquired, described in section 451 of this title, shall do or omit the doing of any act or thing which is not made penal by any laws of Congress, but which if committed or omitted within the jurisdiction of the State, Territory, or district in which such place is situated, by the laws thereof in force on February 1, 1940, and remaining in force at the time of the doing or omitting the doing of such act or thing, would be penal, shall be deemed guilty of a like offense and be subject to a like punishment. (Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 321, Sec. 289, 35 Stat. 1145; June 15, 1933, ch. 85, 48 Stat. 152; June 20, 1935, ch. 284, 49 Stat. 394; June 6, 1940, ch. 241, 54 Stat. 234.)
Prior to the amendment of Sec. 468 of Title 18 U. S. Code (Criminal Code, Sec. 289) by the act of Congress of June 6, 1940, the third paragraph of Sec. 451 of the Code therein referred to read as follows:
Third. When committed within or on any lands reserved or acquired for the exclusive use of the United States, and under the exclusive jurisdiction thereof, or any place purchased or otherwise acquired by the United States by consent of the legislature of the State in which the same shall be, for the erection of a fort, magazine, arsenal, dockyard, or other needful building. However, the act of Congress approved June 11, 1940 (54 Stat. 304) amended the third paragraph of Sec. 451 of Title 18 of the U. S. Code by making the same applicable to crimes or offenses committed within the places therein mentioned which are "under the exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction” of the United States.
Crimes committed within immigrant stations-jurisdiction of State courts.U. S. Code, Title 8, Sec. 116, reads as follows:
For the preservation of the peace and in order that arrests may be made for crimes under the laws of the States and Territories of the United States where the various immigrant stations are located, the officers in charge of such stations, as occasion may require, shall admit therein the proper State and municipal officers charged with the enforcement of such laws and for the purpose of this section the jurisdiction of such officers and of the local courts shall extend over such stations. (Feb. 5, 1917, ch. 29, Sec. 27, 39 Stat. 894.)
Offenses committed within national parks. —By various code provisions (Title 16), it is provided that offenses committed within certain national parks are subject to the same punishment as prescribed by the laws of the respective States in which the parks are located. Sec. 25 Yellowstone (Wyoming)
59 Yosemite and Sequoia (California)
Springs) Migratory bird reservations.— By Sec. 715g of Title 16, U. S. Code, it is provided that the jurisdiction of the State, both civil and criminal, over persons upon areas acquired pursuant to certain provisions of the code therein mentioned, shall not be affected or changed by reason of their acquisition
and administration by the United States as migratory bird reservations, except so far as the punishment of offenses against the United States is concerned.
Sites for lighthouses, beacons, publie piers, etc.- Sec. 727, Title 33, U. S. Code, provides that no lighthouse, beacon, publie piers, or landmark, shall be built or erected on any site until cession of jurisdiction over the same has been made to the United States. However, Section 728 of the same title provides that process of the State may be served and executed within such places notwithstanding the cession contains no such reservation.
Applicatons of State sales, use and income taxes within Federal areas.The act of Congress approved October 9, 1940 (54 Stat. 1059), known as the Buck Act permits the States to extend their sales, use and income taxes to persons residing or carrying on business or to transactions occurring in Federal areas. Secs. 1 and 2 of that act which appear as Sees. 13 and 14 of Title 4, U. S. Code, read as follows: Sec. 13
(a) No person shall be relieved from liability for payment of, collection of, or accounting for any sales or use tax levied by any State, or by any duly constituted taxing authority therein, having jurisdiction to levy such a tax, on the ground that the sale or use, with respect to which such tax is levied, occurred in whole or in part within a Federal area; and such State or taxing authority shall have full jurisdiction and power to levy and collect any such tax in any Federal area within such State to the same extent and with the same effect as though such area was not a federal area.
(b) The provisions of subsection (a) shall be applicable only with respect to sales or purchases made, receipts from sales received, or storage or use occurring, after December 31, 1940. Sec. 14 *
(a) No person shall be relieved from liability for any income tax levied by any State, or by any duly constituted taxing authority therein, having jurisdiction to levy such a tax, by reason of his residing within a Federal area or receiving income from transactions occurring or services performed in such area; and such State or taxing authority shall have full jurisdiction and power to levy and collect such tax in any Federal area within such State to the same extent and with the same effect as though such area was not a Federal area.
(b) The provisions of subsection (a) shall be applicable only with respect to income or receipts received after December 31, 1940. (See Secs. 15, 16, 17 ard 18, Title 4, C. S. C., for additional provisions of this act.)
Tax on motor fuel sold on military or other Federal reservations.The Federal Highway Act of June 6, 1936 (49 Stat. 1521), as amended by the act of October 9, 1940 (54 Stat. 1060; L. S. C., Title 4, Sec. 12), reads as follows: Sec. 12
(a) All taxes levied by any State, Territory or the District of Columbia upon, with respect to, or measured by, sales, purchases, storage, or use of gasoline or other motor vehicle fuels may be levied, in the same manner and to the same extent, with respect to such fuels when sold by or through post exchanges, ship stores, ship service stores, commissaries, filling stations, licensed traders, and other similar agencies, located on United States military or other reservations, when such fuels are not for the exclusive use of the United States. Such taxes, so levied, shall be paid to the proper taxing authorities of the State, Territory or the District of Columbia, within whose borders the reservation affectd may be located.
(b) The officer in charge of such reservation shall, on or before the fifteenth day of each month, submit a written statement to the proper taxing authorities of the State, Territory or the District of Columbia within whose borders the reservation is located, showing the amount of such motor fuel with respect to which taxes are payable under subsection (a) for the preceding month.
Application of State laws in Hot Springs National Park.— Sec. 365, Tit. 16, U. S. Code, provides that:
The consent of the United States is hereby given for the taxation, under the authority of the laws of the State of Arkansas applicable to the equal taxation of personal property in that State, as personal property of all structures and other property in private ownership on the Hot Springs National Park. (Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 533, Sec. 5, 26 Stat. 844; Mar. 4, 1921, ch. 161, Sec. 1, 41 Stat. 1407.)
Action for death or personal injury within places under exclusive jurisdiction of United States—applicaton of State laws.-Sec. 457, Tit. 16, U. S. Code, reads as follows:
In the case of the death of any person by the neglect or wrongful act of another within a national park or other place abject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, within the exterior boundaries of any State, such right of action shall exist as though the place were under the jurisdiction of the State within whose exterior boundaries such place may be; and in any action brought to recover on account of injuries sustained in any such place the rights of the parties shall be governed by the laws of the State within the exterior boundaries of which it may be. (Feb. 1, 1928, ch. 15, 45 Stat. 54.)
State workmen's compensation laws; extension to buildings and works of the United States.-Sec. 290, Tit. 40, U. S. C., provides:
Whatsoever constituted authority of each of the several States is charged with the enforcement of and requiring compliances with the State workmen's compensation laws of said States and with the enforcement of and requiring compliance with the orders, decisions, and awards of said constituted authority of said States shall have the power and authority to apply such laws to all lands and premises owned or held by the United States of America by deed or act of cession, by purchase or otherwise, which is within the exterior boundaries of any State and to all projects, buildings, constructions, improvements and property belonging to the United States of America, which is within the exterior boundaries of any State, in the same way and to the same extent as if said premises were under the exclusive jurisdiction of the State within whose exterior boundaries such place
For the purposes set out in this section, the United States of America hereby vests in the several States within whose exterior boundaries such place may be, insofar as the enforcement of State workmen's compensation laws are affected, the right, power, and authority aforesaid: Provided, however, That by the passage of this section the United States of America in nowise relinquishes its jurisdiction for any purpose over the property named, with the exception of extending to the several States within whose exterior boundaries such place may be only the powers above enumerated relating to the enforcement of their State workmen's compensation laws as herein designated : Provided, further, That nothing in this section shall be construed to modify or amend sections 751-796 of Title 5. (June 25, 1936, ch. 822, Secs. 1, 2, 49 Stat. 1938, 1939.) Discussed in Capetola v. Barclay White Co., 139 F. (2) 559.
State unemployment compensation laws, application within Federal areas.Par. (d), Sec. 1606, Title 26, U. S. Code. It is provided that:
No person shall be relieved from compliance with a State unemployment compensation law on the ground that services were performed on land or premises owned, held, or possessed by the United States, and any State shall have full jurisdiction and power to enforce the provisions of such law to the same extent and with the same effect as though such place were not owned, held, or possessed by the United States. (53 Stat. 187, Aug. 10, 1939, ch. 666, title VI, Sec. 613, 53 Stat. 1391.)
DEFENSE HOUSING PROJECTS
The Act approved October 14, 1940, known as the Lanham Housing Act (Public 849, 76th Congress, 54 Stat. 1125, U. S. C., Title 42, Sec. 1521, et seq.), which authorized the Federal Works Administrator to provide housing for persons engaged in national defense activities, provides in Section 10 thereof that: Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the acquisition by the Administrator of any real property pursuant to this Act shall not deprive any State