exercise of such civil rights as do not interfere with the naval use of the reservations."

"98

In a recent Puerto Rico case the issue involved was whether a summons personally served on a defendant in the United States Naval Base at San Juan conferred jurisdiction on the insular court where the action was filed against the person of the defendant. The trial court had dismissed the motion of the defendant that the summons be stricken and held that the jurisdiction of the Government of the United States over the naval base "is limited to such jurisdiction as may be necessary for the Federal Government to carry out and effectuate the purpose for which such lands were acquired." The United States was not a party to the action, but because of the importance of the issue involved, it appeared as amicus curiae. It did not claim exclusive jurisdiction by virtue of any inherent or sovereign power over its own lands which were being used for governmental purposes, but rather because jurisdiction had been expressly receded by the People of Puerto Rico. The land had been conveyed to the United States by the Governor of Puerto Rico pursuant to an act of the Legislature of Puerto Rico authorizing such conveyance for military purposes. The United States asserted exclusive jurisdiction over the land pursuant to an act of the Legislature of Puerto Rico which consented to the acquisition by the United States "by purchase or condemnation" of lands within the Island of Puerto Rico, and which provided that when so acquired and possession thereof had been taken by the United States, "all jurisdiction of the People of Puerto Rico shall cease and determine." However, the Supreme Court of Purto Rico held that the transfer of the lands by the Governor did not constitute a "purchase" within the purview of the Puerto Rican statute and that the United States, therefore, had not acquired exclusive jurisdiction over the same.

From the foregoing it will be seen that the municipal laws of territorial and insular governments, which have been granted autonomy by Congress, are valid within Federal reservations, if they do not conflict with Federal law and their enforcement does not interfere with governmental functions. However, it should be remembered that such laws are always subject to the supervision of Congress.10 All powers of a territorial government are derived from and are subordinate to the authority of the Federal Government.11 Its laws are always subject to annulment by Congress.12

Earl L. Moore v. District Court of Judicial District of Bayoman, decided Dec. 22, 1941. 8 Citing United States v. Unzeuta, 281 U. S. 138; Ryan v. State, 186 Wash. 115, 61 Pac. (2) 1275; Fort Leavenworth v. Lowe, 114 U. S. 525.

Approved Feb. 16, 1903.

10 Hornbuckle v. Toombs, 18 Wall. 64, 21 L. ed. 266; Oklahoma K. & M. I. Ry. Co. v. Bowling Green, 249 Fed. 592.

11 Snow v. United States, 18 Wall. 317, 21 L. ed. 784; Reynolds v. People, 1 Colo. 179. 12 Wright V. Ynchausti & Co., 272 U. S. 640, 47 S. Ct. 229; 71 L. ed. 454; Brunswick First National Bank v. Yankton County, 101 U. S. 129, 25 L. ed. 1046.

APPENDIX I

FEDERAL STATUTES RELATING TO JURISDICTION WITHIN LANDS OF THE UNITED STATES SITUATED WITHIN THE STATE

Laws of States adopted for purchasing wrongful acts; effect of repeal.— Sec. 468 of Title 18, U. S. Code (Criminal Code, Sec. 289) as amended by the act of Congress approved June 6, 1940, reads as follows:

Whoever, within the territorial limits of any State, organized Territory, or district, but within or upon any of the places now existing or hereafter reserved or acquired, described in section 451 of this title, shall do or omit the doing of any act or thing which is not made penal by any laws of Congress, but which if committed or omitted within the jurisdiction of the State, Territory, or district in which such place is situated, by the laws thereof in force on February 1, 1940, and remaining in force at the time of the doing or omitting the doing of such act or thing, would be penal, shall be deemed guilty of a like offense and be subject to a like punishment. (Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 321, Sec. 289, 35 Stat. 1145; June 15, 1933, ch. 85, 48 Stat. 152; June 20, 1935, ch. 284, 49 Stat. 394; June 6, 1940, ch. 241, 54 Stat. 234.)

Prior to the amendment of Sec. 468 of Title 18 U. S. Code (Criminal Code, Sec. 289) by the act of Congress of June 6, 1940, the third paragraph of Sec. 451 of the Code therein referred to read as follows:

Third. When committed within or on any lands reserved or acquired for the exclusive use of the United States, and under the exclusive jurisdiction thereof, or any place purchased or otherwise acquired by the United States by consent of the legislature of the State in which the same shall be, for the erection of a fort, magazine, arsenal, dockyard, or other needful building. However, the act of Congress approved June 11, 1940 (54 Stat. 304) amended the third paragraph of Sec. 451 of Title 18 of the U. S. Code by making the same applicable to crimes or offenses committed within the places therein mentioned which are "under the exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction" of the United States.

Crimes committed within immigrant stations—jurisdiction of State courts.— U. S. Code, Title 8, Sec. 116, reads as follows:

For the preservation of the peace and in order that arrests may be made for crimes under the laws of the States and Territories of the United States where the various immigrant stations are located, the officers in charge of such stations, as occasion may require, shall admit therein the proper State and municipal officers charged with the enforcement of such laws and for the purpose of this section the jurisdiction of such officers and of the local courts shall extend over such stations. (Feb. 5, 1917, ch. 29, Sec. 27, 39 Stat. 894.)

Offenses committed within national parks. By various code provisions (Title 16), it is provided that offenses committed within certain national parks are subject to the same punishment as prescribed by the laws of the respective States in which the parks are located.

Sec. 25 Yellowstone (Wyoming)

59 Yosemite and Sequoia (California)

117b Mesa Verde (Colorado)

126 Crater Lake (Oregon)

169 Glacier (Montana)

198b Rocky Mountain (Colorado)

204b Lassen Volcanic (California)

375 Hot Springs (Arkansas, and municipal ordinances of Hot Springs)

Migratory bird reservations.-By Sec. 715g of Title 16, U. S. Code, it is provided that the jurisdiction of the State, both civil and criminal, over persons upon areas acquired pursuant to certain provisions of the code therein mentioned, shall not be affected or changed by reason of their acquisition

and administration by the United States as migratory bird reservations, except so far as the punishment of offenses against the United States is concerned.

Sites for lighthouses, beacons, public piers, etc.—-Sec. 727, Title 33, U. S. Code, provides that no lighthouse, beacon, public piers, or landmark, shall be built or erected on any site until cession of jurisdiction over the same has been made to the United States. However, Section 728 of the same title provides that process of the State may be served and executed within such places notwithstanding the cession contains no such reservation.

Applicatons of State sales, use and income taxes within Federal areas.— The act of Congress approved October 9, 1940 (54 Stat. 1059), known as the Buck Act permits the States to extend their sales, use and income taxes to persons residing or carrying on business or to transactions occurring in Federal areas. Secs. 1 and 2 of that act which appear as Secs. 13 and 14 of Title 4, U. S. Code, read as follows:

Sec. 13 (a) No person shall be relieved from liability for payment of, collection of, or accounting for any sales or use tax levied by any State, or by any duly constituted taxing authority therein, having jurisdiction to levy such a tax, on the ground that the sale or use, with respect to which such tax is levied, occurred in whole or in part within a Federal area; and such State or taxing authority shall have full jurisdiction and power to levy and collect any such tax in any Federal area within such State to the same extent and with the same effect as though such area was not a federal area.

(b) The provisions of subsection (a) shall be applicable only with respect to sales or purchases made, receipts from sales received, or storage or use occurring, after December 31, 1940.

Sec. 14 * (a) No person shall be relieved from liability for any income tax levied by any State, or by any duly constituted taxing authority therein, having jurisdiction to levy such a tax, by reason of his residing within a Federal area or receiving income from transactions occurring or services performed in such area; and such State or taxing authority shall have full jurisdiction and power to levy and collect such tax in any Federal area within such State to the same extent and with the same effect as though such area was not a Federal area.

(b) The provisions of subsection (a) shall be applicable only with respect to income or receipts received after December 31, 1940. (See Secs. 15, 16, 17 and 18, Title 4, U. S. C., for additional provisions of this act.)

Tax on motor fuel sold on military or other Federal reservations.— The Federal Highway Act of June 6, 1936 (49 Stat. 1521), as amended by the act of October 9, 1940 (54 Stat. 1060; U. S. C., Title 4, Sec. 12), reads as follows:

Sec. 12 (a) All taxes levied by any State. Territory or the District of Columbia upon, with respect to, or measured by, sales, purchases, storage, or use of gasoline or other motor vehicle fuels may be levied, in the same manner and to the same extent, with respect to such fuels when sold by or through post exchanges, ship stores, ship service stores, commissaries, filling stations, licensed traders, and other similar agencies, located on United States military or other reservations, when such fuels are not for the exclusive use of the United States. Such taxes, so levied, shall be paid to the proper taxing authorities of the State, Territory or the District of Columbia, within whose borders the reservation affectd may be located.

(b) The officer in charge of such reservation shall, on or before the fifteenth day of each month, submit a written statement to the proper taxing authorities of the State, Territory or the District of Columbia within whose borders the reservation is located, showing the amount of such motor fuel with respect to which taxes are payable under subsection (a) for the preceding month.

Application of State laws in Hot Springs National Park.—Sec. 365, Tit. 16, U. S. Code, provides that:

The consent of the United States is hereby given for the taxation, under the authority of the laws of the State of Arkansas applicable to the equal

taxation of personal property in that State, as personal property of all structures and other property in private ownership on the Hot Springs National Park. (Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 533, Sec. 5, 26 Stat. 844; Mar. 4, 1921, ch. 161, Sec. 1, 41 Stat. 1407.)

Action for death or personal injury within places under exclusive jurisdiction of United States-applicaton of State laws.-Sec. 457, Tit. 16, U. S. Code, reads as follows:

In the case of the death of any person by the neglect or wrongful act of another within a national park or other place subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, within the exterior boundaries of any State, such right of action shall exist as though the place were under the jurisdiction of the State within whose exterior boundaries such place may be; and in any action brought to recover on account of injuries sustained in any such place the rights of the parties shall be governed by the laws of the State within the exterior boundaries of which it may be. (Feb. 1, 1928, ch. 15,

45 Stat. 54.)

State workmen's compensation laws; extension to buildings and works of the United States.-Sec. 290, Tit. 40, U. S. C., provides:

Whatsoever constituted authority of each of the several States is charged with the enforcement of and requiring compliances with the State workmen's compensation laws of said States and with the enforcement of and requiring compliance with the orders, decisions, and awards of said constituted authority of said States shall have the power and authority to apply such laws to all lands and premises owned or held by the United States of America by deed or act of cession, by purchase or otherwise, which is within the exterior boundaries of any State and to all projects, buildings, constructions, improvements and property belonging to the United States of America, which is within the exterior boundaries of any State, in the same way and to the same extent as if said premises were under the exclusive jurisdiction of the State within whose exterior boundaries such place may be.

For the purposes set out in this section, the United States of America hereby vests in the several States within whose exterior boundaries such place may be, insofar as the enforcement of State workmen's compensation laws are affected, the right, power, and authority aforesaid: Provided, however, That by the passage of this section the United States of America in nowise relinquishes its jurisdiction for any purpose over the property named, with the exception of extending to the several States within whose exterior boundaries such place may be only the powers above enumerated relating to the enforcement of their State workmen's compensation laws as herein designated: Provided, further, That nothing in this section shall be construed to modify or amend sections 751-796 of Title 5. (June 25, 1936, ch. 822, Secs. 1, 2, 49 Stat. 1938, 1939.) Discussed in Capetola v. Barclay White Co., 139 F. (2) 559.

State unemployment compensation laws, application within Federal areas.— Par. (d), Sec. 1606, Title 26, U. S. Code. It is provided that:

No person shall be relieved from compliance with a State unemployment compensation law on the ground that services were performed on land or premises owned, held, or possessed by the United States, and any State shall have full jurisdiction and power to enforce the provisions of such law to the same extent and with the same effect as though such place were not owned, held, or possessed by the United States. (53 Stat. 187; Aug. 10, 1939, ch. 666, title VI, Sec. 613, 53 Stat. 1391.)

DEFENSE HOUSING PROJECTS

The Act approved October 14, 1940, known as the Lanham Housing Act (Public 849, 76th Congress, 54 Stat. 1125, U. S. C., Title 42, Sec. 1521, et seq.), which authorized the Federal Works Administrator to provide housing for persons engaged in national defense activities, provides in Section 10 thereof that:

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the acquisition by the Administrator of any real property pursuant to this Act shall not deprive any State

or political sub-division thereof of its civil and criminal jurisdiction in and over such property, or impair the civil rights under the State or local law of the inhabitants on such property.

This provision amounts to a disclaimer on the part of the United States of any jurisdiction that might be available to it under State cession laws which are broad enough in scope to cover lands acquired as sites for such housing, as for instance, laws ceding jurisdiction over lands acquired for the erection of buildings for any government purpose.

However, the Act of Congress approved January 21, 1942, supra (56 Stat. 11), which amended the Lanham Act in certain particulars, provides: That the Administrator may, in his discretion, upon the request of the Secretary of War or Navy, transfer to the jurisdiction of the War or Navy Departments such housing constructed under the provisions of this Act as may be considered to be permanently useful to the Army or Navy.

The Comptroller General, in 23 Comp. Gen. 406, in holding that land transferred to the Navy Department under the provisions of the Act of January 21, 1942, supra, was removed from the operations of the Lanham Act, observed that such land "then becomes a part of the property permanently under the jurisdiction of the Navy Department." And in a letter to the Secretary of War dated February 9, 1943, B-31987, the Acting Comptroller General commented that “in view of the fact, as pointed out by you, that the statute here involved does not contemplate a retransfer to the Administrator of the jurisdiction of housing transferred by him to the War or Navy Department under the above-quoted provisions of Section 4 of said act, there would appear to be no room for doubt that it was the legislative intent that such a transfer would be no less complete and permanent than a disposition by the Administrator, of Housing to private parties."

The question has arisen whether Federal jurisdiction may be acquired under existing State cession statutes over lands that have been transferred to the War or Navy Department pursuant to the Act of January 21, 1942, supra, and which are devoted to a use falling within the purview of such State statutes.

The Attorney General of the United States has not rendered an opinion on the subject. However, the Judge Advocate General of the Army, in an opinion dated February 5, 1944, had occasion to consider the matter in connection with an Arkansas statute which consented to the purchase by the United States of any site or ground for the erection of certain expressly named structures, "or other public buildings of any kind whatever." In holding that jurisdiction was available to the Government under the statute over certain lands transferred to the War Department pursuant to the Act of January 21, 1942, supra, the Judge Advocate General said: The land in question was originally acquired by the United States for a purpose within the scope of the Arkansas statute cited, and although the purpose for which the land was originally purchased changed, the land is still held for a purpose within the scope of the statute. Accordingly, it is believed that a notice of acceptance of exclusive jurisdiction on behalf of the United States over the area in question as provided for in Section 355, Revised Statutes, as amended, would be effective to vest such jurisdiction in the United States.