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State law subsequently passed to regulate rights and remedies for death by negligence can have no operation over the tract save as it may be adopted by Congress. And, in what appears to be the most recent expression on the subject by the Supreme Court of the United States,13 Justice Roberts, speaking for the Court, held that an act of the State of California prescribing a minimum sale price for milk sold within the State was not effective within the boundaries of Moffett Field, exclusive jurisdiction over which had been ceded to the United States prior to the enactment of the act. Since laws of a State enacted after cession of territory to the United States have no effect within the ceded area, it follows that the repeal of a State statute existing at the time of the cession is ineffective within such area.14
Notwithstanding pronouncements by the Supreme Court of the United States that a State divests itself of all legislative authority within a territory over which it has ceded exclusive jurisdiction to the United States, many State courts have recognized as effective within ceded areas State laws enacted after the cession which relate to matters with respect to which the courts of the United States are not authorized to exercise jurisdiction, such as, for instance, laws affecting divorces, 15 administration of estates, 16 the custody and guardianship of children.17
65. Political laws of ceding State superseded by Federal law or policy.—As pointed out above, only those laws of the ceding State which pertain to private justice and which are necessary to the peace and good order of the community remain in effect within the ceded area after transfer of the territory to the new sovereign. Complete political dominion becomes vested in the new government, and, therefore, all laws of a political character within the ceded area are superseded by the law or policy of the new sovereign.18 It follows that persons residing within lands over which the United States has acquired exclusive jurisdiction do not enjoy any political privileges of the ceding State and are not subject to any political burdens which it may impose. 19 Such residents are not entitled to the benefits of the public schools 20 of the ceding State nor are they qualified to vote as citizens of that State.21
13 Pacific Coast Dairy, Inc. v. Dept. of Agri. of California, 318 U. S. 285.
21 Sinks v. Reese, 19 Ohio St. Rep. 306; McMahon v. Polk, 10 S. D. 296 ; 73 N. W. 77; State v. Willett, 117 Tenn. 334 ; 97 S. W. 299; Commonwealth v. Clary, 8 Mass. 72; In re Opinion Justices Supreme Court (Mass.) 1 Metcalif 580, 684; Herken v. Glynn, 151 Kans. 855, 101 P. (2) 946. But see State v. Corcoran, 128 P. (2) 999, holding persons residing in Defense Housing Projects constructed under Lanham Act may vote in state elections.
This rule would be qualified where the jurisdiction ceded by the State is only partial and the State has reserved the right to tax persons or property within the ceded areas. In such cases the rights of the individual should be determined in the light of the obligations exacted of him by the State. In a recent case considered by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania (Kiker v. Philadelphia, 346 Pa. 624, 31 A. (2) 289 (1943)), the City of Philadelphia had imposed an income tax upon a person residing within a Federal area on League Island within the Philadelphia Navy Yard over which the Government had acquired exclusive jurisdiction. The City sought to collect the tax under authority of the Act of Congress approved October 9, 1940 (Public Law 819), known as the Buck Act, which provides that persons living or receiving income in a Federal area should not be relieved from liability to pay income tax levied by any State or any duly constituted State taxing authority having jurisdiction to levy such taxes by reason of residence or employment within the Federal area. It was contended by the plaintiff that he received no benefits or protection from the City of Philadelphia and that therefore to enforce the provisions of the ordinance would deprive him of his property without due process of law. The Court said, “With this contention we cannot agree. It is clear that in classifying persons for taxation an obligation on the part of the taxing power to make available some benefit to them must exist. We are satisfied under the circumstances here presented, that such obligation does exist on the part of the City of Philadelphia for the benefit of the persons and property on League Island by reason of the recession by Congress to this Commonwealth of the power to tax in the area in question. A State may reserve to itself the power to tax in an area within its geographical limits when ceding jurisdiction to the National government over such territory. When the State does make such reservation in its act of cession, the obligation of furnishing protection and benefits to the persons and property within the confines of the ceded area impliedly remains in the State
*. Therefore there is no constitutional objection, in our opinion, to the Federal government's receding to a State a portion of the exclusive jurisdiction previously obtained from it, together with the incident obligations which were impliedly transferred by the recession. This Congress has done by Public Act No. 819. There is no doubt that after the cession, Philadelphia was obligated to confer all the usual attributes of government—the same as those possessed by residents and citizens of Philadelphia—upon those deriving income from working on League Island; fire and police protection, the right to use all municipal facilities, etc.” Citing James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U. S. 148.
66. State laws of regulatory or penal character not effective within ceded territory.-Laws of a regulatory character 22 or those which impose penalties may not be applied within the ceded territory. It was held by the Supreme Court of the United States 23 that the State of Virginia could not inflict a penalty for non-delivery of a telegram to an addressee within the limits of the Norfolk Navy Yard. The Court observed: “It is of the highest public importance that the jurisdiction of the state should be resisted at the borders of those places where the power of exclusive legislation is vested in the Congress by the Constitution
*. If it is desirable that penalties should be inflicted for a default in the delivery of a telegram occurring within the jurisdiction of the United States, Congress only has power to establish them.”
67. State Workmen's Compensation Laws in Federal Territory.An Act of Congress approved February 1, 1928, which is quoted in full elsewhere in this work,24 provides that actions for death or injury sustained within any national park or other place subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States shall be governed by the law of the State in which such park or other place may be situated. However, it has been held that this act does not adopt the Workman's Compensation Laws of the State, under which the rights of the complainant must be established by an administrative tribunal, but relates only to actions at law 25 which “can at once be taken into any court of general jurisdiction wherever service can be had and there reduced to final judgment.' However, by a later act approved June 25, 1936, the full text of which may also be found elsewhere in this work,27 Congress authorized the application of State workman's compensation laws within "all lands and premises owned or held by the United States of America." This act does not apply to Federal employees who are covered by the provisions of the Federal Employees' Compensation Law,28 although it was held applicable in the case of an employee of a contractor of the United States engaged in construction work within a United States military
Neither does it apply to causes of action arising before its passage.30 It was held not to be “self-executing,” but required formal legislative sanction by the State.
22 Murray v. Joe Gerrick Co, 291 U. S. 315, 54 S. Ct. 432; Atkinson v. Tax Commission, 303 U. S. 20, 58 S. Ct. 419; Collins v. Yosemite Park Co., 304 U. S., 518; Stewart & Co. v. Sadrakula, 309 U. S. 94.
23 Western Union v. Chiles, 214 U. S. 274, 29 S. Ct. 613. 24 See Appendix I.
25 Murray v. Joe Gerrick Co., 291 U. S. 315, 54 S. Ct. 432 ; State v. Rainier National Park Co., 74 P. (2) 464. 26 Employers Liability Assur. Corp. v. Dileo, 10 N. E. (2) 251. 27 See Appendix I.
28 Breeding v. Tenn. Valley Authority, 9 So. (2) 6; Posey V. Tenn. Valley Authority, 93 Fed. (2) 727.
29 Young v. G. L. Tarlton, 162 S. W. (2) 477.
ENFORCEMENT OF CRIMINAL LAWS IN CEDED TERRITORY
68. State courts may not enforce criminal laws in ceded terri. tory if Federal jurisdiction exclusive.-Criminal laws of a State may not be enforced by State courts within territory over which the State has ceded exclusive jurisdiction to the United States.
Congress has adopted a comprehensive system of criminal laws applicable to all Federal territory within the borders of a State over which exclusive jurisdiction may be exercised by the United States. There are numerous Federal statutes of general application throughout the United States which have been enacted by Congress as a means of accomplishing powers expressly delegated to the National Government by the Constitution and concerning which State courts have no jurisdiction, such for instance, as laws relating to currency and coinage, the postal service, interstate and foreign commerce, the internal revenue, espionage, sabotage, slave trade, peonage, etc. There are also numerous special Federal enactments covering a variety of offenses which are applicable only in certain places, including places over which the United States has the power of exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction.1
Notwithstanding the unquestioned power of Congress to legislate as it may please, within constitutional limits, with respect to areas over which the United States has exclusive jurisdiction, the need was recognized at an early period in our Government's history for a system of criminal laws to be applied within Federal areas in harmony with the laws of the State within which such areas are situated. Accordingly, in 1825, Congress enacted what has come to be known as the first Assimilative Crimes Act,2 which provided that any offense committed within any fort, dockyard, navy yard, arsenal, armory or magazine or within the site of any lighthouse or other needful building, jurisdiction over which had been ceded to the United States, shall be punishable in the same maner as provided for by the law of the State within which said place may be located. Concerning the scope and purpose of this act, the Supreme Court of the United States later said, “Congress in adopting it, sedulously considered the two-fold character of our constitutional government and had in view the enlightened purpose so far as the punishment of crime was concerned, to interfere as little as might be with the authority of the States on that subject over all territory situated within their
1 U. S. Code, title 18, secs. 451 to 468 inc., and secs. 511 to 523, inc. (Criminal Code, secs. 272 to 289 inc., and secs. 311 to 322 inc.). See also secs. 25, 59, 117b, 126, 169, 198b, 204b of Title 16, U. S. Code.
2 Act of Congress, March 3, 1825; 4 Stat. 115.
exterior boundaries and which hence would be subject to exclusive state jurisdiction but for the existence of a United States reservation. In accomplishing these purposes, it is apparent that the statute instead of fixing by its own terms the punishment for crimes committed on such reservations which were not previously provided for by a law of the United States adopted and wrote in the state law, with the single difference that the offense, although punished as an offense against the United States, was nevertheless punishable only in the way and to the extent that it would have been punishable if the territory embraced by the reservation remain subject to the jurisdiction of the state." 3
69. Assimilative Crimes Act discussed.—The act of 1825, although salutary in its effect, was soon found to be inadequate. It was applicable only to lands which had been “ceded” to the United States prior to its passage. Nor did it apply to State laws enacted after its passage. To meet the situation, Congress has from time to time reenacted the statute, with modifications, to bring into force State laws which were passed since the latest Federal statute became effective.5 The current statute on the subject was enacted on June 6, 1940,6 and reads as follows:
Whoever, within the territorial limits of any State, organized Territory, or district, but within or upon any of the places now existing or hereafter reserved or acquired, described in section 272 of the Criminal Code (U. S. C., Title 18, sec. 451), shall do or omit the doing of any act or thing which is not made penal by any laws of Congress, ut which if committed or omitted within the jurisdiction of the State, Territory or district in which such place is situated, by the laws thereof in force on February 1, 1940, and remaining in force at the time of the doing or omitting the doing of such act or thing, would be penal, shall be deemed guilty of a like offense and be subject to a like punishment.
At the time of the enactment of the above act, the third paragraph of Section 272, Criminal Code (U. S. C., 1940 Edition, Title 18, Sec. 451), read as follows:
When committed within or on any lands reserved or acquired for the exclusive use of the United States, and under the exclusive jurisdiction thereof, or any place purchased or otherwise acquired by the United States by consent of the legislature of the State in which the same shall be, for the erection of a fort, magazine, arsenal, dockyard, or other needful building.
Subsequently, however, by act of Congress approved June 11, 1940,7 that paragraph was amended and made applicable to lands “under the exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction" of the United States.
3 United States v. Press Publishing Co., 219 U. S. 1, 31 S. Ct. 212.
* United States v. Paul, 6 Pet. 141; United States v. Franklin, 216 U. S. 559, 30 S. Ct. 434; United States v. Press Publishing Co., 219 U. S. 1, 31 S. Ct. 212.
5 Acts of Congress approved March 3, 1825 (4 Stat. 116) ; April 5, 1866 (14 Stat. 13), July 7, 1898 (30 Stat. 717), March 4, 1909 (35 Stat. 1145), June 5, 1933 (48 Stat. 152), June 20, 1935 (49 Stat. 394), June 6, 1940 (54 Stat. 234).
6 54 Stat. 234; U. S. Code, Title 18, Sec. 468 (Criminal Code, Sec. 289).