ment purpose necessarily involves the power to transfer it. That Congress has constitutional sanction to retrocede to the states jurisdiction over such places has been often judicially declared." 11

61. State cannot revoke or limit jurisdiction once granted to United States.-When a State has once relinquished its jurisdiction to the United States, it cannot revoke or modify the jurisdiction so granted, except with the consent of Congress. A Nebraska statute ceded to the United States exclusive jurisdiction over Fort Robinson Military Reservation in that State, subject only to the right of the State to serve and execute its processes within the reservation and to open and keep in repair public roads. Later the Legislature of Nebraska passed an act purporting to restrict or limit that jurisdiction by reserving the right to tax private property and to regulate the sale of intoxicating liquors within the ceded area. The United States District Court, in denying the right of the State to thus limit the jurisdiction already conferred, said, "No extended argument is needed to show that it was wholly without the power of the State of Nebraska to thus limit the completed cession of jurisdiction created by the act of March, 1887. When the latter act took effect, the legislative jurisdiction of the State over the reservation was wholly ceded to the United States, and until the exclusive jurisdiction thus acquired by the United States is terminated, either by the United States ceasing to own and occupy the reservation or by the United States retroceding its exclusive jurisdiction to the State, the latter is without legislative power over the reservation." 12 And in later cases, both the United States Circuit Court of Appeals 13 and the Supreme Court of the United States 14 have recognized that a State is without authority to revoke or limit jurisdiction previously surrendered to the United States.

CHAPTER IX

PRIVATE RIGHTS WITHIN CEDED TERRITORY

62. Municipal laws of ceding State in force at time of cession remain in effect after cession.-Personal and property rights of the inhabitants of territory ceded by a State to the United States, which existed at the time of the cession, are preserved to such inhabitants within the new Federal area unless in conflict with Federal law or policy. This protection vouchsafed to persons

11 State v. Board of Commissioners, 153 Ind. 302; 54 N. E. 809, citing McLaughlin v. Bank, 7 Grat. 68; Foley v. Shriver, 81 Va. 568; Railroad Co. v. Lowe, 114 U. S. 525, 5 S. Ct. 995; Clay v. State, 4 Kan. 49; Crook, Horner & Co. v. Old Point Comfort Hotel Co., 54 Fed. 604; People v. Godfrey, 17 Johns. 225; 2 Story, Const. (5th Ed.) Sec. 1328; Renner v. Bennett, 21 Ohio St. 431.

19 In re Ladd, 74 Fed. 31.

13 Yellowstone v. Gallatin, 31 Fed. (2) 644 (Ninth Circuit). 14 United States v. Unzeuta, 281 U. S. 138, 50 S. Ct. 284.

residing in the ceded territory finds root in the familiar principle of public law that the cession of territory by one sovereignty to another does not abrogate the laws in force at the time of cession for the administration of private justice.1 Not at least until the new sovereign has abrogated or changed them, do such laws cease to operate, except possibly so far as they may conflict with the political character, institutions and Constitution of the Government to which the territory is ceded.2 In the leading case of Chicago and Pacific Railway Company v. McGlinn,3 the Supreme Court of the United States said, "It is a general rule of public law, recognized and acted upon by the United States, that whenever political jurisdiction and legislative power over any territory are transferred from one nation or sovereign to another, the municipal laws of the country, that is, laws which are intended for the protection of private rights, continue in force until abrogated or changed by the new government or sovereign. By the cession, public property passes from one government to the other, but private property remains as before, and with it those municipal laws which are designed to secure its peaceful use and enjoyment. As a matter of course, all laws, ordinances, and regulations in conflict with the political character, institutions, and constitution of the new government are at once displaced. Thus, upon a cession of political jurisdiction and legislative powerand the latter is involved in the former-to the United States, the laws of the country in support of an established religion, or abridging the freedom of the press, or authorizing cruel and unusual punishments, and the like, would at once cease to be of obligatory force without any declaration to that effect; and the laws of the country on other subjects would necessarily be superseded by existing laws of the new government upon the same matters. But with respect to other laws affecting the possession, use and transfer of property, and designed to secure good order and peace in the community, and promote its health and prosperity, which are strictly of a municipal character, the rule is general, that a change of government leaves them in force until, by direct action of the new government, they are altered or repealed."

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63. Continue as Federal laws. In the comparatively recent case of Stewart & Co. v. Sadrakula, the issue of law involved, as stated by Justice Reed, was "whether an existing provision of a state statute requiring the protection of places of work in the

1 Halleck, International Law, Chap. 34, Sec. 14; Chicago & Pacific Railway Co. v. McGlinn, 114 U. S. 542, 547, 5 S. Ct. 1005.

2 Barrett v. Palmer, 135 N. Y. 336; 31 N. E. 1017; Hill v. Ring Cons. Co., 19 F. Sup. 434; Pacific Coast Dairy Co. v. Dept. of Agriculture, 318 U. S. 285; Capetola v. Barclay White Co., 139 F. (2) 556.

3 114 U. S. 542, 5 S. Ct. 1005.

309 U. S. 94, 60 S. Ct. 431.

manner specified in the statute remains effective as a statute of the United States" within an area over which the State had ceded exclusive jurisdiction to the United States. The case involved a suit against a Government contractor engaged in the construction of a post office in the City of New York and arose from the failure of a subcontractor to comply with a certain building construction requirement of the New York Labor Law. The United States had acquired exclusive jurisdiction over the area within which the work was being done and the contractor, therefore, contended that it was not subject to the provisions of the State statute within that area; it also contended that compliance on its part with the requirement of the statute would amount to a direct interference with the Government. However, the Court disagreed on both points. It pointed out that the Constitution "has long been interpreted so as to permit the continuance until abrogated of those rules existing at the time of the surrender of sovereignty which govern the rights of the occupants of the territory transferred. This assures that no area however small will be left without a developed legal system for private rights." With respect to the contractor's claim of immunity from interference with Government operations, the Court said, "while, of course, in a sense the contract is the means by which the United States secures the construction of its post office, certainly the contractor in this independent operation does not share any governmental immunity." 5

For a long time it was not made clear whether municipal laws in force at the time of cession become Federal laws or continue in force as laws of the ceding State. The Supreme Court of the United States never having expressly declared itself on the subject, the opinions of the lower Federal courts and State courts were in conflict. Some of the courts, both State and Federal, took the position that the laws continued in force as State laws, and are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the State courts, on the theory that enforcement of such laws by the State was not inconsistent with exclusive Federal authority, as it was within the power of Congress to repeal such laws at any time it might see fit. Other courts have held that the laws become Federal laws at the moment of the cession. Some idea of the confusion existing on the subject, even until a few years ago, may be seen in the contrary opinions rendered by different Judges of the same Federal District Court with respect to claims for personal injuries arising under similar circumstances within the Federal post office site at Kansas City, Missouri. One Judge, in holding that the State laws became Federal laws said, "when the

See also Penn Dairies, Inc. et al. v. Mülk Control Com. of Pa., 318 U. S. 261.

Jewell v. Cleveland Wrecking Co., 28 Fed. Sup. 366; See also Coffman v. Cleveland Wrecking Co. of Cincinnati, 24 Fed. Sup. 581.

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post office and court house site at Kansas City was acquired the Missouri law governing liability for negligence continued to apply, but it had become the law of the United States, just as Spanish law became the law of the United States for Florida when Florida was ceded to the United States." However, two of that Judge's colleagues, in two separate cases, disagreed with his views and held that the laws continued in force as the laws of the ceding State, one of them pointing out that "the national government, in acquiring post office sites for its needs, does not undertake to extirpate the territory thus acquired and set it entirely apart as free in every respect from the dominion and control of the local sovereignty. All it does, is to proclaim its superior jurisdiction so as to give it entire freedom in using the property as an instrumentality for its operations. The National government does not undertake to interfere, supervise or control the rights of individuals arising upon the property." In view of the holding of the Supreme Court of the United States in the Sadrakula case, supra, it may be assumed that henceforth both State and Federal courts will uniformly recognize that municipal laws in effect at the time of cession become laws of the United States. However, it has been recognized that State courts may exercise jurisdiction in transitory, as distinguished from local, causes of action arising under such Federal laws.9

64. State laws enacted after cession not effective within ceded area. The rule that municipal laws of a ceding State continue in force after the cession is applicable only to laws in existence at the time of the cession. State laws enacted after the cession do not become effective within the ceded area unless adopted by Congress. This is because exclusive jurisdiction comprehends exclusive legislative authority.10 In Arlington Hotel Co. v. Fant,11 the Supreme Court of the United States held that an act of the State legislature modifying the common law liability of innkeepers did not extend to a cause of action arising within the Hot Springs, Arkansas, Military Reservation, exclusive jurisdiction over which had been ceded to the United States prior to the act. In Murray v. Joe Gerrick & Co.,12 the Court held that where a tract of land within a State had been acquired by the United States for a navy yard with the consent of the legislature of the State and the legislature had ceded exclusive jurisdiction over it to the United States, reserving only the right to serve process, a

7 Jewell v. Cleveland Wrecking Co., 28 Fed. Sup. 364; Misner v. Cleveland Wrecking Co., 25 Fed. Sup. 763.

8 Jewell v. Cleveland Wrecking Co., 28 Fed. Sup. 364.

9 Madden v. Arnold, 47 N. Y. S. 757; 57 N. E. 1116; Norfolk & PBL RR. Co. v. Parker, 147 S. E. 461; Arlington Hotel Co. v. Fant, 278 U. S. 439, 49 S. Ct. 227; Danielson v. Donmopray, 57 Fed. (2) 565; Ohio River Contract Co. v. Gordon, 244 U. S. 68, 37 S. Ct. 590. 10 See section 34.

11 278 U. S. 439, 73 L. Ed. 447, 49 S. Ct. 227.

12 291 U. S. 315, 78 L. Ed. 821, 54 S. Ct. 432.

State law subsequently passed to regulate rights and remedies for death by negligence can have no operation over the tract save as it may be adopted by Congress. And, in what appears to be the most recent expression on the subject by the Supreme Court of the United States, 13 Justice Roberts, speaking for the Court, held that an act of the State of California prescribing a minimum sale price for milk sold within the State was not effective within the boundaries of Moffett Field, exclusive jurisdiction over which had been ceded to the United States prior to the enactment of the act. Since laws of a State enacted after cession of territory to the United States have no effect within the ceded area, it follows that the repeal of a State statute existing at the time of the cession is ineffective within such area.14

Notwithstanding pronouncements by the Supreme Court of the United States that a State divests itself of all legislative authority within a territory over which it has ceded exclusive jurisdiction to the United States, many State courts have recognized as effective within ceded areas State laws enacted after the cession which relate to matters with respect to which the courts of the United States are not authorized to exercise jurisdiction, such as, for instance, laws affecting divorces, 15 administration of estates,16 the custody and guardianship of children.17

65. Political laws of ceding State superseded by Federal law or policy. As pointed out above, only those laws of the ceding State which pertain to private justice and which are necessary to the peace and good order of the community remain in effect within the ceded area after transfer of the territory to the new sovereign. Complete political dominion becomes vested in the new government, and, therefore, all laws of a political character within the ceded area are superseded by the law or policy of the new sovereign.18 It follows that persons residing within lands over which the United States has acquired exclusive jurisdiction do not enjoy any political privileges of the ceding State and are not subject to any political burdens which it may impose. 19 Such residents are not entitled to the benefits of the public schools 20 of the ceding State nor are they qualified to vote as citizens of that State.21

13 Pacific Coast Dairy, Inc. v. Dept. of Agri. of California, 318 U. S. 285.

14 McCarthy v. R. G. Packard Co., 94 N. Y. S. 203, 105 App. Div. 436.

15 Craig v. Craig, 143 Kan. 624; 56 P. (2) 464.

16 Divine v. Unaka Natl. Bank, 125 Tenn. 98; 140 S. W. 747.

17 In re Kernan, 288 N. Y. S. 329.

18 Chicago & Pacific R. R. Co. v. McGlinn, 114 U. S. 542, 5 S. Ct. 1005. 196 Atty. Gen. 577.

20 In re Opinions of Justices Supreme Court (Mass.) 1 Metcalf 580, 584.

21 Sinks V. Reese, 19 Ohio St. Rep. 306; McMahon v. Polk, 10 S. D. 296; 73 N. W. 77; State v. Willett, 117 Tenn. 334; 97 S. W. 299; Commonwealth v. Clary, 8 Mass. 72; In re Opinion Justices Supreme Court (Mass.) 1 Metcalif 580, 584; Herken v. Glynn, 151 Kans. 855, 101 P. (2) 946. But see State v. Corcoran, 128 P. (2) 999, holding persons residing in Defense Housing Projects constructed under Lanham Act may vote in state elections.