The Congress shall have power * * * to exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever over such district (not exceeding 10 miles square) as may, by cession of the particular States and the acceptance of Congress, become the seat of Government of the United States, and, To exercise like authority over all places purchased by the consent of the Legislature of the State in which the same shall be for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards, and other needful buildings. 33. Cession of jurisdiction, unless qualified, means exclusive jurisdiction.—Where a State statute cedes jurisdiction, without qualifying terms, Federal authority over such areas becomes complete when jurisdiction is accepted. It is not essential that the cession statute expressly indicate that exclusive jurisdiction is intended. A Nebraska statute ceding to the United States "jurisdiction over the military reservations" therein named, was interpreted by the Supreme Court of the United States as vesting the United States with "entire" jurisdiction over the reservations named, save in the matter of the right of executing process and opening and repairing roads as therein expressly reserved.1 34. Meaning of “exclusive jurisdiction” as used in State cession statutes. Many State cession statutes cede exclusive jurisdiction to the United States. The term "exclusive jurisdiction" as used in such statutes is recognized by the courts as being synonymous with the power to "exercise exclusive legislation", as the latter term is used in the Constitution.2 To say that the United States has acquired exclusive jurisdiction over lands within a State, means that the State has relinquished to the Federal Government all authority to enforce its own laws within such areas. In the Mason case, Chief Justice Hughes, speaking for the Court, observed "that question (of exclusive territorial jurisdiction) assumes the absence of any interference with the exercise of the functions of the Federal Government and is whether the United States has acquired exclusive legislative authority so as to debar the State from exercising any legislative authority, including its taxing and police power, in relation to the property and activities of individuals and corporations within the territory. The acquisition of title by the United States is not sufficient to effect that exclusion. It must appear that the State, by consent or cession, has transferred to the United States that residuum of jurisdiction which otherwise it would be free to exercise." From this, it follows that a reservation by the State to enforce any of its own laws within a ceded area would be incompatible with the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States within such area. 1 United States v. Unzeuta, 281 U. S. 138, 142, 50 S. Ct. 284. Fort Leavenworth v. Lowe, 114 U. S. 525, 538, 5 S. Ct. 995; James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U. S. 134, 141, 58 S. Ct. 208; Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Chiles, 214 U. S. 274, 278, 29 S. Ct. 613; United States v. Bevans, 3 Wheat. 336, 387; United States v. Wurtzbarger, 276 Fed. 753, 755. * Mason v. Tax Commission, 302 U. S. 186, 197, 58 S. Ct. 233. clearly indicates the intent and purpose of the United States to exercise jurisdiction over the lands involved. However, jurisdiction would not vest in the United States until such notice of acceptance is received by the Governor of the State wherein the land is situated. The officer accepting jurisdiction on behalf of the United States should, therefore, request and obtain from the Governor of the State a formal acknowledgment of the receipt of the Government's acceptance of jurisdiction. This might become a convenient means of proof in a case where an issue has been made as to the exact time the United States acquired jurisdiction over the lands concerned. 26. Non-acceptance of jurisdiction by United States over lands acquired prior to act of February 1, 1940, may be shown by circumstances.-Little difficulty should be experienced in establishing the jurisdictional status of lands acquired by the United States since enactment of the act of Congress approved February 1, 1940, supra. However, the presumption of non-acceptance of jurisdiction created by the act, as now written into Section 355, as amended, does not apply to lands acquired prior to February 1, 1940. It, therefore, may be expected that perplexing problems will continue to arise with respect to such lands because there seldom will be any formal or record proof of acceptance of jurisdiction by the Federal Government. As pointed out above, in the absence of evidence indicating that the United States does not intend to exercise jurisdiction over such lands acceptance of jurisdiction may be presumed. It is not necessary, however, that such intent should be made known by any affirmative act on the part of the Government in declining jurisdiction. This may be shown by circumstances. It was held by the Supreme Court of the United States that any intention on the part of the Government to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over lands acquired in the State of Washington for the construction of Grand Coulee Dam was negatived by the fact that the Government's contract for its construction provided that the contractor should comply with all laws and regulations of the State of Washington which affect the building, maintenance and operation of the contractor's camp, as well as with all health laws of the State, and also that the contractor shall make arangements with State and County authorities for school facilities and police protection.3 27. Requirement that Government contractor comply with State laws, effect of. In an Oregon case involving jurisdiction over lands acquired for the Bonneville Dam project, the major part of the dam structure was built upon lands in the bed of the Columbia River, to which the United States had not acquired title. 3 Mason v. Tax Commission, 302 U. S. 186, 209, 58 S. Ct. 233. It had, however, acquired title to some adjacent upland upon which a lesser portion of the structure was erected. In holding that the United States had not acquired jurisdiction over any portion of the lands, the Supreme Court of that State said, "It would be somewhat inconsistent to assume that since it does not have such jurisdiction over the major part of the structures which are now being built, the federal government is seeking exclusive jurisdiction over that part of the works located on lands, title to which it has acquired." When this case was considered on appeal by the Supreme Court of the United States, that court saw another reason why it was apparent that the United States did not intend to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over the premises, namely, that the Government's contract for the construction of the dam provided that the contractor should comply with the compensation laws of Oregon. The court said, "The enforcement and administration of the Oregon compensation law *** with which the contractors were required to comply, were incompatible with the existence of exclusive legislative authority in the United States." "" 5 28. General rule respecting lands acquired before act of February 1, 1940.-If lands were acquired by the United States prior to the approval of the act of Congress of February 1, 1940, supra, and the legislature of the State had consented to the purchase of, or had ceded jurisdiction over, such lands, then the jurisdiction granted will be considered as having vested in the United States ipso facto upon consummation of the acquisition of the land, provided that the act of consent or cession contains no provision having the effect of postponing the time for vesting of jurisdiction, and provided also that there are no circumstances to indicate that the United States does not desire to exercise the jurisdiction granted. 29. Conditions precedent to vesting of jurisdiction in United States. State statutes sometimes contain special requirements that must be complied with before the jurisdiction granted will vest in the United States, such as the requirement that maps, deeds or complete descriptions of the land shall be filed in the local land records or in other offices designated in the cession statute. A Nevada statute, after giving formal consent to the purchase of lands by the United States, expressly ceded jurisdiction over such lands to the United States "provided that an accurate description and plat of such lands so acquired, verified by the oath of some officer of the general government having knowledge of the facts, shall be filed with the governor of this state." On Atkinson v. State Tax Commission, 156 Ore. 461; 67 P. (2) 161, 168. • United States v. Holt, 168 Fed. 141, 147; United States v. Tucker, 122 Fed. 518, 520; United States v. Wurtzbarger, 276 Fed. 753, 754; In re Kelly, 71 Fed. 545; 6 Atty. Gen. 577; 7 Atty. Gen. 571; 7 Atty. Gen. 628. the trial in the State court of a defendant charged with murder committed within the limits of Pyramid Lake Indian Reservation, it was not shown that the description and plat had been filed as required by the statute. The defendant contended that the State court was without jurisdiction to try him because the United States had acquired jurisdiction over the lands pursuant to the Nevada statute above mentioned. He contended that the filing of the decription and plat as required by the statute was a mere ministerial act, the omission of which did not prevent jurisdiction vesting in the United States under the statute. The Supreme Court of Nevada was not impressed with this view and held that jurisdiction over the Reservation had not passed from the State. The court said, "The proviso, in our opinion, was intended to be complied with to accomplish a completed cession of jurisdiction. Until such compliance the statute was a mere offer upon the part of the State to cede jurisdiction. The proviso provided the manner of acceptance."7 A similar provision in a Tennessee statute was construed by the Supreme Court of that State as a condition precedent to the vesting of jurisdiction in the United States.R In a recent case the Supreme Court of Montana held, contrary to its decisions in former cases, that the filing of a metes and bounds description and of a map or plat of land purchased with the consent of the State, is a condition precedent to transfer of jurisdiction under a general cession statute of that State.9 In not all instances are provisions in State cession statutes for the filing of deeds and other documents construed as conditions precedent to the vesting of jurisdiction in the United States. Each statute must be construed in the light of the particular language used. A Connecticut statute, after authorizing the Governor of that State to cede jurisdiction over certain lands to the United States, enacted "That the deed or instrument of cession shall be recorded by the Secretary of State before its final delivery to the United States." The Attorney General of the United States held that this provision was not considered in the nature of a condition precedent but was a "mere formality not necessary to give jurisdiction." 10 30. State statutes requiring deeds of cession by Governor.Statutes of some States do not expressly grant jurisdiction to the United States, but, after consenting to the purchase of lands, provide that the Governor of the State may cede jurisdiction thereover to the United States. A Texas statute giving the consent of the State to the purchase of lands by United States provided that when the United States shall desire constitutional jurisdiction over such lands, "it shall be lawful for the Governor of this State, 7 State v. Mendez, 61 P. (2) 300, 303. 8 Gill v. State, 141 Tenn. 379, 210 S. W. 637. 9 Valley County v. Thomas, 97 P. (2) 345. 10 13 Atty. Gen. 411. to cede to the United States exclusive jurisdiction over any lands so acquired, when application may be made to him for that purpose." The act further provided that the right of the State to serve civil and criminal process of the State within said lands should always be expressly reserved in any instrument of cession issued pursuant thereto. Subsequent to the enactment of this statute the United States acquired certain lands in Nueces County for military purposes. It did not appear, however, that the Governor had ever granted a deed of cession as provided by the act. The Criminal Court of Appeals of Texas, after expressing the view that "the right to withhold consent (to purchase) altogether carries with it necessarily the right to annex such conditions as it sees fit to the giving of such consent," held that in the absence of anything in the record showing that a deed of cession had been executed by the Governor as required by the act, jurisdiction had not passed to the United States.11 31. Can jurisdiction vest in the United States before title acquired? Conflicting views.-A statute of the State of Washington consented to the acquisition by the United States through donation by Pierce County of certain lands on which was established Camp Lewis Military Reservation, such donation to be evidenced by deed as therein provided. After giving such consent in terms of the Federal Constitution, the statute further authorized the United States to exercise "exclusive jurisdiction in all cases whatsoever over such tracts or parcels of land so conveyed to it, Provided, upon such conveyance being concluded a sufficient description by metes and bounds and an accurate plat or map of each such tract or parcel of land shall be filed in the Auditor's office of Pierce County, together with copies of orders, deeds, patents, or other evidences in writing of the title of the United States." During the First World War a defendant was alleged to have committed the crime of murder within the Reservation. the time of the alleged murder the deed to the land had not been accepted by the United States, but the Secretary of War, pursuant to the emergency powers granted him by the Act of Congress approved July 2, 1917 (40 Stat. 241, U. S. C., Title 50, Section 171), had entered into possession of the lands, erected buildings thereon and occupied it with 50,000 troops. The United States Circuit Court of Appeals, in reversing the action of the District Court in denying the defendant's release, followed the doctrine that all acts in derogation of sovereignty should be strictly construed, and held that "the sovereignty of the State over the tract had not then been yielded up, and was not until the deed, map, etc., were filed in the office of the county auditor of Pierce County * * 12 11 Curry v. State, 12 S. W. (2) 796, 798, 799. 12 Pothier v. Rodman, 291 Fed. 311, 321. At |