persons the commissioners might think proper, and representing the result of such conversation to the ministry, who, provided the colonies would subject themselves, might, after all, or might not at their pleasure, make any alterations in the former instructions to governors, or propose in parliament any amendment of the acts complained of, we apprehended any expectation from the effect of such a power would have been too uncertain and precarious to be relied on by America, had she still continued in her state of dependence.

Ordered that the above be published.

JOHN HANCOCK, President.

Attest, CHAS. THOMPSON, Secretary.

Congress in their manifesto had recommended to each colony, whose government was not already sufficient, to proceed to the institution of such a form, as was necessary to the preservation of internal peace, and suited to the then exigency of their affairs, for the defence of their lives, liberties, and properties, against the hostile invasions and cruel depredations of their enemies. In conformity with this recommendation a convention was assembled at Philadelphia in July, 1776, for the purpose of settling a new form of government for the then State of Pennsylvania. Dr. Franklin was chosen president of this convention. The constitution formed and established at that period for Pennsylvania, was the result of the deliberations of that assembly, and may be considered as a digest of Dr. Franklin's principles of government. The single legislature and the plural executive, appear to have been his favorite tenets.

The virtuous and unfortunate duke de la Rochefoucault, in his eulogium of Dr. Franklin, in 1790, thus remarks on this system of government.

* Mr. John Adams, whose want of liberality to Dr. Franklin continued through life, survived his death, and carried persecution against his grandson; has in a letter published in a Boston paper, betrayed a gross malevolence on the subject of this constitution of Pennsylvania; but experience has proved the misfortune of the change of a constitution which placed so many barriers against abuse, for one which has laid open every temptation to corruption in the inordinate patronage of the executive. Philadelphia Editor.

“Franklin alone, disengaging the political machine from those multiplied movements and admired counterpoises that rendered it so complicated, proposed the reducing it to the simplicity of a single legislative body. This grand idea startled the legislators of Pennsylvania; but the philosopher removed the fears of a considerable number, and at length determined the whole to adopt a principle which the national assembly has made the basis of the French constitution."

The same distinguished person adds in a note on this pas sage, of his printed oration,

"The usual progress of the human mind leads man from the complex to the simple. Observe the works of the first mechanics overloaded with numerous pieces, some of which embarrass, and others diminish their effect. It has been the same with legislators, both speculative and practical; struck with an abuse, they have endeavored to correct it by institu tions that have been productive of still greater abuses. In political economy the unity of the legislative body is the maximum of simplicity. Franklin was the first who dared to put this idea in practice: The respect the Pennsylvanians enter. tained for him induced them to adopt it; but the other states were terrified at it, and even the constitution of Pennsylva nia has since been altered. In Europe this opinion has been more successful. When I had the honor to present to Franklin the translations of the constitutions of America, the minds of the people on this side the Atlantic were scarcely better disposed towards it than those on the other side; and if we except Dr. Price in England, and Turgot and Condorcet in France, no man who applied himself to politics agreed in opinion with the American philosopher. I will venture to assert that I was of the small number of those who were struck with the beauty of the simple plan he traced, and that I saw no reason to change my opinion when the national as sembly, led by the voice of those deep-thinking and eloquent orators, who discussed that important question, established it as a principle of the French constitution, that legislation should be confided to a single body of representatives. It will

not perhaps be deemed unpardonable to have once mentioned myself, at a time when the honor I have of holding a public character makes it my duty to give an account of my sentiments to my fellow-citizens. France will not relapse into a more complex system, but will assuredly acquire the glory of maintaining that which she has established, and give it a degree of perfection which, by rendering a great nation happy, will attract the eyes and applauses of all Europe, and of the whole world."-The prediction has not been verified as to France; but there requires much consideration of other cotemporary causes, not likely to be revealed in the present day, before the true causes of the failure can be properly determined.

During Dr. Franklin's presidency of the convention he drew up the following protest against the equality of voting in congress; but (as he acknowleged at the time) he was dissuaded from endeavoring to carry it through, from prudential considerations, respecting the necessary union at that critical period, of all the states in confederation.

PROTEST.

"We the representatives of the state of Pennsylvania, in full convention met, having duly considered the plan of confederation formed in congress, and submitted to the several states, for their assent or dissent, do hereby declare the dissent of this state to the same for the following reasons, viz.

1st, Because the foundation of every confederation, intended to be lasting, ought to be laid in justice and equity, no unfair advantage being given to, or taken by, any of the contracting parties.

"2d, Because it is, in the nature of things, just and equal, that the respective states of the confederacy should be represented in congress, and have votes there in proportion to their importance, arising from their numbers of people, and the share and degree of strength they afford to the united body. VOL. I.

3 B

And therefore the XVIIth article, which gives one vote to the smallest state and no more to the largest, when the difference between them may be as ten to one, or greater; is unjust, and injurious to the larger states, since all of them are, by other articles, obliged to contribute in proportion to their respective abilities.

3d, Because the practice hitherto in congress, of allowing only one vote to each colony, was originally taken up under a conviction of its impropriety and injustice, was intended to be in some future time corrected, and was then and since submitted to only as a temporary expedient, to be used in ordinary business, until the means of rectifying the same could be obtained: this clearly appears by the resolve of congress, dated September 6, 1774, being the day of its meeting, which resolve is in these words, That in determining questions in this congress, each colony or province shall have one vote, the congress not being possessed of, or at present able to procure proper materials for ascertaining the impor tance of each colony.' That importance has since been supposed to be best found in the numbers of the people; for the congress, not only by their resolution when the issuing of bills was agreed to, but by this present confederation, have judged, that the contribution towards sinking those bills and to the common expense, should be in proportion to such numbers, when they could be taken, which has not yet been done; and though the larger colonies submitted to this temporary inequality of representation, expecting it would much sooner have been rectified; it never was understood that by the resolution above cited, a power was given to the smaller states to fix that inequality upon them for ever, as those small states have now attempted to do, by combining to vote for this 17th article, and thereby to deprive the larger states of their just

This since forms part of the 5th article of the confederation as agreed to by all the states,, except Maryland, on the 9th July, 1778; and finally ratified by the whole union, on the 1st March, 1781, (the state of Mary. land acceding thereto.)

right, acknowleged in the same resolution. Smaller states having given us in advance, this striking instance of the injustice they are capable of, and of the possible effects of their combination, is of itself a sufficient reason for our determining not to put ourselves in their power, by agreeing to this article as it stands connected with those concerning the quotas of each state, since being a majority of states in congress, they may by the same means, at any time, deprive the larger states of any share in the disposition of our strength and wealth, and the management of our common interests.

"But as the smaller colonies may object, that if the larger are allowed a number of votes in proportion to their importance, the smaller will then be equally in danger of being overpowered and governed by them: we, not having the least desire of any influence or power that is unjust, or unequal, or disproportioned to the burthens we are to bear, do hereby offer our consent to the said 17th article as it now stands, provided the quotas to be contributed by the larger provinces shall be reduced to an equality with the smallest, in which case all, by contributing equally, will have a right to equal votes. Not that we mean thereby to avoid granting additional aids, when the exigence of our common interests shall appear to us to make them proper and necessary; but, leaving to the congress, with regard to such additional aids, the right of making requisitions as enjoyed by our late kings, we would reserve to ourselves the right of judging of the propriety of these requisitions, or of refusing or complying with them in part, or in the whole, as to us shall seem best, and of modifying our grants with such conditions as we shall judge necessary, in like manner as our assemblies might formerly do with regard to requisitions from the crown: for it appears to us just and reasonable, that we should retain the disposition of what strength we have, above the equal proportion contributed, as aforesaid, by our state to the common service, with every power necessary to apply the same, as occasions may arise, for our particular security; this we mean to do from this time forward, unless we are allowed