terms. Sometimes, as in the view of Hooker, Grotius and Hobbes, it is denied that there is any right, either moral or legal, to resist government. Professor Pollock, who combines to an unusual degree the practical training of a lawyer with the imagination of a philosopher, tells us that: The vast majority of men adhere to their established institutions, not because they admire them, not even because of any positive prejudice in their favor, but because they dread the unknown. They cling to any tolerable certainty for certainty and custom's sake, and when they break loose from their accustomed order it is a vehement presumption that their present state is not only imperfect but intolerable.1 Yet, whatever may be the theory upon which revolution is justified, it is apparent that for much the greater portion of recorded history the only practical method of changing an unsatisfactory government was by revolution. But revolutions are costly. They disturb the stream of human experience. They may rid us of some past and contemporary evils but they rarely carry over into the new era adequate machinery by which a recurrence of the same evils in the new situation may be avoided. There grew up in the 17th and 18th centuries in England, and there has been carried from England to almost every civilized government in the world, a procedure through which party government becomes in large measure a substitute for revolution. In its fundamental aspect it is based upon a very simple principle. A and B and C do not like the way that X and Y and Z are conducting the government. Instead of killing X and Y and Z, they criticize them. X and Y and Z defend themselves so long as they can, and finally say to their critics: "Well, you try it then." Now, X and Y and Z may desire very much to stay in office to advance the interests of the State. Moreover, there may be very many advantages that accrue to the particular persons who carry on a government. In primitive governments these advantages may be largely material. In advanced governments they may be largely intangible the desire for distinction or glory or applause. Quite naturally, X and Y and Z are reluctant to hand over the administration of the government to others unless the difficulties of their position outweigh the advantages. Therefore, A and B and C make the position of X and Y and Z as uncomfortable as they can "It is the business of an opposition to oppose " was the principle upon which Lord Randolph Churchill acted. The criticism of the opposition may be truthful or untruthful; the opposition may be fair or unfair. But the vital point to note is that it terminates in recourse to an electorate rather than in an appeal to the sword. The historical development which has brought about this improvement in political conduct is interwoven with the development of parliamentary and representative government. There must be an electorate of some kind before there can be party government. 1 History of the Science of Politics, p. 95. 2 Professor Macy considers the breakdown of the political parties of the United States in the period immediately preceding our Civil War as one of the factors leading to the great tragedy. The destruction of the parties left "no recourse in the settlement of difficulties but brute force." (Political Parties in the United States, 1846-1861, p. 73.) For many centuries prior to the 17th the English parliament had shared with the king in the government of the nation. In fact, as both Freeman and Marriott have pointed out, in the early part of the 15th century the parliament for a time won the controlling position, the king was subordinated to parliament, the king's council was actually nominated by parliament. The system collapsed because, in the words of Bishop Stubbs: "constitutional progress had outrun administrative order." 2 Anarchy accompanied the effort of an unorganized deliberative assembly to rule a growing nation. After the disastrous War of the Barons, the English people were quite willing to let the strong Tudor family carry them along the pathway to the modern national state. But subsequent history was to show that the experiments of the 14th and 15th centuries were not total failures. They were only premature. 1 The actual phrase cannot be accurately attributed to Churchill. He did, however, say that if an Opposition is compelled to support the Government "the support should be given with a kick and not with a caress and should be withdrawn on the first available moment." (Winston S. Churchill, Lord Randolph Churchill, Vol. I, p. 233.) 2 Cited by J. A. R. Marriott, English Political Institutions, p. 51. 3 H. A. L. Fisher, Political History of England, 1485-1547; A. D. Innes, England under the Tudors. With the coming of the 17th century the situation had materially changed. Under the leadership of the Tudors, the English people had become a powerful modern state. There was no longer the imperative necessity of a strong sovereign to prevent disintegration. Moreover, the new forces, which came in with the advent of the middle class and the intellectual awakening that followed the printing press, had made of the parliament quite a different thing from the parliament of two hundred years before. The struggle between Richard II and parliament was mainly a struggle between king and barons, but the struggle of the Stuarts with their parliament was chiefly a struggle between king and commons. The new merchant classes were stirring. They may have been impelled by their selfish interests or by their constitutional and ecclesiastical principles. At all events they were quite willing to support by their contributions the itinerant nonconformist preachers who were making such heavy inroads upon the church of England. The whole 17th century is marked by the flood of pamphlets which came out in attack upon, and in support of, political and religious claims. Bagehot's "age of discussion" had arrived. But nationality and debates could not at once secure the recognition of party principles and practices. John Eliot tried to organize a parliamentary opposition, and he was treated by James I as an outlaw. And, from the point of view of the king, he was an outlaw. He was against the king, and in the past the simple way of dealing with a man opposed to the king was to kill him, just as, if he were successful, he would kill the king and take his place. When the twelve members of the House of Commons called on James I at Newmarket in 1621 the stubborn Scotch king said ironically: "Chairs! Chairs! here be twal' Kynges comin'! "1 Looking at Pym and the other eleven, not as individuals, but in their capacity as representatives of parliament, James was not far wrong. When we get down to the stormy days of 1640 and Pym rises higher in power, the pamphleteers refer to him over and over again as King Pym. "Is there no king but Pym for to assent what shall be done by act of parliament? "2 When the five members were driven from the House by King Charles and his soldiers in January, 1641, and came back a few days later in triumph from the City of London, Sir Edward Dering could write to his wife: "If I could be Pym with honesty I had rather be Pym than King Charles." 3 Of course, all this is more than a personal tribute to Pym. In the large sense it is testimony to the new power in parliament of which Pym was the leader. When his opponents call him King Pym they are really accusing him of trying to get control of the government. And whether or not Pym fully realized it, that is what he was trying to do. 1 See the earliest extant letter of Oliver Cromwell, written to Mr. Storie, of London, January 11, 1635. (Carlyle, Cromwell's Letters and Speeches, Vol. I, Letter I.) The record of the Stuarts with their parliaments is a sorry one. The king proceeds from blunder to blunder, and the parliament advances from claim to claim. As Professor Pollard puts it: The policy of the parliament was "offensive strategy and defensive tactics." 4 They steadily moved their lines forward and waited in the advanced position for the king to attack them. Over and over again the Stuarts tell the parliament not to meddle in the mysteries of government that such matters as the Spanish marriage and the foreign wars are beyond the competence of parliament. Such statements might have been made with some truth two hundred years before, but the times had changed. An incompetent court was now talking to a competent parliament. There is something tragic in the sorrowful statement of Clarendon, the one extremely able man who followed Charles I: "One side seemed to fight for monarchy with the weapons of confusion, 1 J. Forster, John Pym, in Statesmen of the Commonwealth, Vol. II, p. 20. 2 J. Forster, Arrest of Five Members, p. 43. 3 Ibid., p. 372. 4 History of England, p. 138. and the other to destroy the King and Government with all the principles and regularity of monarchy."1 A new thing had happened. Parliament had been for a generation the centre of the opposition to king and church. When the king left his capital, the nation, therefore, looked to parliament for orders. Parliament had become the executive. Parliament had become king, and for a few years it might be fairly said that the leadership of the government rested with the man who could best control by argument and organizing capacity the action of the deliberative assembly. The cause of parliamentary government, of course, did not move forward uninterruptedly. Pym died, and no one was found to take his place. Then, with the great military success of Cromwell and the growing inefficiency of parliament, the governmental authority shifted to the military forces. Cromwell, at first indirectly and then openly, became the government. But Cromwell found the organization of a new type of government a much more difficult task than the destruction of the old form. The brilliant victories at Naseby and Marston Moor might remove an ancient tyranny, but the enduring institutions of a people are not made by cavalry charges. Milton, in his Ode to Cromwell, wrote that: "peace hath her victories no less than those of war." But even the genius and energy of a Cromwell could not completely garner the victories of peace. Thomas Hill Green gives the reason in an arresting sentence. The victories of peace are to be won not in days but in centuries, and by the energy not of feeling but of thought." 2 For several years, a stern Puritan régime was forced upon England at the point of the sword, and then in 1660 Charles II was welcomed back to the throne by all classes. The pleasure-loving king said smilingly that "it had been his own fault that he had been absent so long, for he saw nobody that did not protest he had ever wished for his return. 3 1 History of the Rebellion, Vol. III, p. 231. 2 Works of T. H. Green, Vol. III, p. 354. • Clarendon, History of the Rebellion, Vol. VI, p. 264. |