fused to persecute; he did everything to conciliate; and in the inaugural of 1801 he appropriated and took under his protection and that of his party the useful work that they had done. This policy made a revival of Federalism impossible. Had the Republicans attacked the Constitution or sought to weaken the national government, the Federalists, in defending their own creations, would have had a future. But Jefferson's policy deprived them of the most honorable and useful activity which is open to a party in opposition, and left to them little more than a choice of ways to die. A second result of Jefferson's policy was that it helped to Federalize the Republicans. Desertion from the defeated to the victorious party soon grew into a stampede, and the new element in the Republican camp became quickly and greatly influential. Looked at from the standpoint of party, the destruction of the Federalists and the Federalization of the Republicans are the most striking consequences of the revolution of 1800. From the higher standpoint of the state the most important consequences are these: first, the resumption of that progress toward democracy which had been the marked characteristic of the colonial and revolutionary periods, but had been checked during the conservative aristocratic reaction of the years 1786 to 1800; - а progress on whose resumption and healthful unfolding was to depend what is most distinctive and beneficent in the contribution of America to the civilization of the world; and second, a powerful impulse to the forces which were slowly establishing in our people a national and American character. The trouble in 1786 had been that through breaking our relationship to Great Britain we had come to occupy the position of a nation without possessing either a national organization or a national character. In 1800 the national organization, thanks to the Federalists, had been supplied, but we still lacked a national American character. This, then, was the urgent, the overshadowing want of the new period. The attitude of the mass of the people toward the beneficial changes made by the Federalists had been either reluctant acquiescence or passionate opposition; only in a slight degree had they unlearned the provincialism and the unbalanced democracy that had produced the calamities of 1786; only in a slight degree had they concerned themselves hitherto for national interests or national honor; but now, through their elevation to power, the welfare and the good name of the nation were placed in their keeping, and the new responsibility tended to develop within them those larger political conceptions which, when added to those traits which had distinguished them from the beginning, namely, love of freedom and devotion to self-government, were to make the character of our people national and American; - and these were the greatest and best of the consequences of the party revolution of 1800.

VII

THE POLITICAL INFLUENCE OF
ANDREW JACKSON1

N THE fourth of March, 1837, Andrew Jackson was able to review his completed official career with a

degree of complacency rare, if not unique, in the annals of magistracies. It was an almost unbroken succession of victories that he looked back upon. He had signally triumphed over his political rivals, Clay and Calhoun. He had destroyed the Bank, and broken the rule of the classes and the party which supported it. He had subjected Congress to his will, and extorted from the Senate the "expunging resolution." His course toward nullification had been courageous and consistent, and had increased his power and fame. His conduct of foreign relations had been successful. He had reorganized and disciplined the Democratic party. He had named his successor. Moreover - and it was this that gratified him most he believed that in all his warfare he had fought and won, not for himself, but for the people; and he knew from full and grateful testimony that this was their view, and that they honored him as their faithful and invincible champion. His farewell address testifies, it is true, to a feeling of disquietude on account of the growth of sectionalism. But for this he could not justly hold himself responsible; and his firm trust in the people, now through his agency masters of the state, reassured him.

The estimate of his own work, by one so little capable of impartial judgment as was Jackson, is, of course, not authoritative. Equally fallible are contemporary views of a man, respecting whom all ranged themselves as ardent friends or foes. It is now, however, a half century since Jackson set out from the White House on his return to the Hermitage - a period long enough to reveal, with considerable distinctness, the real scope and nature of his work, and to lessen, if not remove, early prepossessions.

Of the lives of Jackson, Parton's, written during the period just preceding the Civil War, and Professor Sumner's, published in 1882, are the best. We possess also, in Professor von Holst's Constitutional History of the United States, a very able discussion of Jackson's character and political work.

On the extent to which personal feeling became a factor in Jackson's policy and the mischief resulting therefrom; on the usurpations by which a nominally republican administration was transformed into the really despotic "reign" of one man; on Jackson's spirit and methods in the Bank controversy, Sumner and von Holst are in substantial accord. They condemn without reserve. Parton, although lenient in particulars, reaches a similar verdict. Jackson's course toward nullification receives praise. Sumner, however, qualifies his approval as follows:

"Nullification involved directly the power and prestige of the federal government, and he would certainly be a most exceptional person who, being President of the United States, would allow the government of which he was the head to be defied and insulted."1 And later, commenting on the proclamation to the people of South Carolina:

"He lives in popular memory and tradition chiefly as the man who put down this treason, but the historian must remember that, if Jackson had done his duty to Georgia and the Indians, nullification would never have attained any strength." 2 Parton holds the widely prevalent opinion that Jackson is responsible for the "spoils system" in national politics. Sumner dissents. "It is a crude and incorrect notion," he 1 Sumner, Jackson, 219. 2 Sumner, Jackson, 283. 3 Parton, Jackson, III, 692.

says, "that Andrew Jackson corrupted the civil service. His administration is only the date at which a corrupt use of the spoils of the public service as a cement for party organization under the democratic-republican self-government, having been perfected into a highly finished system in New York and Pennsylvania, was first employed in the federal arena."1 Von Holst's views are similar. He thinks that Jackson, by vigorous resistance, could have put off the evil day.

"But, by this means, only a short delay would have been gained. To prevent the evil, it was necessary to avert its causes, and to do this there was need of something more than a powerful will; a single person could assuredly not do it." 2 We have been looking at single features and measures. What of the administration as a whole? Parton's view is as follows:

"I must avow explicitly the belief that, notwithstanding the good done by General Jackson during his Presidency, his elevation to power was a mistake on the part of the people of the United States. The good which he effected has not continued, while the evil which he began remains." Sumner, in commenting on "Jackson's modes of action in his second term," says:

"We must say of Jackson that he stumbled along through a magnificent career, now and then taking up a chance without really appreciating it; leaving behind him disturbed and discordant elements of good and ill just fit to produce turmoil and disaster in the future." Later he adds:

"Representative institutions are degraded on the Jacksonian theory just as they are on the divine-right theory, or on the theory of the democratic empire. There is not a worse perversion of the American system of government conceivable than to regard the President as the tribune of the people.” 5 The view of von Holst may be inferred from the following passages: