tage whatever from his father's rank. He however became a chief at an early age, for his extraordinary talents attracted the notice of his countrymen even in boyhood.

His first eminent services were those of a warrior in the ranks of his tribe. It is well known that long after the conclusion of the peace of 1783, the British retained possession of several posts within our ceded limits on the north, which were rallying-points for the Indians hostile to the American cause, and where they were supplied and subsisted to a considerable extent, while they continued to wage that war with us which their civilized ally no longer maintained. Our Government made strenuous exertions to pacify all these tribes. With some they succeeded, and among others with the powerful Creeks, headed at this time by the famous half-breed Mc'GILLIVRAY. But the savages of the Wabash and the Miami would consent to no terms. They were not only encouraged by foreign assistance-whether national, or simply individual, we need not in this connection discuss-but they were strong in domestic combination. The Wyandots, the Potawatamies, the Delawares, the Shawanees, the Chippewas, the Ottawas, not to mention parts of some other tribes, all acted together: and last, but by no means least, the Miamies, resident where Fort Wayne has been since erected, inspired the whole confederacy with the ardor which they themselves had but to imitate in their own fearless chieftains.

These were generally the same parties who had thirty years before been united against the whites under Pontiac; and the causes of their irritation were now mainly the same as they had been then, while both the cordiality and facility of cooperation were increased by confidence and experience derived even from former failures. These causes have been already sufficiently experienced. They arose chiefly from the frontier advances of the white population on the In dian lands always and almost necessarily atten ded with provocations never discovered, and of con

sequence never atoned for, by the proper authorities. National claims were also brought forward, which, so far as founded on the representations of persons interested, were likely enough to be abuses. In fact, here was an exact precedent for the combination of Tippecanoe. The Turtle was politically the first follower of Pontiac, and the latest model of Tecumseh.

The Turtle, we say, but the zealous assistance he received from other chieftains of various tribes, ought not to be overlooked. Buckongahelas commanded the Delawares. BLUE-JACKET was at this time the leading man of the Shawanees a warrior of high reputation, though unfortunately but few particulars of his history have been recorded. The Mississagas, a Canadian tribe on the river Credit, some remnant of which still exists, contributed not a little to the power of the confederacy in the talents of a brave chief, whose very name is not preserved, though his movements among the more northern Indians were felt on the banks of the St. Lawrence, as far down as Montreal itself.*

On the 13th of September, 1791,-all attempts to conciliate the hostile tribes who were now ravaging the frontiers, having been abandoned,-General Harmer, under the direction of the Federal government, marched against them from Fort Washington (the present site of Cincinnati) with three hundred and twenty regulars, who were soon after joined by a body of militia, making the whole force about fifteen hundred men. Colonel Hardin, at the head of six hundred Kentucky troops, was detached in advance to reconnoitre. As he approached the enemy's villages, they fled. The villages were destroyed, and a light force again detached in the pursuit. These men were met by a small Indian party, led on by the Turtle,

*A respectable Montreal publication, of 1791, notices one of this person's visits to the tribes in the vicinity of that town;-describing him as "forty-five years old, six "et in height, of a sour and morose aspect, and appa-ntly very crafty and subtle '

who attacked thein furiously, and fought them with such effect, that of thirty regulars twenty-three were killed, while all the militia of the detachment sought safety in flight.

Notwithstanding this check, the enemy's only remaining town in the section of the country near the battle-ground was laid waste, and their provisions destroyed. General Harmer then returned to Fort Washington, unpursued, but disgraced and deeply chagrined. Under these circumstances he resolved to hazard another action. He halted eight miles from Chilicothe, and late at night detached Colonel Hardin with orders to find the Indians, and fight them. Hardin succeeded in his search about daylight. The savages fought with desperation, for they were maddened by the sight of their flaming villages and their uncov ered dead, and the war-cry of the Turtle again urged them to the onset. Some of the Americans fled, but a greater number, including fifty regulars and one hundred militia, with several officers of note, fell upon the field of battle, bravely discharging a fruitless and fatal duty. General Harmer claimed the victory,with how much propriety may appear from these facts. The Turtle however suffered so severely in the engagement, that he permitted him to march home unmolested.

Harmer's disasters were followed by the most deplorable consequences, for the savages renewed their devastations to such a degree that the situation of the frontiers became truly alarming. Congress directed the organization of a strong military force, and meanwhile two volunteer expeditions from Kentucky, under Generals Wilkinson and Scott, were fitted out against the enemy. Considerable damage was done to them on the Miami and Wabash, though without much loss of life on either side.

The campaign of the Federal troops,-mustering about two thousand, besides garrisons in two or three newly erected forts, commenced late in the summer of 1791. Desertion reduced the number to fourteen

hundred, before the commander, General St. Clair, had advanced far into the hostile territory. Continuing his march, however, on the third of November he encamped on a piece of commanding ground, within fifteen miles of the Miami villages. An interval of only seventy paces was left between the two wings of his army. The right was in some degree protected by a creek, and a steep bank; the left, by cavalry and picquets. The militia, about three hundred fresh Kentuckian recruits, were permitted to cross the creek, and draw up in two lines on the first rising ground beyond it, at the distance of a quarter of a mile from the main body, from which they were separated also by a rich sugar-tree 'bottom.'

The enemy had apparently articipated a movement of this kind. The chieftains had collected a force of from one thousand to fifteen hundred men, upon the Miami territories; and for several days previous to the halt, numbers of them had been hovering round and evidently watching the movements of the troops. During the night of the 3d, shots were occasionally exchanged between them and the American sentries, and small parties were sent out in different directions to prevent their too near approach.

so on.

Meanwhile the Indians were holding a grand council of war. The plan of attack was agreed upon, and the order and rank of the various tribes settled with a precision as punctilious as that of the ancient Greeks. The Wyandots stretched to the west; the Delawares were stationed next to them; the Senecas third, and The Turtle, acting as commander-in-chief, superintended and stimulated the whole, but headed no particular detachment; the arm of the warrior was to do much, but the eye and voice of the chieftain, much more. Nothing happened during the night to alarm the Americans, and indeed the noise and stir of the outskirts in the early part of the evening gradually subsided. All at length was silent, and it might well be supposed, as it probably was, that the enemy had taken advantage of the darkness of the night to

make good a precipitate retreat, or that their whole force as yet consisted only of a few scouting and scalping parties. But the mistake was of short duration. The milita were violently attacked between dawn and sunrise of the fourth, by a powerful body of the Indians, who, with a terrific yell, poured in a volume of musketry along the entire length of the two lines. Never was surprise more complete. The ranks of the militia were thrown into confusion at once; and although the battle was hotly contested for three hours at least, no efforts of the officers, or of the regular troops of the main body, proved sufficient to recover the lost ground. The former, indeed, were picked off by the enemy's sharp-shooters so rapidly, that very little could be expected from the aggregate of their exertions.

Besides, the savages generally fought under shelter of the woods. "The Indians were very numerous," we are informed by one who was present, "but we found it out more from their incessant heavy fire, than from what we could otherwise discover of them. They fought under cover, though they would frequently advance very close under the smoke of the cannon; and as soon as it began to clear away, the fire became very fatal."* Emboldened, however, by success, they sometimes charged the Americans tomahawk in hand, drove them back on their lines, kept possession of their tents for some minutes, and though repulsed, continually returned to the contest with redoubled fury.

The Americans were at length compelled to retreat; and this retreat,-as St. Clair himself confessed, in his despatches, "was a precipitate one, in fact a flight." The camp and artillery were abandoned. Most of the militia threw away their arms and accoutrements. All were closely pursued by the savages from halfpast nine, when the route commenced, until after sunset, when they gained Fort Jefferson, at a distance of

*New-York and other news-papers of December, 1791