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vision of the subject in the limited space at his disposal. The index is especially worthy of note because of its thorough and careful analysis of the subjects treated.

B. E. C.

Law of Bailments Including Carriers. Students' Edition. By James Schouler, LL. D. Little, Brown & Co., Boston, 1905. Buckram, pages 403.

It

Professor Schouler, after having taught the subject of Bailments in a law school, and having written formerly a very thorough and comprehensive work on the subject, it would seem, is most thoroughly qualified to present the above treatise. This fact alone should guarantee the success of the book, covers the entire subject of bailments, especially emphasizing the topics of pledge and carriers, and touching upon inter-state carriers and the legislation relative to them. The work is more or less elementary, being an abridgment of a former larger work of the author and for this reason will be found of greater benefit to law students than to practicing lawyers. It is analytical, with full notes, and the citations, while not superabundant, are apt and brought down to date.

The book is of such merit and the author so well known that no words of commendation are necessary to introduce it to the profession or the wide circle of students using his works. M. S. W. Howe's Studies in the Civil Law. Second Edition. By William Wirt Howe, L L. D. Little, Brown & Co., Boston. Law Buckram, pages 391.

This book occupies a distinct position among legal textbooks. It could not be used, we believe, to advantage in the class-room work of a student, both because of the large ground covered in small space and to the unconfined though most interesting treatment recorded to individual topics. On the other hand, one who cannot enjoy profoundly reading these chapters has no right to consider law his profession-it can be no more than his business. The careful nicety in the author's use of the English language, a quality which many legal writers of to-day unhappily regard with apparently profound indifference, and the clearness of his style add much to the presentation of the "Studies." To one who has any inclination whatever toward legal literature, both the subject matter and the composition of this book will greatly appeal. The second edition, prepared with the application of the civil law in our new possessions in the foreground of the writer's mind, has something more than a mere scholarly virtue (though that virtue appears continuously), it is worth, for practical purposes, the study of the geaat number of lawyers who intend, or at least hope, sooner or later, to become engaged in the modified, or rather altered, civil law courts in Porto Rico and the Phillipines.

G. S. A.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.

POMEROY'S EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE. The Bancroft-Whitney Co., San Francisco. Review will follow.

PAGE ON CONTRACTS. The W. H. Anderson Co., Cincinnati. Review will follow.

THE AMERICAN JUDICIARY. The Century Co., New York. Review will follow.

EWELL ON FIXTURES. Callahan & Co., Chicago. Review will follow.

PROBATE REPORTS ANNOTATED. Volume IX. Baker, Voorhis & Co. Review will follow.

ROMAN WATER LAW. West Publishing Co., St. Paul, Minn. Review will follow.

LAWSON ON CONTRACTS. The F. H, Thomas Co., St. Louis. Review will follow.

COURTS AND PROCEDURE. England and New Jersey. Soney & Sage, Newark, N. J.

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One of the most interesting and at the same time one of the most perplexing questions which the admiralty lawyer has to answer is in relation to State Statutes giving and attempting to give actions against vessels.

In many of the states bordering upon navigable waters statutes have been enacted providing for liens for the building, repairing and supplying of vessels. The statutes have generally been enacted without any regard for the exclusive jurisdiction of admiralty in certain cases growing out of actions against vessels, without any distinction being made between domestic and foreign vessels or without any thought but that state courts might enforce actions in rem against vessels in all instances. The confusion and litigation which have resulted from such statutes have in many instances made "confusion worse confounded" to those who are not familiar with maritime law. This confusion from these misleading statutes is not confined to laymen having dealings with vessels, but it is very troublesome to a state court practitioner when called upon to give any advice to a client in regard to these matters.

Since The Lottawanna, (2 Wall. 558), it has been a recognized province of the states to provide for a lien against a domestic vessel for supplies and repairs and provide for its enforcement in the admiralty courts, but to provide for liens against a foreign vessel or against all vessels is in direct conflict with the admiralty jurisdiction; for admiralty gives action in rem against a foreign vessel.

This question was only recently before the Supreme Court of the United States where the State of Washington attempted by statutes to create liens on ocean-going vessels for work done and

materials furnished on the order of a contractor and provided that a lien could be enforced any time within three years and also for the enforcement of this lien in admiralty. The Supreme Court held the act unconstitutional as an unlawful interference with the exclusive jurisdiction of the admiralty courts. In this case the vessel was owned in Illinois and was subject to a lien under the general maritime law which could have been enforced at any time and these statutes attempted to make the lien good for three years, while the general rule of admiralty recognizes no time for which a lien shall be good, but does require one to pursue his claim with reasonable diligence, and the reason for this must be obvious, for a vessel trading in different ports, supply and material men have a right to suppose she is worthy of credit and not subject to any state liens.

The Court in commenting on the question whether materials and labor furnished to a contractor constitute a lien upon a vessel said the following: "There is a general consensus of opinion in the state courts and in the inferior federal courts that labor and materials furnished to a contractor do not constitute a lien upon the vessel unless at least notice be given by the owner of such claim before the contractor has received the sum stipulated by his contract." (The Roanoke, 189 U. S. 185, 47 L. Ed. 770.)

It will be interesting to observe that these statutes also provide for the construction of a vessel and provide for an enforcement of the lien in admiralty. While this question was not before the Court, until People's Ferry Company v. Beers, (20 How. 393. 15 L. Ed. 961,) is overruled, which decides flatly that contracts for the construction of a vessel are not maritime, it must be apparent that these statutes, so far as they apply to the construction of a vessel, and enforcement of a lien for such construction in the admiralty, are void.

It has long been the contention of some of the text writers, notably Mr. Benedict and Mr. Hughes, (Benedict on Admiralty, Sec. 265 A.; Hughes on Admiralty, p. 106), that there is no sound reason why a contract for building a vessel is not just as much maritime as a contract for repairing her. The contract for repairing a vessel has nothing to do with any particular voyage, which was one of the main contentions in the case of People's Ferry Company v. Beers, supra. It would seem that the only thing that can be said in support of the theory that the construction of a vessel is not maritime is, that it has never been in the water and is not licensed and registered.

The decision was rendered when the tendency of the Supreme Court was to curtail the admiralty jurisdiction, while at the present time the tendency seems to be in the opposite direction, and one might reason that in view of The Blackheath, (195 U. S. 361, 49 L. Ed. 236,) which has upset the practice of this country for more than forty years, that admiralty had no jurisdiction of an action that was consummated upon land, holding that in the case of a beacon light affixed to piles driven into the bottom of a river and being damaged by a vessel, an action for such damages was cognizable in admiralty. Mr. Justice Brown, in concurring in this opinion, said: "I accept this case as practically overruling the former ones, and as recognizing the principles adopted by the English admiralty court jurisdiction act of 1861 (sec. 7), extending the jurisdiction of the admiralty court to 'any claim for damages by any ship.' This has been held in many cases to include damage done to a structure affixed to the land. The distinction between the damage done to fixed and floating structures is a somewhat artificial one, and, in my view, founded upon no sound principle; and the fact that Congress, under the Constitution cannot extend our admiralty jurisdiction affords an argument for a broad interpretation commensurate with the needs of modern commerce. To attempt to draw the line of jurisdiction between different kinds of fixed structures as, for instance, between beacons and wharves, would lead to great confusion and much further litigation."

It might be reasonably argued from this that should a case now be brought before the Court for the construction of a vessel, admiralty might take jurisdiction of it.

Another interesting case is that of Perry v. Haines, (191, U. S. 18, 46 L. Ed. 73,) which was a case for repairs to a canal boat while she was engaged in navigating the Erie canal. In this case it was attempted to enforce a lien under a state statute in the state courts of New York. This statute provided that upon the written application to a justice of the Supreme Court of New York, a warrant would issue for the seizure of a vessel and an order to show cause why she should not be sold to satisfy the lien-the contention being in this case that the Erie canal was not within the admiralty jurisdiction but an inland canal of the state and therefore the state courts had exclusive jurisdiction. The Court held that the Erie canal was part of the great water ways of the country and it would be anomalous to say that a vessel was subject to the admiralty jurisdiction when in the Hudson river

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